General Law on Fixtures

This letter is in response to the queries raised by you. As you are purchasing a freehold detached house and believed that some of the items were part of the sale, the general law on fixtures will be relevant, that is whatever  is attached to the land belongs to the land which was clearly outlined in Holland v Hodgson (1872). This will be beneficial to your case if indeed, there were no agreements made, where it is specified what is excluded and what is exactly in the sale.

 The law of Property Act 1925 states that “‘Land’ includes land of any tenure, mines, and minerals, whether or not held apart from the surface, buildings or parts of buildings (whether the division is horizontal, vertical or made in any other way) and other corporeal hereditaments”.  The context of this law implies that corporeal hereditaments define the availability of any tangible elements that are part of a material object that is closely related to the property.

The case study can properly be evaluated in a court of law through the application of both tests relating to degree of annexation and purpose of annexation. These tests attempt to explain the intention of an object that is part of larger land property. It is important to develop a degree of annexation because it provides the basis to understand whether a fixture is truly attached to land or a building so that Mrs. Day can claim ownership. Basically, the compactness or strength with which an object is attached to a building or the earth surface, increases its classification as a fixture. In Holland V. Hodgson case [1872], the degree of annexation is clearly elaborated concerning the classification of fixtures. Applying these tests, the Yorkshire terrace was properly constructed and cast into a stone wall with the intention of serving the purpose of the house and become an integral part of the structure. Elitestone V. Morris [1997] is a case example where the degree of annexation was applied to a property suite. In the ruling of this case, an object was classified as a fixture and it not being firmly attached to the land did not prevent it from being a part of the land. Similarly, in the context of this case scenario, even if the Yorkshire terrace is built at the rear of the house, it is a fixture because of it’s purpose on the land. Therefore, replacement of the terrace has directly caused damage on the land

The Law of Property Act 1925

Another example in which the degree of annexation was applied in case was in Berkley V. Paulett. This is important for the study because it provides the ground to determine how affixed the Yorkstone terrace was in the case scenario. In analysing the case, the process of replacing the York Stone terrace involved digging so that concrete could be used to replace it. As such, applying the degree of annexation is clearly firm in this case. Here, the concrete was firmly attached to the terrace, and this clearly demonstrated that it is a fixture. Therefore, the York Stone was a fixture that Mrs. Day is entitled to it in the purchase of the property. Also, the terrace was removed without the consent of Mrs. Day, and this creates a room for her to claim its replacement based on the law of Property Act 1925. Here, it is a law that after buying the land, all ownership of fixtures is transferrable to the buyer. Mrs. Day is also protected by a policy that once a sale agreement is finalised the initial owner has no legal right to remove or replace any items affixed to the property unless evidence of a mutual agreement is provided between the seller and the buyer.

The purpose of annexation provides an exact basis through which an object was placed in a certain place. Considering the exactness of an object to the property provides an understanding of the role and purpose of that fixture. For example, some objects are securely placed in a property to serve certain purposes. In addition, the object can also be movable but is an important aspect or part of the intended architectural design completely qualifies to be classified as a fixture. In the case of Leigh V. Taylor [1902], the court ruled that chattels only serve the purpose of providing fun. Based on this case, it is important that underlying statues be evaluated as fixtures. Applying a subjective test, it is obvious that the statues enhanced the land and properly fit to be classified as fixtures. Similarly, this is similar to another case in D’Eyncourt V. Gregory (1866) where it was ruled that statues are a component of the land because of their role in achieving a desired architectural design and could not be removed. In the case scenario, it was not in order for the statues to be removed because their removal or otherwise destroyed the initial architectural design. Mrs. Day should subsequently disclose that her willingness to purchase the property was also informed by the presence of statues that she understood to be part of the property.

Tests relating to degree of annexation and purpose of annexation

This object can properly be evaluated by applying the purpose of annexation to determine the main role of fitted shelves.  Here, the main factor that forced placement of an object in a certain place explains its purpose for being placed in that place within the property. The case of Botham V. TSB Bank plc [1996] provides a ruling that classified all kitchen units as fixtures.  The argument of the jury, in this case, was that such kitchen units are a permanent improvement to the kitchen. On the other hand, a library room is required to have shelves so that it can serve its purpose of holding stationery. Therefore, its purpose is permanent for it to operate as a library and it cannot be removed for whatever reason. In relation to the case scenario, the shelves were permanently designed in the library room for a permanent purpose, and this makes it part of the land.

