Arab Marriage and Family Formation

Arab societies are undergoing major changes as new patterns of marriage and family formation emerge across the region. For long decades, early marriage was the common pattern in the Arab world. However, it is no longer the only pattern. The average age of marriage is rising and more Arab women are staying single for a long time and sometimes they don’t get married at all.
These new marriage trends in the Arab World are part of a world global phenomenon. The changes of marriage trends in the Arab world reflect the social and economic changes taking place in the region. Arab economies moved away from agrarian based systems which supported both early marriage and extended family numbers [Hoda R.and Magued O., 2005].
The majority of the Arab populations live in cities working in industrial or service sectors. Today, Arab women are more educated and more likely to work outside their homes for personal and financial independence. These changes create a new image of woman and change her past traditional role as a mother and household member.
The objective of this research is the studying of marriage issue in the Arab world because marriage is one of the key important factors that determine the social and economic present and future in the Arab countries. Both problems of early marriage and increase of average age of marriage of marriage are explained. Finally, a recommended solutions and actions are proposed in order to naturalize the two problems for decreasing the negative impacts and creation of better Arab societies.

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Importance of Marriage in Arab Society
Family is the main concern in Arab societies. Family is considered the main social security system for young and elder people in Arab countries. In Arab culture, parents are responsible for children well into those children’s adult lives, and children reciprocate by taking responsibility for the care of their aging parents—responsibilities that Arabs generally take on with great pride. Marriage for Arabs is thus both an individual and a family matter.
In Arab societies, marriage is considered the turning point that defines prestige, recognition, and societal approval on both partners, particularly the bride. Marriage in Arab societies is considered the social and economic contract between two families. Marriage is also considered the right form of socially, culturally, and legally acceptable sexual relationship [1].
Early marriage in Arab World
Early marriage is any form of marriage that takes place at age of 18 years. Early marriages are often associated with enforcement. Forced marriage is the marriage conducted without full consent of both parties and sometimes with a threat [2].From human rights point of view, early marriage is considered a violation of human rights conventions. In Arab societies- especially developing countries- early marriage, is considered a means of securing young girls’ future and protecting them. Wars and social problems may leads also to early marriage as in Palestine, where the intifada has led to earlier marriage.
Many countries in the world have declared 18 as the minimum legal age of marriage. However, more than millions of young girls are expected to marry in the next decade according to the international statistics. [2].
Early marriage has decreased in many world countries in the last decades. However, it is still common in rural areas and among poor people. Poor parents believe that early marriage will protect their daughters and save their future. Young girls are forced into marriage by their families while they are still children because they think that marriage benefits them and secure their financial and social future.
Early marriage violates children rights because it decreases their human development, leaving them socially isolated with little education, skills and opportunities for employment and self-realization. These conditions ultimately make married girls vulnerable to poverty .Early marriage is a health and human rights violation because it takes place within the context of poverty and gender inequality with social, cultural and economic dimensions [3].
Reasons of early marriage in Arab World
There different reasons of early marriage in Arab countries, some of these reasons are referred to cultural reasons, others are referred to economic reasons. Some of these reasons are: High poverty rates, birth rates and death rates, greater incidence of conflict and civil wars, lower levels of overall development, including schooling, employment, health care and believes that early marriage is a means of securing young girls’ future and protecting them [4]. Traditional values surrounding girls’ virginity and family honour play a major role in Arab families’ decisions to marry off their daughters at young ages [1].
Effects of early marriage
Although the trend of early marriage is decreasing in the Arab world, the number of young girls in Arab countries teenagers who are married is still high. Early marriage is generally associated with early childbearing and high fertility, both of which pose health risks for women and their children [5]. Young mothers are at greater risk than older mothers of dying from causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. And the younger a bride is, the more significant the age gap with her husband tends to be—which exacerbates her disadvantage in negotiating with her husband on matters such as her own health care needs [6].
Young wives are required to do a many hard domestic duties, including new roles and responsibilities as wives and mothers. The young bride’s status in the family is dependent on her demonstrating her fertility within the first year of marriage when she is not physiologically and emotionally prepared [7]. Young wives are forced to be responsible for the care and welfare of their families and future generations while they are still children themselves.
They have no decision making powers, restricted mobility and limited economic resources. Early marriage is a direct cause of woman poverty and wide age gaps between younger married girls and their spouses create unequal power relations between the young bride and her older and more experienced husband, resulting in husbands having total control over sexual relations and decision-making [5].
Young wives are often unable to make wise plans for their families and may be forced to select between one of two hard choices: either to tolerate husbands’ violence or to make crimes (killing them). AIDS epidemic increases in young women due to the combination socioeconomic, cultural and political factors that put young women at greater risk of HIV infection due to the lack of sexual knowledge and limited access to information and resources. Younger women may face unsuccessful marriages and divorce could happen as a result of lack of maturity, incomplete independence, limited time to get prepared for marriage and having kids, dealing with education/career building and family formation at the same time.
Relative Marriage in Arab World
Marriage between relatives is a significant feature in Arab societies. High rate of marriage between relatives is known as consanguinity. Marriage between relatives is clear in Arab countries such as Libya and Sudan. Sometimes, consanguineous marriage is arranged marriages that reflects the wishes of the marrying relatives. But marriage between close relatives can jeopardize the health of their offspring, as can marriage among families with a history of genetic diseases [1].
New trends in Marriage in Arab world
In the last decade, early marriage has declined in many Arab countries such as Kuwait and Emirates. For example , in Emirates, the pace of decline is very significant where the percentage of women ages 15 to 19 who were married dropped from 57 percent in 1975 to 8 percent by 1995 [1]. The general feature of marriage pattern in the for the region as a whole, women are marrying later in late of 20th or 30th and some women are not marrying at all.
As shown in table (1), In Tunisia, Algeria, and Lebanon, only 1 percent to 4 percent of women ages 15 to 19 are married, and the percentage of women ages 35 to 39 who have never married in these countries now ranges from 15 percent to 21 percent. The percentage of women ages 35 to 39 who have never married is a good indicator for measuring changes in the universality of marriage, because the likelihood of a single woman marrying after age 40 is quite low [8]
Pan-Arab Project for Child Development: Arab Mother and Child Health; Council of Health Ministers of GCC States, Gulf Family Health Surveys; and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics’ special tabulations of the 2004 Palestinian Demographic and Health Survey .
Palestinians have different marriage pattern where early is the most type that takes place. The main reason is the war and occupation where families wishes to increase the generation for freeing their countries and help them to face hard life in the region. As shown in figure (), most of Palatines marry in the age of 14 to 24 year old [1].
SOURCES: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, special tabulation, 2004 Palestinian Demographic and Health Survey.
The marriage-age gap is particularly pronounced in Arab societies. One-quarter of recent marriages in Egypt and Lebanon had women at least 10 years younger than their husbands [9].
Marriage problem in Egypt
The main problem of marriage in Egypt is its high costs especially because of dowry, Shabka, Housing, Furniture and appliances and gihaz. Regardless of the economic situations of marrying couples and their families, the gihaz and other goods purchased to set up the newlyweds’ home have to be new, not used.
The rising cost of marriage is in part attributed to the rising expectations and consumerism that have accompanied the opening of the Egyptian economy, which began in the 1970s. The country’s high cost of housing and furnishings have had a number of unintended consequences for marriage patterns, such as youth entering into urfi (common-law marriages that are unregistered and generally secretive) as well as men marrying women who are older and financially secured [10].
Nonconventional Forms of Marriage
The high costs of Arab marriage as well as high unemployment and economic difficulties are blamed for the spread of so-called “urfi” (or common law) marriages among young urban adults in some countries in the region. Generally hidden from the participants’ families, urfi marriages are undertaken to avoid the difficulties of a standard marriage and give a sexual relationship some degree of legitimacy.
The secrecy surrounding urfi marriages puts young women at a particular disadvantage because these women are not able to negotiate the terms of their marriage a role usually played by families in conventional marriages. There are thousands of urfi marriages cases in Egypt among university students [11].
Traditionally, urfi marriages have been religiously condoned as proper if the couple’s parents approve of the marriage and there is a public announcement of the ban. Some families in rural villages opt for urfi marriages when the bride is too young to be legally married, deferring the official registration of the marriages to a future date. But the public, the religious establishment, and the legal system have generally perceived urban urfi marriages as a pretext and cover for premarital sex.
Another form of unconventional marriage in the Arab World is the muta’a and messyar. Muta’a is a temporary marriage, which is practiced by the Shi’ites in southern Lebanon and other areas, couples specify in their marriage contract the date upon which the marriage ends. On ther hand, Messyar marriage is common in the Gulf region. In this type of marriage, there is an arrangement that man marries without any of the housing and financial responsibility that a standard Arab marriage generally requires of him.
In general, Messyar and Muta’a are practiced mostly by men who are marrying a second wife where they tend to give legitimacy to sexual relationships and reduce the number of never married women in society, they introduce other social complications, such as the upbringing of children from such marriages [1].
Women’s rights regarding marriage
According to the international human rights conventions, woman has the rights when entering, during and at the end of the marriage. When entering marriage, woman has the same right as a man to enter marriage only with full consent. A woman married under minimum age shouldn’t be considered legally married. Marriage must be registered in an official registry. If a woman marries someone with another nationality, she will not have her nationality automatically changed to that of her husband unless she chooses that [12].
During marriage, woman has the same rights and responsibilities as man. She has the right to equal access to health services, the right of protection from violence within the family. She also has the same rights as a man to decide freely about the number and spacing of children and to have access to information, education and means to exercise these rights [12].
Woman has the same rights and responsibilities as her husband towards children regardless of her marital status and family benefits. Change in woman’s husband nationality during marriage doesn’t imply that her nationality must be change. If woman is employed she must not be discriminated against on the grounds of marriage and maternity.
At the end of marriage, woman has the same rights as man when a marriage ends. Neither woman nationality nor that of her children shall automatically be affected by the ending of a marriage. Woman has the same rights and responsibilities as a man towards her children regardless of her marital status [12].
How to solve the problem?
There is an urgent need to for a better understanding of the social and economic environment surrounding Arab marriage. Policies and governmental programs should meet the youth need to marry and make families. Understanding of marriage patterns changes and their social and economic implications need to be addressed. Successful implementation including right decisions and accurate schedules are needed to address and meet the requirements and needs of young people who want to marry or remain single [1].
The recommended solutions for improving marriage situation in Arab World are:

Work cited

Hoda R. and Magued, O,, ” Marriage in the Arab World “, Population Reference Bureau, September 2005.

