The Principle of Justice and Basic Liberty

As Chandran and Pettit (1990) puts it in “A Theory of Justice and its Critics”, paying the price for addressing issues of climate change is a justice related question. Justice’ most important principle is that every individual to be subjected to equality in terms of basic liberty. However, the practical aspect of this principle as put by the two writers is that individuals with rights likely to be categorized as poor or vulnerable should not be given the task of bearing such climate change costs (Daniels, 1989).

According to the reprinted journal of Robert and Adams (2013) “A New Divine Command Theory”, burdens and benefits should be fairly balanced as justice demands. If anyone can afford the cost and burden himself or herself with the task of mitigating such climate change is at liberty of doing so. The outcome of such involvement is to ensure that they – who take the burden upon themselves, and others who do not take the cost, enjoy the fruits of a climate that is healthy. On the contrary, there are many objections to this approach one of which claims that it is an unfair approach. It becomes unfair because it relies on those who are wealthy to volunteer and take responsibility for emissions of others (MacKinnon, 2004). Contrary to such objections, it is my sincere belief that climate justice is a human rights thing, as well as a collective responsibility towards soliciting solutions for climate change and not entirely entangled with personal ethics or so.

Enforceability is yet another justice issue with a lot of significance (Daniels, 1989). This argument will agree to the fact that “…the ‘ability to assist’ as an approach…is enforceable” concerning climate change. Enforceability is achievable since those who are wealthy could easily take action. Otherwise, there are approaches that deduce means of determining those who should be responsible for climate change. According to the theory of a “New Divine Command”,

“…If we conceive of the good life for human beings as consisting in activities and character qualities that fulfill us, then the good life will depend upon our nature, as human beings. Given human nature, some activities and character traits will fulfill us, and some will not…” (Adams, 1979, pg. 221).  

 Otherwise, this activity defends the same notion of human nature to approve the fact that “justice will depend on morality and one’s ability to afford to fix climatic change problems”. Otherwise, the approach that is “most just” in tackling climate change is that which strives to ensure that individuals with risked rights are protected (MacKinnon, 2004).

Another approach known as the “ability to pay” is significant in this argument because it meets the most important requirement of justice. In line with climate change, this approach argues that every individual is entitled to equal right when it comes to basic liberty. And; or such liberty would be restricted for liberty itself, not for anything else, not even gain in welfare. However, change in climate is a threat to such liberty. While basic human rights in the forms of life, subsistence, health, and other rights for the poor are jeopardized in the end. According to the IPPC reports, change in climate is likely to cause an increase in diarrheal diseases in regions that have low-income by around 2% to 6% come 2020. In this context, justice is about creating partnerships and being open to help those who are affected by climatic change then not being able to deal with such impacts adequately. Apart from that, this approach is the only approach to climate justice that is open to helping individuals adversely affected by change of climate (Moss, 2009). It does so by prioritizing to help those that are burdened a not those that are responsible for such changes. On the contrary, there are particular objections to this approach. The most outright objection is that the “ability to pay” approach is unfair since it depends on those who are advantaged to have to pay for problems they necessarily did not create. The objection however, is based on an assumption that is unlikely to destabilize the approach in whatever way. Actually, dealing with the issue of climate change will require some people to bear costs of what would appear not to be their fault entirely. As Gauthier (1987) puts it, the only available options when it comes to fixing issues are three in number. The first is to have the advantaged pay, or the poor to pay for the same, or otherwise no one pays. Otherwise, arguments that it would be unfair to press the rich to pay for climate change is mutable since the other two ways – asking the poor to pay, or not paying at all but taxing individuals to pay, to an extent, violates the rule of fairness. What should be considered in actual sense when going for approaches of climate change is to ensure that the rights of humans are not whatsoever violated. In as much as personal ethics plays a major role in this argument, finding a solution that is collective is the ultimate goal herein. From a personal account, the fairest impression of climate justice is one in which individuals who are will, and are able to pay to do the same since such is the only option that does not compromise one’s right to basic liberty (Gauthier, 1987).