In applying the degree of annexation to this situation, the level of force that was used to remove the fitted shelving demonstrates that it was a strong part of the wall. Several damages were caused to the wall as a result of forcefully removing the shelves indicating a high degree of annexation. In addition, the damage cause shows that it was developed in a way that it was not supposed to be removed in the future. This was the main basis for the reasoned judgement in an earlier mention case of Elitestone V. Morris [1997]. As such, this can properly be related to Mrs. Day case because difficulty in removing a fitted shelve is determined by the level of damage caused to the property or to the object itself.

As such, shelving should be considered as a major part of this land because it qualifies as a corporeal hereditament. At the same time, it qualifies the definition of a fixture because it improves the quality and increases value of the property altogether. According to the act, a fixture is defined as an object that is attached to a land for a special reason that makes it integral aspect to that land. Therefore, it is practically accepted in law that Mrs. Day is entitled to the ownership  as they were present during her initial visit to the property.

“Specialist fitting” is another aspect that can be argued in this land case law. Particularly, it is any object or combination that is not expected in an ordinary average house, but its addition provides an increase in the value of that property. In this case study, the removal of shelves did not only lower the value of the library room, but it caused a physical damage to the walls. However, at the discretion of the buyer, he can accept to remove the shelves and give a less value of the property offers.

Examples of Application of Tests in Relevant Case Scenarios

According to the understanding of this court ruling, Mrs. Day upon her need for the shelves can request the seller to return the shelves and repair any damages that resulted from its removal.

The founder of a premise has a legal right to take ownership of objects found on a premise after it has been sold. In the case of Mrs. Day, the neckless was half buried in the soil, and this is not a legal factor to assume ownership of the neckless. It is illogical for Mrs. Day to claim ownership of the neckless in the first place because she has not even purchased the property at the very least. A similar case can be compared to Parker V. British Airways Board [1982] concerning a gold bracelet. In this case, a ruling was made that the finder of the gold bracelet had more rights to keep it than the British Airways because the owner had not been identified. Applying this ruling to this case scenario, Mrs. Day can only keep the neckless provided the rightful owner cannot be determined. The right to own the neckless fir Mrs. Day in case of the absence of a claim from the owner is based on her proving ownership of the property on which she found the neckless.

A similar case Hannah V. Peel [1945], a court ruled that a soldier who obtained a brooch had more rights of ownership than the landowner. The basis of the court decision was based on the location in which the brooch was discovered. The case of Mrs. Day would be easy to decide based on the above case similarity. However, the challenge comes in the manner it was obtained. It was half buried in the soil, and this has a bearing on the decision. Mrs. Day has a role and legal burden of proof to demonstrate that the neckless was not attached or located beneath the surface of the land. In the event that she cannot prove these issues, it is obvious that the landowner has a more right to the neckless and it would illegal for the finder to stay with the jewellery. Another possible recommendation can be based on the case of Bridges V. Hawksworth [1851] concerning bank notes. In the ruling of this case, a claimant was awarded the ownership of bank notes after he had surrendered them. After three years there was no real owner of the bank notes, and the court ruled that it should be given to the claimant. Applying this ruling to the case scenario, Mrs. Day can surrender the neckless under the condition that it should be returned in case the real owner is not established.

References

Berkley v Poulett (1976) 242 EG 39

Botham v TSB Bank Plz (1997) 73 P & CR D1

Elitestone V. Morris [1997] ALL ER 513 [3]

D’Eyncourt v Gregory (1866) LR 3 Eq 382

Holland v Hodgson [1872] LR 7 CP 328, 334 (Blackburn J).

Leigh v Taylor [1902] UKHL 1 (1902) AC 157 at 158 per Lord Halsbury L.C., House of Lords (UK)

Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB (1004).

Powell v McFarlane [1997]. 38 P & CR (452).

Law of Property Act 1925

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