Stephen H. , “Early Marriage – Child Spouses “, Innocenti Digest no. 7, UNICEF , March 2007.

UNIFEM, “Forced and Early Marriage”, “URL:”, Advocates for Human Rights, August 2007.

Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls, “Early Marriage and Poverty Exploring links for policy and program development” ,2003.

UNFPA, “The Promise of Inequality: Gender Inequality and Reproductive Health”, “URL:”, 2005.

World Health Organization, “WHO/UNFPA/Population Council Technical Consultation on Married Adolescents” ,Geneva: WHO, 2003.

United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ” A Choice by Right: Working Group on Forced Marriages Child Marriage Fact Sheet, 2000.

League of Arab States, Pan-Arab Project for Child Development: Arab Mother and Child Health Surveys , Pan-Arab Project for Family Health; Council of Health Ministers of GCC States, Gulf Family Health Surveys; ORC Macro, Demographic and Health Surveys; and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics’ special tabulations of 2004 Palestinian Demographic and Health Survey.

Diane S. and Barbara I., “The Cost of Marriage in Egypt: A Hidden Variable in the New Arab Demography,” in the New Arab Family, Cairo Papers in Social Science 24 (2001): 80-116; and World Bank, “Building Institutions for Markets,” World Bank Report 2002 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002): table 1.

Gihan S., “The Double Bind,” Al Ahram Weekly On-line 397 (Oct. 1-7, 1998).

The International Women’s Tribune Centre Rights of Women, “A Guide to the Most Important United Nations Treaties on Women’s Human Rights”, New York 1998.


‘Arab Nationalism’ in the Modern Context

‘Arab Nationalism’ was an important part of anti-colonial struggle. A generation on it has little meaning today. Discuss.
This essay will examine to what extent Arab nationalism as an ideology was of significance to the anti-colonial struggle and the influence of Arab nationalism in present times. A prominent question of interest in this study will be: was western domination eliminated due to the might of Arab nationalism? Certainly there has been a debate surrounding the significance of Arab nationalism today, this essay will highlight central issues surrounding the debate such as whether Arab nationalism has terminally declined or has just become a lessened force. A further question of concern will be: If Arab nationalism has gone into political remission could it be revived or gain appeal in present times? Furthermore this study will analyse when Arab nationalism was at its strongest and when the greatest expression of Arab nationalism were evident.

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Arab nationalism is considered to be a nationalist ideology which objective is to achieve a unified Arab nation encompassing the entire territory which is categorised as “the Arab World” from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). The assertion of Arab nationalism is that there should be political unity within the Arab world. Arab nationalism is an ideology that stresses solidarity of the Arab people which is entrenched in a common language, history and culture. The Arabic language is considered to play a significant unifying role. Certain scholars such as al-Hursi deem that the Arabic language is a central element of Arab nationalism (Suleiman, 1994). In addition, the end of Western hegemony and domination in the Middle East and North Africa region was a prominent objective of Arab nationalism. The notion of unity was believed to be a method that could be utilised to overcome colonisation. Arab nationalism was considered to be the sole vital method capable of providing an avenue away from colonialism and imperialism and a means to eliminate colonialism altogether. It was regarded to have the potential to provide larger regional unity as it offered the foundation of establishing an amalgamated nation that could be capable of resisting colonial powers and ultimately attaining independence.
Various forms of long lasting grievances were caused by colonial occupation such as political oppression and marginalisation plus excessive economic profits and resources were continuously seized and exploited by the colonial powers. Furthermore a foreign unfamiliar culture was forced upon the Arab populaces; Arab nationalism and the set of beliefs surrounding the ideology were believed to have the capability to dissolve such matters in order to redeem and revert back to an indigenous culture and heritage. Most of the Arab world experienced colonial suppression and were ruled by western powers such as Britain and France. Was Arab nationalism vital in the struggle against colonialism? It is deemed that “…through the imperial world during the decolonizing period, protest, resistance, and independence movements were fuelled by one or another nationalism” (Said, 1993).
The end of the Second World War caused vast political, social and economic transformations to the world order subsequently certain colonised nations gained their independence. In spite of this, the end of explicit or direct colonialism obviously did not equate to the termination of colonial dominance. European powers sought to retain their power across the Middle East and North Africa and colonialism still dominated large parts of the region. European imperialist presence was still evident as certain monarchies were under their rule and were still well disposed to them. For example, Egypt had been granted independence by the British in 1933 however Britain still played a direct role in Egyptian affairs and exercised a huge influence over the nation. It would be in this context that Arab nationalism would serve to provide a compelling set of beliefs and gain ground as a robust force in opposition to foreign occupation. Rafik Asha deemed that “(Arab) nationalism constitutes the vital soul-force of our people, the bloodstream of Arab life and political vitality, the spirit which guides a resurgent people towards freedom from domination, servitude and patronage” (Pfaff, 1970). The Arab nationalist movement was immensely advanced by Gamal Abdel Nasser whom attained power in Egypt and became the nation’s president. In 1956, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal which had still been occupied by the British. Furthermore, he fought against British, French and Israeli hostility and attacks towards Egypt later on that year. Both these forms of action exhibited a defiant attitude towards the Western powers and inevitably forced them into submission. During this epoch, Arab nationalism gained immense support and popularity throughout the Middle East and North Africa due to Nasser’s leadership furthermore many people in other Arab nations believed that they shared a common struggle against colonial powers.
Furthermore the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958, which was the fusion of Egypt and Syria into one nation, was a bold experiment of Arab unity. Arab unity is one of the principal goals of Arab nationalism and it had been finally achieved. Even though it was a short lived political union it was distinguished to be a significant triumph over Western imperialism and emphasised that Arab nationalism and Arab unity did have the potential to be a distinct reality instead of being a mere ideological dream.
The Arab defeat of the 1967 war had an implicit impact on Arab nationalism and led to the questioning of the secular ideology which had dominated Arab politics during the 1950s and 1960s. “It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible” (Dawisha, 2003). It is important to note that there was a considerable amount of other challenges which hindered the accomplishment of Arab unity, the principle goal of Arab nationalism. For instance there were evidently competing fidelities to tribes, sects region and religion “the Arabs were divided into sub-states identities such as tribe, religion and sect” (Dawisha, 2003). Furthermore there were different interpretations and clarifications of Arab nationalism. “Variations on Arab nationalism multiplied sometimes even inspiring separate classifications such as Nasserism and Ba’thism, and even more arcane subclassifications, such as neo-Ba’thism. Many of these became rivals, even to the point of bloodshed” (Kramer, 1993).
Certain scholars stress that nationalist sentiment in the Middle East has significantly declined as a consequence of contesting ideologies such as Islamism (Myhill, 2010). Since 1967, Islamism has increasingly been perceived as an alternative discourse to secular Arab nationalism. In particular, it is deemed by some to be a form of response to significant failures such as the defeat of 1967 and the failure of the Arab nations to unite politically. The dissatisfaction of the people permitted Islamist groups to mobilise further recruits. During the period in which Nasser’s Arab nationalism was in power, Islamist ideologies had been marginalised and had been repressed from the political arena. For instance Egypt and Syria constrained the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such circumstances as the defeat of 1967 and the on growing disillusionment of Arab nationalism led to the return of Islamist movements to the political field as such experiences of loss allowed Islam to offer a discourse that would provide the assurance of restoring the Arab region to a condition of fullness and glory. Therefore as an outcome of the decline of Arab nationalism, Islamist ideology began to fill the political void. It is claimed that Islam is the solely authentic ideology native to the Arab people, in particular Islamists contented that the secular nationalist phase was “untrue to Islam and lacking ‘authenticity’” (Fuller, 2004). In a similar vein it is argued that “Arab soldiers would have fought more bravely and effectively under the banner of Islam then they did under that of Arab nationalism”.