The New Divine Command Theory and Fair Burdens Distribution

This critical review activity also justifies the claim to have “those who are capable to pay” as a proper approach towards curbing climatic change. Such is because this approach promotes fairness in terms of distributing burdens and benefits of climate change. According to Moss (2009), it would interest every global citizen if individuals in poor regions emitted less. Effects of such emissions include reduction of food production, extreme weather conditions, as well as housing insecurity. Therefore, the fight for a healthy climate is important in alleviating such circumstances (Robert and Adams, 1979, pg. 68). However, the problem with achieving a healthy climate is that individuals from third-world countries are not able to pay the price of what they emit. In such a case, adopting the “ability to pay” argument would burden those that are advantaged to a given level though everyone will enjoy the benefits. In the process, a fair balance of burdens and benefits is created (Michael and Austin, 2016). Otherwise, the objection raised on the matter that “taxing the wealthy is unfair” would count for nothing in a socio-justice viewpoint. The truth is that asking the already burdened to burden themselves even more, is one way to undermine their basic human rights. On the contrary, giving such a duty to the advantaged will benefit them and in the end, won’t undermine their basic human rights (Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2004).

Finally yet importantly, adopting the approach that advocates for “having the wealthy pay to fix climate change issues without considering who caused such problems” would be a “just” argument in this case since it is “enforceable”. Critically, justice has to be enforced no matter the circumstance (MacKinnon, 2004). The enforceability of beneficial and responsible of climate justice accounts, while considering the present difficulties in relation to the same, are not conceivable. For instance, the “responsibility” or “polluter pays” argument regarding climate change has two major drawbacks making it unlikely enforceable. One, it claims that pollution or emissions generated before a given date are likely to be considered “innocent” and thus, aren’t accountable for compensation claims. The argument further elaborates that it would be so since individuals may not have been aware of the caused harm before such stipulated dates. Second, past generations are faulted for most of the emissions (Barry, 1997). This argument could however describe the second account, as the “weak link” since holding a given generation of individuals for a particular problem of which they could possibly have no control over is “morally-implausible”. This “responsibility” argument as an account of climate justice advocates for individuals who have contributed most towards climate change to pay more to fix such issues. Having considered “responsibility” argument’s account it would be difficult to enforce it. Before enforcing such an argument, its doctrines need fixing first. Better still, the “ability to pay” theory still deals with historic emissions better. Historic emissions have harmful impacts to the current generation therefore, implying the need for quick, appropriate interventions using the most appropriate theory or argument (Miller, 2005, pg. 61).

To summarize this elusive critic, any justice system’s fundamental purpose should not be to punish the wrong doers, but to have the innocent spared. In as much as punishment for the guilty is necessary at times, it is but a process of making sure that the innocent are no more victims of injustices. In this critic, therefore, support is given to the argument that claims “individuals who are able to bear the costs of climate change to take the burden without considering who caused such problems”. Such is because the rights of poor individuals are at stake concerning the climatic change effects. Otherwise, it is the moral obligation of those who are capable (while considering justice requirements) to help such poor individuals (Pogge, 2002).  

References

Barry, B. (1997) ‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective’ in Goodin and Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chandran, K. and Pettit, P. (1990). Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), especially chapters: 2, 3 & 4.

Craig, W., L. and Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2004) A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist. New York: Oxford University Press.

Daniels, N. (1989) Reading Rawls: critical studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Lyons.

Gauthier, D. (1987). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

MacKinnon, B. (2004) ‘Egoism’, in Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. Belmont, Calif.: Thomson/Wadsworth, Chapter 3.

Michael, W. and Austin (2016) ‘Divine Command Theory’. [Online] Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c/ [Accessed on 6 November 2018]

Miller, D. (2005) ‘Against Global Egalitarianism’, Journal of Ethics, 1(9), pp. 55-79.

Moss, J. (June 16, 2009) Climate Change and Social Justice. Social Justice Series, e264

Pogge, T. (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge: Polity, Ch. 4.

Robert E. and Goodin. (1991). ‘Utility and the good’ in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 241-248.

Robert M. and Adams (1979) “A New Divine Command Theory,” Journal of Religious Ethics 1(7), 66–79.

Robert, M. and Adams (2013). “A New Divine Command Theory”. Journal of Religious Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), London: Wiley- Blackwell, pp. 220-224.