Taking all of this into consideration, it is noticeable that the notion of that Islamism has replaced secular Arab nationalism particularly since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war is widely held. “In the 1980’s and 1990’s, radical Islam had become for the Arab regimes what Arab nationalism was in the 1950’s and 1960’s” (Dawisha, 2005). A question of relevance here is: Does Arab nationalism have any importance or significance today? It is evident that Arab nationalism went into decline following the 1967 War and that Islamist movements have been deemed as an alternative ideology however is it past the point of resuscitation? Some scholars advocate that Arab unification is completely over with and has no significance in any form (Ajami, 1978). However some judge that Arab nationalism is still in existence but will unlikely to be a potent influence. “But the Arab world today is so complex and fragmented, with such a maldistribution of population and resources (with a result that exploitation is also skewed in its local intensities) that it seems unlikely that Arab qawmiyya nationalism will survive as a major formative force” (Leiden, 1979). Arab nationalism can no longer hold the assertion that it retains an absolute grip in the mentality of the Arab people. All this, however, should not diminish the potential importance for the future course of Arab politics and culture. “Yet the idea is not dead; it still possesses force and it is possible that it can be resurrected at some later time” (Leiden, 1979). In a similar vein, it is deemed that “the fact of Arab nationalism cannot be argued away. It is a major political and social phenomenon as well as a mobilising ideology that has shaken the whole region since the last years of the nineteenth century” (Nafaa, 1983).
It cannot be denied that attempts and experiments of Arab unity have been endeavoured and have not produced sincere effective outcomes. For instance notably the United Arab Republic highlighted the disagreements between Egypt and Syria. Furthermore in terms of carrying out collective aims the Arab League which was formed in 1945 was meant to bring into line meaningful cooperation plus social and economic unity. However the Arab League failed to achieve any substantial outcomes. “Arab nationalism as an ideology and political movement was meaningless if its ultimate goal, the organic unity of all Arabs was unrealisable” (Dawisha, 2005). On a more individual level, at present many Arabs doubt the certainty of the belief in an Arab nation and are significantly less confident on whether there now is an existing collective Arab pursuit or objective (Kramer, 1993). However, does the prosepect of attaining Arab untity really hold no weight in present times?
It is important to recognise that at present unities amongst certain nations in the world are prevailing and effective. Undoubtedly, nations gain more power in numbers and that a group of nations united will certainly be more potent than a group of nations separated and split. In recent times, some may deem that the Arab population strongly requires Arab nationalism in order to gain influence in international issues. Long lasting divisions and discords have caused certain Arab nations to be less prominent in international affairs even though the Arab populace represents a considerable amount of people in Middle East and North Africa. For instance, nation states such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are utterly reliant on the West (Khashan, 2000). From the time that they were established, individual Arab states have continuously given precedence to their individual interests.
In present times the notion of Arab unity which is the ultimate goal of Arab nationalism may not be as inadequate as many perceive it to be. Undeniably, the accepted wisdom and thinking surrounding Arab nationalism has be subjected to certain setbacks leading to a great sense of dissatisfaction and stunted ambitions. However the notion of Arab unity holds a certain weight and is still of relevance at the current moment in time. If one is to analyse this line of thought on a pragmatic level a coherent political community would stand to serve significant purposes. Some deem that Arab nations should in spite of everything still work towards unity in order to attain constructive entities. This could be regarded to be entities such as an economic market that guarantees free movement of trade, goods and labour, a cohesive stand when handling with foreign powers in concern with economic and political matters. Unity could also serve to provide rapid assistance to an Arab nation intimidated by a foreign power and to resolve internal Arab disagreements. Additionally an entirely Arab military authority could even be utilised to prevent potential foreign invasions (Khashan, 2000). An innovation Arab awareness should be established on the values of solidarity and constructive cooperation so that nations can associate with one another beneficially.
Furthermore, some deem that the decline of Arab nationalism and its lack of influence now are due to the diminishment of imperialism as the perceived enemy. It must be recognised that by the 1960s the threat of imperialism had diminished and the issue had become less pertinent. In specific instances in Egypt and Iraq the British presence had been removed, Algeria had gained independence from the French colonial power; the Baghdad pact had been beaten (Dawisha, 2003). Without the significance of the “anti-imperialist” or “anti-colonial” resonance had Arab nationalism deteriorated to be nothing but a meaningless slogan which has run its course? Furthermore the opposition to western domination presented an opportunity and motive for unity, divisions intensified once Western imperialist domination had been removed. “So long as the greater part of the Arab polities were under the domination of their British, French or Italian overlords, the Arab nationalist could cooperate with those espousing a more parochial nationalism in a common effort to expel the colonial power. But once these fragmented parts attained their political independence, the efforts made to unite politically the several parts of the Arab world foundered on the shoals of parochial consideration” (Pfaff, 1970). However, undeniably in more recent times the Arab world has found itself struggling to resist foreign domination yet again in terms of international interference in the forms of Western militaries and United Nations sanctions particularly since after 1990s. On one hand this may be interpreted to have pushed Arab nationalism to retreat virtually to its state of origin however on the other hand this may be seen as to be a potential catalyst for a revival of Arab nationalism. For instance, the 2003 invasion of Iraq evoked a reaction of a certain Arab nationalist rhetoric (Taylor, 2003).
All of this points to the conclusion that even though in the present day the set of beliefs relating to Arab nationalism are not as widely held as they were in the epochs of the 1950s and 1960s furthermore many claimed that the Arab vision for unity was irrelevant and exhausted especially after the Arab defeat in 1967 and overshadowed by Islamist movements. In spite of this the existence of Arab nationalist ideas are still prevailing in the Arab world and unification and political amalgamation is still required. “Nationalism will always exist when one group feels exploited by another” (Leiden, 1979) therefore in the future Arab nationalism may become more appealing due to prevailing international interference in the region and western domination. It has become evident in this study that Arab nationalism was considered to be a force implemented against colonisation and imperialism in this line of thought Arab nationalist ideas could still be utilised today in order to attain solidarity to deter foreign intrusions.
Ajami, F. (1978). End of Pan-Arabism. Foreign Affairs, 355-373.
Dawisha, A. (2003). Requiem for Arab Nationalism. Middle East Quarterly, 25-41.
Dawisha, A. (2005). Arab nationalism in the twentieth century : from triumph to despair. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Fuller, G. (2004). The future of political Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Karsh, E., & Karsh, I. (1996). Reflections on Arab nationalism. Middle Eastern Studies, 367-392.
Khashan, H. (2000). Revitalizing Arab Nationalism. Middle East Quarterly, 49-56.
Kramer, M. (1993). Arab nationalism: mistaken identity. Daedalus , 171-206.
Leiden, C. (1979). Arab Nationalism Today. Middle East Review, 45-51.
Myhill, J. (2010). The islamization of arab nationalism. Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 19-43.
Nafaa, H. (1983). Arab Nationalism: A response to Ajami’s Thesis of the’ End of Pan-Arabism’. Journal of Arab Affairs, 173-199.
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Suleiman, Y. (1994). Nationalism and the Arabic language: A historical overview. In Y. Suleiman, Arabic sociolinguistics: Issues and perspectives (pp. 3-23). New York: Routledge .
Taylor, P. (2003, April 04). War Spawns New Arab Nationalist Mood, Pride. Retrieved April 04, 2014, from Arab news:

Reality TV Shows in the Arab World

Reality TV: the Reality that is Globalized
Media Research Methods
Arab satellite television stations have recognized themselves now as one of the major sources for information for the Arab world for they are demanding the domination of the American media. Television broadcasting in the Arab world goes back to the mid-1950s when on-governmental air operations were launched in Morocco, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In almost all Arab countries, television services were subordinated to ministries of information or other government bodies, therefore revolving into executive mouthpieces of regime policies as well as into outlets of public civilizing look. By the end of the 1980s, the Arab world TV domination representation began to practice key cracks with the foundation of more independent television organizations in more than a few of Arab countries and the increase of profitable television service besides government spreading.

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One of the significant developments in the Arab television picture in the 1990s has been the disintegrated of a 40-year government domination representation of broadcasting in the Arab world. The model habitually derives from the idea of broadcasting as a device of public growth that is supposed to be positioned below the government control. In service within ministries of information, television organizations for the majority piece were funded completely from nationwide budgetary allocations and their recruits were viewed as element of state-owned establishment. Moreover, the entry of marketable broadcasters with gigantic technological and monetary possessions into the Arab world television prospect has been a central improvement. In September 1991, Arab audiences had their first experience of confidential satellite television when MBC went on the air from studio services in London with Western-styled indoctrination. More secretive broadcasters followed outfit: Orbit in 1994, ART in 1995, LBC and Future Television in 1995, and Al-Jazeera from Qatar in 1996.
The Arab world Television stations had developed too much by the end of the 90’s, for the huge and remarkable development era was during 2002 and 2003. The Arab nation since then had decreased the interest in watching news and documentaries, becoming addicted instead to the new trend known as “Reality TV”. Since 2003 and something new was occurring in the Arab world. Millions of families have closed themselves up in their homes, eyes glued to the TV monitor when the shows begin! The Reality TV had changed several characteristics of the TV broadcast image and content since it occurred, for it is an interesting phenomenon to be focused on to know more about it. Reality TV in the Arab world is built on certain basics which affects the traditions and cultures of the Arabian societies in different ways.
1. The History and The Rise of Reality TV
In the past, television programs were built up to be for all family members, however nowadays most of the TV shows and mostly the Reality TV ones are built on the bases of an audience made up of females teenagers and housewives. Reality TV has a historical background that should be focused on in order to know how it arrived to the Arab world countries.
Moreover, the rise of reality TV came at a point when networks were in search of a rapid secure way out to financial troubles within the cultural industries. Enlarged expenses in the fabrication of drama, sitcom and comedy ensured unscripted, accepted realistic programming became a feasible financial alternative throughout the 1900s (Hill, 2005). Reality TV has its ancestry in scandalous journalism and popular entertainment, but it owes its supreme money owing to documentary television, which has nearly vanished from television screens in the get up of popular realistic programming. Also, there are three major strands to the progress of popular realistic television, and these relate to three areas of different, and so far overlapping, areas of media fabrication: sensationalist journalism, documentary television, and well-liked entertainment (Biressi & Nunn, 2005).
The apprehension about reality TV as putting a finish period to documentary includes the claim that modern television or decision about the world that documentary is seen to have occupied, and therefore lacking hope for the setting up of meaning (Bignell, 2005). The quarrel for an apocalyptic finish of television history is reliant on comparing Reality TV to documentary’s past but differentiates Reality TV from that past and makes it look like a split growth. Furthermore, Reality TV seems to drift liberated of the past, obtainable in a nonstop present, and therefore looks to its critics like a reckless television type.
As an observation of the growth of a “live on air” television production in the 60s, it’s obvious that programmers started producing traditional dramatic works of Arab and world literature, but they also started looking at Western shows for either motivation or stealing. By the ’80s, the main successes were Arabian versions of primarily European and American shows. In the ’90s, it became ordinary for the perception of a Western show, its privileges and invention bible, to be bought and locally reproduced for local use.
The rise of Reality TV in the Arab world was in 2003, the program Super Star rapidly became the majority important show of that period. It was broadcasted on Future TV, where by Super Star attempted a clear Pan-Arab explore for the next star singer, by means of casting calls, adjudicators, and live performances, and the audience’s right to take part in the ballot.
2. The bases that are built on for the concept of Reality TV
The principle of program scheduling is to arrange television performance time donating programs that will lift up ratings at meticulous periods of the day. In a broadcasting ethnicity with several channels, the plan enables channels to contend with each other for audiences by scheduling their programs considering what their competitors will be presenting. Reality TV programs are merely commercial and flourishing if they keep on giving reasons for their expenses and catch the attention of the audience over a comparatively extended run (Escoffery, 2006 ). The guarantee that a long-lasting series has on holding onto the viewers for a period of the program’s run which offers the vision of a reliable viewers whose demographic demand and a mass may be eye-catching to advertisers and can lift up the broadcasting channel’s public profile. Schedulers offer recommendations to commissioning are prepared (Andrejevic, 2004).
The last day of December 2003 witnessed the labor of the most successful Arab reality show formed in Lebanon: Star Academy. Following “Endemol” the production company format for the French version, Star Academy’s group recognized a grouping of talented Arabs and invited them to participate in the Academy, where they lived and skilled to become star singers. A “graduation progression” permitted the instructors at the academy to suggest two candidates and the public would vote for one of them to stay in the Academy. Joe Khalil, director and executive producer in several Arabian TV stations for more than 12 years, said in Nov. 23, 2009 that Star Academy extended the restrictions of reality television for the reason of its extraordinary fame and because it represented a complete realization of a promotion and marketing prospective. Possibly the show’s major effect, nevertheless, remains its reliable audience faithfulness to both the “prime” episodes as well as the 24-hour enthusiastic channel.
For most of the Reality Shows and especially Star Academy, the concept is based on celebrities and primes for which every Friday there is a celebrity that has to attend the prime and sing with the participants. For commercial purposes and for it to be more popular Rola Saad the executive producer of Star Academy intend to get international celebrities in the same prime collaborating with Arabian Celebrities.
For Star Academy rules of participation is to accept living in the same place with people from the opposite sex, and to swim together in the same swimming pool, and to train sports and dancing together, and the most important is to accept to build up love relationships for some participants. For example, Star Academy chose last season Michel Azzi to be in love with Tania Nemer, the crew of Star Academy had discusses this case with Michel whereby he accepted in order to stay till the last prime, and this was what truly happened.
3. The Globalization and the Privacy publicized in the Reality TV
Globalization of communication in the second half of the twentieth century was determined by the commercial benefit of United States corporations. Conservative local cultures are believed to be tattered by dependencies on media products, with their helping ideologies resulting from the United States, with the impact of globalizing customer way of life across regions and populations which turn out to be inhibited to get used to its logics and needs, regardless of the need in some of these regions of possessions to contribute with them (Bignell, 2005). What happens in the communication of globalization is a move from opinions for the homogeneity of media customs to opinions for the homogeneity of political financial system of the media, regardless of provincial and neighborhood differences in the intellectual forms which the media receive.
The programmers formulate public the dramas of the individual and carry the ideologies of privacy exposed into new interaction with the negotiated meanings they gain from their meticulous local and provincial television contexts. The type of program develops new conceptions of the open and secret spheres and also draws on discourses of body and self those have already been in circulation in such spheres as popular magazine journalism, optional medicinal measures, and lifestyle-interview television programs (Bignell, 2005). The cultural nationality that these programs reply to displays a challenging cooperation between the plan of the perfectibility of the identity and the institutions, socio-economic constraints and networks of domestic and social dealings that limit it.
Television programs have been worried with the capability of television to tolerate observation to the varieties of usual people’s lives, and its ability to become a medium for the community exposure of confessions and revelations that seem incapable to be shared with a person’s close sphere (Biressi & Nunn, 2005). Star Academy is a distinguished case of this style, in which young people are usually paraded on screen and where the issue of how far the contestants will go in their close relations with each other is a big element of their appeal for audiences. Noticeably, the transitional spread of this mixture of the private body and shared moral challenges and tests, is the medium for financial action inasmuch as the television formats occupied are traded supplies, and the appeal of audiences promotes profitable well being for television institutions in a diversity of ways.
4. Audience Perceptions of Reality TV
Audiences most of the times consider Reality TV is there so that viewers can see for themselves, and get an unmediated imminent into some phase of life and manners. Audiences are pessimistic about the reality claims of Reality TV programs, set programs beside a range between reality and fiction, and provide the most admiration to what they distinguish as the most truthful programs. Moreover, the incidence at the present time of huge number of Reality TV programs in the schedules has not enlarged viewing hours, so audiences obviously do not rate Reality TV any more than the programs that they have replaced. If Reality TV had a particular position within the audiences, the viewing of Reality TV would be an addition to other viewing time and entire viewing hours might rise. Even though in the television business Reality TV is seen as the newest important tendency, the commissioning of such programs might have more to do with contest over audience contribution and the branding of channels and audiences, then with an important move in lifestyle of television viewing (Hill, 2005). In addition, the focal point on younger viewers requires a clarification of the traditions in Television studies that have discussed youth audiences and appreciated their defiant attitudes to programs. The creations of television program bands, personalities and rumor have been essential for an extended era. The vulnerable outcome on recent ways of organizing television is that it would end to consist of must-see programs when crowd audience view the same live broadcast at the same time.
Star Academy unpredictably became an essential part of many people’s discussions, and viewers’ contribution was not only with the program and the website but also with the remarks on the program with other viewers and in the media. Rumor was a significant enjoyment for viewers of Star Academy, and it became a convenient subject for discussion about people who viewers felt they knew. The production of viewer chat is expectant and mirrored by talk in Reality TV programs themselves. Television programs are conquered much more than cinema, for example, by people chatting and interacting in common situations, just as life for viewers at home is often centered on these actions. Star Academy consists largely of sequences of discussion among the participants, representing familiar contact and chat which could be then talked about the viewers. The common use of close-up shots of faces in Star Academy reinforces this wisdom of closeness between the viewer and what is publicized on television, and contributes to an awareness of correspondence between the audience’s regular world and the constructed worlds of the plan. This technique of using and experiencing television gives the fantasy of bodily intimacy, and invokes policies of communal contact which require awareness and generate social closeness.
5. Reality TV effect on the Arabian Societies
Most of the participants’ aim in Reality Shows is to become famous, which had become a new phenomenon. Contestants have been constructed as exemplifying a fame culture in which ethos of “famous to be famous” has triumphed over the concepts of talent and hard work, and they are seen as diminishing victim to the controlling powers of a cruel fame-making mechanism (Escoffery, 2006). Reality TV shows in the Arab World are based on the aspect of emotional recognition among the observer and the protagonists. The Arab channels won’t vacillate to split social and ethical borders in order to enlarge earnings. It’s obvious to see how the participants symbolize an exceedingly tolerant social cultures and unusual for Arab society. They hug and kiss on live TV. Although most of the viewers agree on the undesirability of such actions, they can’t split their eyes away from the screen. The Reality shows get such high ratings that one wonders about present priorities in the Arab world. Some people see it as an Israeli-American conspiracy, created in order to distract the Arabs from important issues like Iraq and Palestine.
Star Academy had made many changes in the concept of Arabian traditions and cultures in which viewers are being inspired by the participants’ activities. Several conservative families had to remove the LBC channel from their satellite not to let their children to keep on watching Star Academy because they started imitating the participants in the way they dress, communicate with the other sex, and have fun during the breaks time.
Moreover, Big Brother Arabia was a 2004 Reality TV show based on the worldwide program Big Brother, in which contestants live in a unique house while competing to win in the end. The show was filmed in Bahrain, aired on MBC 2, and was planned to follow the success of Star Academy, but failed to do so, and instead the show was only aired for 11 days and then got major controversy in the countries it aired in. Big Brother Arabia producers decided to cancel the show, as there were many complaints from viewers. Joe Khalil, a member in the production crew of the program, said in Nov. 23, 2009 that the program had to be canceled because it brought new traditions to the gulf area which is none as a conservative area in the Arab World, because the audience didn’t accept the fact that it featured six men and six women living together in one area, despite staying in separate parts of the house. Star Academy and Big Brother showed the women in the Arab World so close to the western Women in the way they dress, dance, and communicate with men. This is what not all of the viewers accept or welcome.
Reality TV, in the recent years, has become a very famous phenomenon that has influenced the life of viewers in the Arab world. Reality TV shows were based on some theories and techniques in the work process in which these shows were able to change certain thoughts and traditions in the Arab countries. The audience plays an important role in relation with their perception concerning the Reality TV shows. The audiences consider much reality programming to be entertaining rather than informative. These audiences draw on their own personal experience of social interaction to judge the authenticity of the way ordinary people and their behavior on TV. Reality shows works on collapsing the distance that separates those on either side of the screen by enlightening the hope that it really could be you up there on that screen. The democratized adaptation of the star-making machinery goes further than representing its ability to convert real people into celebrities apparently at will. The power that the airbrush once exerted over the image is transposed into the record of reality in the form of the power the blade exerts on soft tissue. Television is like religion, is basically a type of social power. Without both people would really begin to consider for themselves and the social communications would break down.
Reality TV had been much popular to reach the Arab World, with certain basics built on it had affected the Arabian societies in different ways. Reality TV had arrived to the Arab World after passing by different stages and experiences. All in all, Reality TV had been a main reason for losing privacy in front of the public audience. Lastly, producing reality shows involves a variety of executive, artistic and technological aspects. Reality shows are mostly approved formats that programmers buy for a certain area, such the case of the Arab World. Reality Shows by nature have a huge number of influences, as well as an important profitable section.
Andrejevic, M. (2004). Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched. (pp.1-23). United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bignell, J. (2005). Big Brother: Reality TV in the Twenty-First Century. (pp. 34-47, 65-72, 150-160). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Biressi, A. & Nunn, H. (2005). Reality TV: Realism and Revelation. (pp. 118-144). London & New York: Wallflower Press.
Escoffery, D. (2006). Essays on Representation and Truth: How Real is Reality TV? (pp. 7-26, 61-78, & 115-133, & 247- 259). North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers.
Hill, A. (2005). Reality TV: Audiences and Popular Factual Television. (pp. 39,55, & 78, & 106). London & New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Effect of the 2011 Arab Spring on Democracy & Terrorism

In the year 2011, the world was shocked by events that sparked a series of major uprisings throughout the Middle East, a region known for its instability, fiercely dictatorial governments, exotic imagery, violence, and oil.  The 2011 Arab spring was a start from a series of protests in countries of repressive and autocratic form of governments, which have been affected with great unemployment, rising living costs, low education and low human rights. The 2011 Arab Springs had extensive implications in the Middle East where countries went into a process of change. From peaceful protests, into violence and armed insurgency and full scale civil war and eventually the breakdown of civil society giving the rise of terrorist elements of the armed insurgency, who actively opposed the governments and who were prepared to use violence i.e. terrorist means. The countries which will discussed, in the context of the 2011 Arab spring, will include the following: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Some of the key features will include evidence of the process of democracy. Institutions established to bring about change. Evidence of change from protest and concessions made to the people. However there are also other arguments to consider relating to the 2011 Arab springs which include the foreign intervention during the 2011 Arab spring, the rise and support of terrorist activities in the 2011 Arab spring.
The 2011 Arab Spring began in Tunisia, also known as the Jasmine Revolution there was major civil unrest across the country with street by street battles and mass demonstrations taking place in Tunisia, ‘On January 14 a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. That announcement also failed to quell unrest, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down as president’, leaving the country in January 2011. Turkey thereafter had free and democratic elections. They saw the victory of a coalition of the Islamist Ennahda Party with this was one example of a country where free and democratic elections meant a government elected from its people. Also all political prisoners were released and the ban on political parties lifted. 
In Tunisia even though its revolution was
considered a success it is notable that the country has the most fighters of
Isil and other various ‘rebel groups in Syria and Iraq taking part in terrorism
to uproot the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya’ (THE SOUFAN GROUP, 2017).
In Syria protests calling for the resignation of President. Bashar al-Assad broke out in southern Syria in mid-March 2011 and spread through the country. The Assad regime responded with a brutal crackdown against protesters, drawing condemnation from international leaders and human rights groups. A leadership council for the Syrian opposition formed in Istanbul in August called the Free Syrian Army. However in Syria  the little hope for democracy and concessions made my President Basher Al-Assad has turned into a full scale Civil war leading to the deaths of more than half a million people in Syria with numerous proxy wars and more recently have led to the rise of the Salifi movement ISIS. At the beginning of 2012 two prominent Salafi armed groups emerged: ‘Jabhat al-Nusra and Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham (the Freemen of Syria Battalions) both of which embraced the language of jihad and called for an Islamic state based on Salafi principles’ (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Libya from 1 September 1969 the ‘Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
headed by Gaddafi abolished the monarchy and the old constitution and
proclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic, with the motto: freedom, socialism,
and unity’ (Michigan State University, 1994 – 2016). The Leader Muammar Gaddafi
would rule Libya for 42 years. Under Gaddafi, law number seventy-one of 1972
banned all political parties and opposition groups. Dissent was punishable by
death, and in fact political opponents were assassinated both domestically and
had the highest Human Development Index, the lowest infant mortality and the
highest life expectancy in all of Africa. Even though, Libya was considered as
a “brutal dictatorship” by the west, it is clear that Libya was a prosperous
nation with free education and health care and laws that protect discrimination
and violence against woman as defined in the sources by the (Us Department of
State, 2017). Before the 2011 Arab spring al Qaeda and militant terrorism did
not exist in the country. Libya was a peaceful nation which did not threat to
use Weapons of Mass destruction nor other means to destabilise Europe by
terrorist means.
events in Libya turned from protests into a full scale civil war between the
National Transition council and loyal forces of the Libyan armed forces.
The Foreign intervention in the 2011 Arab Spring
Foreign intervention in the
2011 Arab spring was a pivotal moment during the Libyan Civil war. The United
Nation Security Council on the 11th March 2011 passed on a
resolution to implement a no fly zone. The resolution implemented by NATO was
to prevent the harming of civilians in Libya and to implement and democratic
resolution in Libya (United Nations Security council, 2011). However during the
Libyan Civil war there wasn’t any consideration of whom NATO was going to help
militarily.  The parliamentary Foreign
affairs committee stated in the recent report that ‘the possibility that
militant extremist groups would attempt to benefit from. The rebellion should
not have been the preserve of hindsight. Libyan connections with transnational
militant extremist groups were known before 2011, because many Libyans had
participated in the Iraq insurgency and in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda’. (The
Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016).
Movement towards Democracy

In Many opposition participants called for a return to the constitution and a transition to multi-party democracy most notably in Tunisia and Libya however with the use of violent means which the effect could count as the use of terrorism to the government in charge. As violence increased security forced ordered to shoot with impunity defected. The Arab uprisings were less a cry for democracy than a demand for better governance and improved economic performance. Few citizens across the region directly attributed to democracy itself the changes, good or bad, that the uprisings brought. By this measure at least, the uprisings and the events that followed did little to dampen the overall demand for democracy in the region as a whole. Citizens have continued to believe, as they did before the protests, that democracy is the best form of government and that the regimes in their countries have a long way to go to become fully democratic. Tunisia, the place where the Arab uprisings began and the site of the greatest progress toward democracy since then, represents an exception to this broader trend in public opinion. Since the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, Tunisians have grown increasingly concerned about the effects of democracy and have become less likely to say that this system is suitable for their country. Despite these trends, however, the vast majority of Tunisians continue to say that democracy, whatever its problems, is the best system of government for their country. As the Tunisian case suggests, Arab publics are responding mainly to developments at home rather than to wider regional factors. Thus Egyptians, unlike Tunisians, have been disinclined to hold democracy responsible for their country’s rocky political course, and instead have blamed the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. This decision about where to place blame in turn reflects factors specific to the political situation as it has unfolded in Egypt since dictator Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign in February 2011.
In Tunisia, there is clear
promise in the areas of freedom of association and freedom of expression, and
media freedom in particular. A fairly open field for the exercise of these
rights has emerged, in stark contrast to the deeply repressive environment for
news media and civic groups under the Ben Ali regime. Civil society and trade
unions since January 14, 2011, have operated with a degree of openness and
independence that was unimaginable before that date. In addition, spirited
political jockeying took place ahead of October’s constituent assembly
elections and the elections themselves proved to be open, competitive, and
pluralistic. But these gains do not mean that Tunisia has already cemented
institutional reforms in the media, civil society, or electoral politics.
Instead, they represent a promising early advance toward a culture of
transparency and pluralism that must be safeguarded with concrete legal and
regulatory changes. If citizens, political leaders, and other influential
figures make the right choices, they can fortify Tunisia’s nascent democracy
against the challenges it will inevitably face.
In Egypt, the months since
Mubarak’s ouster have revealed a much darker outlook for reform. As of the end
of October, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had resorted to familiar
methods of repression, including severe curbs on the activities of civil
society and independent media, and foment of sectarian tensions for political
gain. The SCAF’s extension and expansion in September 2011 of the country’s
oppressive emergency law, a hallmark of the Mubarak era, sent a chilling signal
to those working toward democratic governance. The scope of the law—nominally
restricted in 2010 to narcotics and terrorism offenses—was widened to include
labor strikes, traffic disruptions, and the spread of false information.
Egypt could achieve almost
immediate progress by opening and defending the space for civil society and the
news media, while ensuring fair, open, and transparent elections in November
2011. But if these first-tier reforms in the areas of free expression and
association are not enacted and are prevented from growing roots, then the more
difficult overhauls of the judiciary, security services, and other state
institutions are far less likely to follow or succeed.
Tunisians favoured giving
religious leaders a say over government decisions in 2011, this percentage held
steady during the transition. In 2013, the share of Tunisians agreeing with
this statement was 24 percent, suggesting that support for political Islam may
even have gone up a bit. Meanwhile, trust in Ennahda, the main Islamist party,
also stayed fairly stable, dipping only five points to 35 percent. Taken
together, these results imply that the attitudes of Tunisians toward the
relationship between religion and politics and the country’s main Islam-based
movement changed little following the transition. Differences between the
Tunisian and Egyptian transitions likely explain the contrasting effects on
public opinion. In Tunisia, Ennahda won only a plurality of National
Constituent Assembly seats and formed a weak “troika” government with two
secular parties. Although feeble and unsteady, this arrangement fostered an
environment of democratic compromise and relative inclusiveness. Rather than
blame Ennahda or its ideology for transition-era travails, Tunisians updated
their beliefs about the costs and benefits of a democratic system. In Egypt,
Islamists won a commanding majority in parliamentary elections and narrowly won
the presidency. In November 2012, President Mohamed Morsi decreed that he would
be above the law pending the ratification of a new constitution. Soon
thereafter, the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly finalized a draft
constitution with no support from secular or minority voices. The Arab uprisings not only sparked major
transformations in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, but also spurred
limited reforms in others, among them Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco. Despite all
these changes, however, publics across the region in 2013 tended to rate their
regimes as no more or less democratic than had been the case in 2011.
Tunisians, for example, had experienced free and fair elections but were still
no more likely to say that their regime was democratic (BBC, 2017). EU
announced its support for the democratic progress in Tunisia and Egypt, which
was followed by further unrest in several other Arab states, potentially
leading to radical changes of Middle East polity. An affirmative wording became
part of official EU documents, as it for instance could be seen when in 2011
the EU launched its renewed European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), stating that
the “EU needs to rise to the historical challenges in our neighborhood.” This
new version of the ENP was characterized by two significant elements. First of
all, the new policy allowed for an increased differentiation regarding the
links between each ENP-partner and the EU as to cater to the needs and
aspirations of the specific Mediterranean state. The principle of ‘more for
more’ was the second central pillar of the reformulated ENP, together with the
opposite, a principle of ‘less for less’. The latter signaled that the EU
intended to downgrade its relations with regimes, which violated human rights,
including making use of targeted sanctions.
The Algerian government
removed its incongruous 19-year state of emergency. Oman’s elected legislature
got the authority to pass laws. Sudan’s war criminal president promised not to
seek reselection. All the oil-rich states committed to wealth redistribution or
the extension of welfare services. But real-world politics is not just what
happens offline. A classically trained social scientist trying to explain the
Arab Spring would point to statistics on the youth bulge, declining economic
productivity, rising wealth concentration, high unemployment, and low quality
of life. These explanatory factors are often part of the story of social
change. It does not diminish their important causal contribution to the Arab
Spring to also say that digital media shaped events and outcomes: digital media
were singularly powerful in getting out protest messages, in driving the
coverage by mainstream broadcasters, in connecting frustrated citizens, and in
helping them realize that they shared grievances and could act together to do
something about their situation.
Evidence of NATO Support of Terrorism during the 2011 Arab Spring
There is significant evidence
to suggest that the Arab Spring in Libya, Syria and Tunisia were one of the
main reasons to the rise of terrorist activities thorough the Middle East with
criminal gang’s acquiring large scale military grade equipment from NATO and
who were benefiting from the large scale breakdown of law and order and also
the collapse of the criminal justice system. Some of the criminal and terrorist
activities included: “people trafficking, arbitrary detention, torture,
unlawful killing, indiscriminately attack, abduction, bombings and rape” (The
Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016).
‘The U.S. supported opposition which overthrew Libya’s Gadaffi was largely comprised of Al Qaeda terrorists’. (Brad Hoff, 2017).
According to a 2007 report by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Centre, ‘the Libyan city of Benghazi was one of Al Qaeda’s main headquarters and bases for sending Al Qaeda and fighters of the Salafi-Jihadist movement’ into Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen during and before the start of the 2011 Arab Spring who wanted to destabilise and overthrow the governments in those countries (The Combating Terrorism centre, 2017).

The Hindustan Times reported in March 2011: ‘There is no question that Al Qaeda’s Libyan franchise, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, is a part of the opposition,’ Bruce Riedel, former CIA officer and a leading expert on terrorism, told Hindustan Times (Yashwant Raj, 2017). It has always been Gaddafi’s greatest enemy and its main stronghold is Benghazi. It is also reported that Al Qaeda flags were flown in the Benghazi courthouse once Gaddafi was toppled.
Gaddafi was on the verge of invading Benghazi in 2011, 4 years after the West
Point report cited Benghazi as a hotbed of Al Qaeda and Salafi terrorists.
Gaddafi claimed – rightly it turns out – that Benghazi was an Al Qaeda
stronghold and a main source of the Libyan rebellion.  But NATO planes stopped
him, and protected Benghazi. ‘The White House and senior Congressional
members,’ the group wrote in an interim report released Tuesday, ‘deliberately
and knowingly pursued a policy that provided material support to terrorist
organizations in order to topple a ruler Muammar Gaddafi who had
been working closely with the West actively to suppress al-Qaeda (BBC,
2017). “Some look at it as treason,” said Wayne Simmons, a former CIA officer who
participated in the commission’s research.
The Aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring
of 2017, it seems that only in its birthplace, Tunisia, has the Arab Spring
been successful in the establishment of something which vaguely resembles a
Western style democratic system. Egypt saw its first-ever
democratically-elected president, the pro-Islamist Mohammed Morsi, overthrown
in a military coup in 2013 led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Libya has descended
into a civil war of its own, with four factions vying for supremacy: the
democratically elected Council of Deputies, Libya Dawn (an Islamist
organisation backed by Qatar, Sudan and Turkey), the Shura Council of Benghazi
Revolutionaries (again an Islamist organisation) and Islamic State. Syria
meanwhile presents a most complicated picture: Assad and the Free Syrian Army
are still fighting against one another; both are fighting against Islamic
State; an American-Arab League air force is bombing ISIS bases in eastern
Syria; and the Kurds are busy establishing an independent state in the north.
The Syrian civil war has become something of a proxy war, with behind the
scenes Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran all manoeuvring for advantage.
rise of Isis was in direct response to the funding and arming of rebel groups
such as the Free Syrian (BBC, 2017). American troops from Iraq in December
2011. In April 2013 Islamic State was created by a fusion of the Islamic State
of Iraq and the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (although not all members
of Jabhat al-Nusra support this. The Arab Spring protests were partly caused by
the rise on food prices across the region: one of the first actions by Islamic
State in any new territory it takes control of is to lower the price of bread.
As is often the case, people will submit to any kind of regime if their
personal safety is assured.
speech and civil society and arrested those calling for political change.
According to some analysts, Al Qaeda has some regional interests, which include
the ousting of the Shiite-aligned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while
supporting Islamists in the Middle East to attain power; or some of the goals
already achieved through recent Arab Spring uprisings, which have politically
destabilized the region already (Williams 2013). We are conscious of the
current turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, while various components
of Al-Qaeda hope to be able to consolidate amid the lawlessness and power
vacuums that have emerged in some regions following successful revolutions and
in areas experiencing on-going conflict. Equally aware, however, of Al-Qaeda’s
increasing marginalization, the group’s media publications continue to strive
to present jihadism as the most appropriate way to protect collective
interests, eliminate adversaries, eradicate vice and establish a zealously
pious social order. (Holbrook 2012). However, the biggest problem has been how
the Arab Spring took a lot of pressure off Islamic radical groups and allowed
these fanatics to more easily recruit, raise money, and organize more violence.
The revived Islamic terror groups promptly began attacking their former allies
(the secular and democratic reformers) as well as Westerners. The leaders of
the Arab Spring movements were initially sympathetic to Islamic radical groups,
seeing them as fellow victims of the old dictatorship. Now most of the Arab
Spring leaders see the Islamic radicals as more interested in imposing another
 In 2011, the authorities carried out a major
campaign of repression in the wake of the Arab uprisings by censoring public
discussion of the movement for Arab democratization, prosecuting or arbitrarily
detaining scores of social-media commentators and human rights lawyers, and
strengthening the online censorship of domestic social-networking services.
However to the contrary violence continued unabated in 2011, with high-profile
political assassinations and high civilian casualty rates in Libya, Syria and
2011 drew to a close, officials in Egypt made headlines by conducting a series
of raids on NGOs that monitor human rights and promote democracy. Most of the
targeted organizations were Egyptian; a few were international groups (Freedom
House was one of the latter). The authorities were insistent that the raids,
which included the seizure of files and computers, were legal and technical in
nature. Government officials emphasized and reemphasized that they believed
human rights organizations had a role to play in a democratic Egypt. Their
actions indicated otherwise. In fact, the behaviour of the Egyptian
authorities, now and under Mubarak, reflects a deep-seated hostility to NGOs
that support democracy and human rights
were many heroes, many casualties, and many martyrs to freedom’s cause in 2011.
There were also many extraordinary achievements. Authoritarians who aspired to
rule in perpetuity were toppled in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and autocratic
heads of state in Yemen and Syria however who would know what would replace the
authoritarian structures of law and order, society and education
Foreign countries especially the West
including Britain, USA and France were the first countries to take advantage of
the deteriorating situation in the Middle East whilst not condemning the
violence, used this as a pretext to intervene in Sovereign nations for the
benefit of them self and not for the ordinary civilians  (Greenwald, 2017). 
The USA had early discomfort with democracy
as a foreign policy during the 2011 Arab Spring. ‘Despite the unfortunate
characterization that it was leading from behind, America’s firmness in
assisting NATO’s Libyan campaign was an important step. After initial
hesitation, the administration has also cautiously supported the process of
building democratic systems in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya’. It is a strong
contradiction where the NATO bombings were a pretext of getting rid of Muammar
Gaddafi and there was no plan on how the establish democracy after arming
terrorist groups according to the (Atlantic, 2017).
conclusion it is clear that the 2011 Arab Spring was a factor that caused the
rise of terrorist activities throughout the Middle East and the wider region.
Evidence of large scale protests harboured terrorist organisation such as
Al-Qeada who wanted to see revolutions take place throughout the Middle East
and the cause of the rise of ISIS who have pledged to reign terror around the
world. However other factors are responsible such as the British and US arming
rebel groups in Syria and Libya. NATO bombing campaigns in Libya. Democracies
were successful in Tunisia and Egypt, also in Libya but it is very difficult to
comprehend whether living conditions and freedoms have improved since the 2011
Arab Spring.
The 2011 Arab the rise of Democracy or Terrorism?
(The Combating Terrorism centre, 2017)

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Greenwald, G. (2017, 01 11). The
Intercept. Retrieved from

The U.S. Intervention in Libya Was Such a Smashing Success That a Sequel Is Coming

International Criminal Court. (2016,
January 1). Case Sheet Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,. Retrieved from
Michigan State University. (1994 –
2016). Global Edge. Retrieved December 27, 2016, from
The Combating Terrorism centre.
(2017, January 14). Al‐Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at
the Sinjar Records,. Retrieved from University of Oregen,:
The Foreign Affairs Committee.
(2016). HC 119 Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s
future policy options. Retrieved december 27, 2016, from
THE SOUFAN GROUP. (2017, January 2).
FOREIGN FIGHTERS An Updated Assessment of the Flow of,. Retrieved from
United Nations. (2017, January 20). UN
Human Rights council,. Retrieved from
United Nations Security council.
(2011). Resolution 1970 (2011). Retrieved December 27, 2016, from
Us Department of State. (2017,
January 3). Libya,. Retrieved from State Gov,:
Williams. (2017, January 22).
Retrieved from
Yashwant Raj. (2017, January 14). The
Hindustan Times,. Retrieved from
Key words and definition:
Democracy: a system of
government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state,
typically through elected representatives.
Terrorism: the unofficial or
unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham

Arab Spring and US Travel Ban

Orientalism: The Arab Spring and
U.S. Travel Ban
Donald Trump has continuously urged Arab and Islamic leaders to unite and
contribute their share in the name of defeating Islamist extremists. He has
made an impassioned plea about undermining terrorists all the while toning down
his own harsh rhetoric about Muslims. This would indicate that the West, led by
Trump is engaged with developing a people’s uprising throughout the Arab world
that can be commonly referred to as an “Arab Spring”. The countries most
involved in an Arab Spring would be Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. The West, led by
Trump, has recently singled out Iran as a primary source of providing financing
and support for militant groups. His words have resonated with the views of his
Western backers and have delivered the unmistakable message to Middle East
extremists: We want you out of influence. The president has not used the term
“radical Islamic terrorism” in his exhortations, a signal that he has
finally taken advice to use a more moderate tone in the region after using that
unfortunate phrase often as a tool by which to galvanize the fledgling Arab
Spring. But yet the US president displays a penchant for Orientalism in his
thinking and that is evident in his attempt to whittle down very complex
problems into convenient sound-bites. It is true that terrorism has spread all
across the world. But the path to peace begins with the Arab Spring, a term
given to the “wave of
citizen revolts that are toppling, challenging or reforming regimes” (Khouri,
2011). Trump’s approach though contains elements that cannot be
differentiated from that of classic approaches concerning Orientalism. The
leader of the free world has told leaders from numerous Muslim-majority
countries representing more than a billion people that their future is in their
own hands. Trump declares: “A better future is only possible if your
nations drive out the terrorists and drive out the extremists. Drive them out!
Drive them out of your places of worship, drive them out of your communities,
drive them out of your holy land and drive them out of this earth”
(Holland, 2017). The president’s actions and words concerning Middle East
policy provided an opportunity to show his strength and resolve, and also
demonstrate an unwitting incorporation of the tenets of Orientalism into his
rhetoric. Orientalism can be defined as “a political vision of reality whose
structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, us)
and the strange (the Orient, the East, them)” (Said, 1979). In contrast to the
vested interest that the Western world has in propagating the Arab Spring,
Trump’s domestic policies include the ongoing travel ban on predominantly
Muslim countries.

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The conflict
between East and West is often simply portrayed as one between good and evil.
That observations smacks of Orientalism in its most basic form. This is
ideological conflict that exists, not conflict between civilizations. The
desire to propagate the Arab Spring is clear in the rhetoric delivered in a
forceful tone that Washington will partner with the Middle East but expected
more action in return. But there is still much work to be done in the sphere of
East/West relations. That means honestly confronting the crisis of Islamic
extremism, and the Islamists, and Islamic terror of all kinds. The terror faced
by many Muslims is definitely tangible and an affront to the notion of basic
human rights. But Orientalism fans the flames of conflict. Islamist extremism
is often responsible for this aspect of Middle Eastern instability. The term
“Islamist extremism” refers to Islamism as a political movement rather
than Islam as a religion, a distinction that the Western world sometimes
seriously overlooks in its attempts to explain the frequent strife that makes
the region so controversial.
The connection that Canada has with this ongoing issue constantly promoted by US President Trump aligns with oil prices and immigration. The fear of terrorism is something that Trump leans on to promote his security-obsessed right-wing ideology and political stance. It is largely responsible for his travel ban on Muslim countries. The fallout from this ban is painfully apparent in the human cost. Families are torn apart as they wait for clearance at major U.S. airports. This too becomes an illustration of the basic ignorance at the core of all forms of Orientalism. This has not gone unnoticed by many American citizens. They express their outrage and frustration with the US leadership by staging acts where they “stormed airports to protest Trump’s travel ban” (Ball, 2018).  Such actions have also tied as diversion from other issues plaguing the White House. Interestingly, these acts highlight the differences between the US and Canada in terms of attitudes towards religion. Whereas Canada interprets religious beliefs as mainly outlets for faith and prayer rituals, Americans understand religious identity as potentially holding a degree of violence or terrorism. The result of that belief is that millions of integrated American citizens who innocently hold Islamic beliefs merely as religious comfort are misidentified as terrorists by the Trump administration. This affects daily life for those who complete such everyday activities as using public transit; they are often in a heightened state of fear due to the overwhelming negativity that surrounds the reporting of terrorism-themed news and events. This is a direct consequence of the Orientalist approach to understanding the world.
of the faults of Orientalism is that it is an attempt at reducing what are
often military campaigns and their relationships to desired democracy to a
simple mathematical formula. Nations that undergo a military intervention are
believed to be some 15% more likely to make democratic political systems a
priority. And that is the type of linear thought that Orientalism seeks to
incorporate. “That Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than
the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques
of representation that make the Orient, clear, visible, “there” in discourse
about it” (Said, 1979). Therefore, we rely on our own Western-developed
perceptions about what the Middle East is and isn’t. This is inherently
dangerous though. Anger towards Western political ideologies run rampant
throughout the Arab world. Up until relatively recently, suicide bombers were
the norm and not the exception within many Muslim countries where the populace
had grown tired of their leaders’ constant capitulation towards Western
It is
expressed that demonstrating the banner of support can be an unobtrusive
technique for presenting or showing an enthusiasm for national issues taken up
by outside influences. Yet definitely those at first encouraged by its
appearance will wind up frustrated with an implied helping hand that yields no
tangible outcomes. In such confused circumstances, it might inversely affect
the individuals who eagerly welcome the ramifications of direct outside
influence or mediation. It would be a tremendous break in confidence to leave
the individuals who cheered a normal show of bolstered support in such a harsh
glare. This can be considered as another reason to get Orientalism out of the
minds of Western interference in the Middle Eastern ideologies. The so-called
Arab Spring will do fine under its own steam and could probably benefit from an
absence of US-led cheerleading. Slowly but surely, the Middle east is adopting
the tenets of Western-style democracy. No longer is it true that “Islam is
inherently antithetical to American democracy, and Muslims presumptively
subversive and suspicious” (Beydoun, 2017).
Finally, it
is startling to note just how complacent the North American public has become
in its treatment of Trump’s Muslim country travel ban. The travel ban imposed
on non-U.S. citizens was a shock to the system of these airports, where many
tired, hungry, and stymied people where essentially left with no recourse
whatsoever about being able to plan their own travel itineraries. The slight
differences that exist in personal approaches to implementing such rules are
often not in existence in US politics where the concept of shocking and awing
seems to be coming more and more commonplace. A few scant years ago, at JFK
airport in NYC for example, the “Islamophobia rising to the fore during the
2016 presidential campaign was not created by the candidates; rather, it was
embedded in established American law, policies, and political rhetoric”
(Beydoun, 2017). It is somewhat likely that President Trump may have requested
that Canada obey the travel ban but here in Canada it is pleasant to believe
that such short-sighted Orientalism does not pervade political and legal
thought when it comes to law and policy.
In conclusion,
it can be observed how Orientalism infiltrates Western thought and leaves us
with the erroneous sense that the rest of the world needs some kind of
leadership and correction that only we in the West can provide. The twin
examples of the Arab Spring and the Muslim travel ban provide examples that
illustrate the dangers of including Orientalist tendencies into our collective
political and legal consciousness.  The
topics are lightning rods for controversy and the basic ignorance that becomes
inserted to them through Orientalism is the reason for this. Orientalism, it
can be concluded, leads to a fundamental sense of Islamophobia. This unfortunate
premise can be defined as “the presumption that Islam is inherently violent,
alien, and unassimilable . . . and the belief that expressions of Muslim
identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism’’ (Beydoun, 2017). It
must be said that such fear should not be allowed to permeate political thought
in the world as it stands in 2018.
Ball, M. (2018). Redder. Bluer. Trumpier. America Is About to Be Even More Divided. Time. Retrieved November 2018 from, K. (2017).‘‘MUSLIM BANS’’ AND THE (RE)MAKING OF POLITICAL ISLAMOPHOBIA. Holland, S. (2017). Trump tells Middle East to ‘drive out’ Islamist extremists. Reuters. Retrieved November 2018 from, R. (2011). Arab Spring or Revolution. The Globe and Mail.Said, E. (1979). Orientalism.

Country Analysis Of The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, once seven independent states under British oversight, has emerged into a global economic powerhouse because of its abundant natural resources, successful financial investments, and extensive focus on real estate and tourism. Having the world’s sixth largest oil reserves and fifth largest natural gas reserves, the UAE is poised for year over year economic growth, which has allowed them to focus more heavily on economic diversification and political reform. As this desert country continues to grow, so does their reliance on energy, which has spurred a major governmental effort to identify renewable energy sources to offset consumption. Renewable energy initiatives that the UAE have pursued drove the investment recommendations made in this analysis.

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UAE’s economy has seen extreme growth in recent years, as seen by above average GDP and eight figure year-over-year trade surpluses since 2003. This economic boom is more impressive when considering the country’s strong push to alleviate its reliance on oil exports and diversify into other industries. Currently, profits from oil exports represent roughly 33% of the economy. Volatile oil prices, which heavily correlate to UAE profitability, are becoming less important to overall financial growth. Actions like this help to mitigate risk for potential investors and should make the UAE more attractive in the foreign investment arena.
Capital markets in the UAE are also modern and robust. They enjoy two stock exchanges, have implemented an extensive market oversight organization to protect the integrity of their markets, and have created several government-owned investment institutions to help foster investment diversification. The Emirates welcome new business, as they have established Free Trade Zones that offer many benefits to investors that set up operations within UAE borders. The UAE ranks number one among Arab countries in foreign investment and is considered a global business center for its constant pursuit of social, economic, and technological advancement.
Political reform has been prevalent in the UAE throughout history. The first federal constitution was established in 1971 that brought these seven Trucial States together to operate as one entity. Although the UAE has experienced some growing pains in transferring authority from individual states to a federal governing body, the political stability is high. The UAE has recently rolled out a detailed, objective action plan called “Vision 2021” to help them methodically reach their goal over having balanced power among state dictatorship and federal policy.
The UAE has seen massive growth in its economy, population, infrastructure, and energy consumption for many years. The citizens of the UAE emit more greenhouse gases per person than any other country, and because of its geographic location, nearly all of their buildings are air-conditioned and water is obtained through energy-intensive desalination plants. Because of the exponential increases in demand for electricity, the UAE has focused its efforts on developing renewable energy sources. Estimates currently project that the demand for domestic power will more than double by 2020, and the UAE is tackling these consumption hikes head-on. Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, is aiming to obtain 7% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020 and is currently planning the construction of a zero-waste city that will rely solely on renewable energy sources. This renewable energy push poses significant foreign investment opportunities, as an already economically-thriving country aims to eliminate energy reliance in parallel with having world-leading economic growth.
United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was established in 1971 and is comprised of seven independent emirates or states, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah Ajman and Ra’s al-Khaimah. It is located on the Arabian Peninsula and occupies 32,000 square miles between Saudi Arabia and Oman on the Persian Gulf. The country is over 80% desert and has no natural water sources. (The UAE, 2010)
As the largest of the emirates, occupying more than 75% of the country (United Arab Emirates, 2011), Abu Dhabi is the country’s capital. Another major city is Dubai, which is considered to be a financial and commercial mecca for the country.
The UAE’s history dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries when the dominant tribe in the area was the Qawasim. The Qawasim’s control of the maritime trade routes in the lower Persian Gulf and much of the Indian Ocean eventually provoked the British into a naval attack in 1819. After defeating the Qawasim, the British signed a series of treaties with the sheikhs of each of the emirates to preserve a maritime truce. This eventually led to the area becoming known as the Trucial States. In the truce, the sheikhs agreed not to engage in foreign relations or to relinquish any of their territories without British consent. In exchange, they were promised protection against naval attack, and assistance in any land attacks.
In January 1968 the British announced that they would be withdrawing from the Persian Gulf. Over the next three years, the emirates that made up the Trucial States worked to form their own federation. Agreement was finally reached between Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and Ajman on December 2, 1971, and the United Arab Emirates was formed. On February 10, 1972 the seventh and final emirate, Ra’s al-Khaimah, joined the federation. (United Arab Emirates, 2011)
Currency & Exchange Rate Arrangements
After federation of the UAE in 1973, a new national currency was created, the Emirati Dirham (AED). In 1997 the AED was fixed and pegged to the US Dollar (USD). Currently pegged at a rate of 3.673 (The World Factbook: United Arab Emirates, 2011), this remains the country’s currency arrangement today. However, prior to the implementation of the AED in 1973, a host of different currency arrangements were used throughout the region.
Prior to 1966, the Persian Gulf rupee was the currency utilized in the Arabian Peninsula, which was pegged to the British pound (GPD) at a rate of 13.33. (Symes) Due to a devaluation of this currency in June 1966, the Bahraini dinar and the Qatar-Dubai riyal were adopted by the emirates.
The Bahraini dinar (BHD) debuted in 1965 in Bahrain, an island nation located north of the UAE in the Persian Gulf. The BHD was adopted by Abu Dhabi in 1966 and was used until 1973 when it was replaced by the Emirati Dirham. (Symes) It is currently pegged to the US Dollar at a rate of 0.377.
The Qatar-Dubai riyal was introduced in 1966 as a result of the Qatar-Dubai Currency Agreement. This agreement was reached between the countries of Qatar and Dubai because of a push by Britain for the Trucial States to take responsibility for their economic future. The Qatar-Dubai riyal was used by all of the emirates except Abu Dhabi from 1966 until 1973. Its value was equal to that of the Persian Gulf rupee prior to its devaluation. (Symes)
Political Structure
The formation of UAE meant significant changes to the overarching political structure. The creation of the constitution of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 established some formality within the conglomerate, although individual states still maintained significant power to control finances and natural resources. Since much disparity exists between the size, maturation, and political complexity within each emirate, the political environment is much different as well. The most developed emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have fairly sophisticated governments comprised of multiple hierarchical levels, while more remote settlements typically have only one ruler and several local representatives who are appointed solely by the ruler.
The UAE constitution established executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and called for the formation of a number of fundamental councils to sustain these branches. The Federal Supreme Council has both legislative and executive powers, and is comprised of each emirate’s ruler and a separate President and Vice President who are elected by the Council every five years. All general policy, enactment or ratification of federal laws, overarching financial decisions, and international relations strategies are made by the Federal Supreme Council. The Federal National Council, UAE’s version of a Parliament and main legislative entity, is a 40-member body that represents the voice of the UAE constitution. Fifty percent of these members are chosen by an Electoral College, while the remaining twenty members are chosen by emirate rulers. The FNC has the authority to amend federal legislation and, amongst other duties, is responsible for reviewing the federal budget and managing international activities. The UAE constitution also formed the Federal Judiciary, which consists of five appointed judges. These judges have the authority to try cases involving senior officials, and often rules on disputes between emirate entities.
The biggest barrier that the UAE government has faced since its inception is the lack of cohesion between local policy and federal oversight. The UAE is growing and developing rapidly, and it is imperative to tailor the political systems to make them more responsive to the country’s needs as it faces the challenges of this development. Much emphasis has been placed on formalizing the local political environment to provide more stability and consistency from emirate to emirate, as well as ensuring that local government policy is representative of the federal political strategy and values. The first major breakthrough occurred in 2007, when the UAE launched the “UAE Government Strategy”. This strategy outlined a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing the six UAE government strategy sectors: social development, economic development, public sector development, justice and safety, infrastructure, and rural development. This initial reform strategy was undoubtedly a success, as the UAE has made significant strides towards unifying political efforts and operating within a common framework.
In 2010, the UAE announced its “Vision 2021”, which vowed to steer the country through upcoming challenges by operating efficiently and responsibly, displaying determination and innovation, and by being proactive in all governmental matters. The UAE is driving towards their vision very methodically, as the government recently released its “Government Strategy 2011-2013” as the first step to achieving the goals outlined in Vision 2021. This Government Strategy outlines seven general principles, seven strategic priorities, and seven strategic enablers that will be used when developing strategic and operational plans and will push the country closer to its vision (See Exhibit 1).
The political environment of the UAE is changing rapidly. The balance of power is slowly shifting from individual states to a central government entity through the establishment of an overarching constitution and the creation of formal federal councils. Individual emirate states have been slow to embrace this cohesion. Inter-state relationships have historically been relatively unstable in the UAE, which was highlighted in 2009 when Abu Dhabi provided Dubai with a $10B bailout when they could not repay a $4.1B Islamic bond and was in financial turmoil with creditors. This bailout caused strife between the two largest and most powerful UAE entities, and questions still linger as to whether Dubai will be able to meet its financial commitments.
Despite these recent events and overall political reform, the UAE political system is relatively stable. World Bank currently ranks the political stability of UAE in the 74th percentile of countries, while all Middle Eastern countries have a combined rating in the 37th percentile. Government effectiveness is also rated exceptionally high: in the 77th percentile (Middle Eastern countries combined are rated in the 48th percentile). Business Monitor International ranks UAE political stability at 82.1 (of 100). BMI uses specific objective data to analyze political risks, including distribution of wealth, policy stability, foreign relations, etc. These political risk ratings highlight the effectiveness of UAE’s government reform efforts. Despite residing in a hostile region, having individual states that control almost all local governmental matters, and the presence of rivalries within the states, UAE is viewed as having a stable political environment (See Exhibit 2).
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Over the past forty years, the UAE has transformed from a relatively unknown country into a thriving economic force. The UAE economy is the third largest in the Middle East behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their financial success started with the exportation of oil, an abundant resource in the UAE, and since then their economy has grown into other industries such as financial services, trade, retail sale, real estate, and tourism. The following discusses the UAE economy in detail.
Foundations of Economy
Oil was discovered in the lands of what is now the UAE in the early 1930’s. Once discovered, oil exportation began, and oil sales continued to grow, especially throughout the 1960’s. In 1971, the seven emirates formed the UAE, becoming the only Arab federation in the world. As the oil business continued to grow and prosper, the UAE used its financial success to develop the country and expand their economic goals. The UAE has since grown exponentially as an economy, due to success in areas such as natural gas exportation, foreign investment, trade, financial services, real estate, and tourism. Its government policies have also helped to spur this rapid growth. The UAE promotes a free market through its free trade zones created to attract foreign investment.
As much of the world faced financial struggles in the past few years, Dubai was hit especially hard. Similar to the real estate problems recently faced by the U.S., Dubai real estate prices rose constantly due to over-speculation on the assumed future value of property. When demand for real estate did not meet investors’ high expectations, Dubai was left owing billions in debt it could not pay. The Central Bank of the UAE provided Dubai a $10 billion loan to pay off its debt obligations. As a result of these recent financial difficulties, growth in the short term appears to be slower than recent years as the country recovers from its financial downturn. The UAE economy grew at a rate of 2.5 % in 2010. However, the economy should rebound in time. Its projected growth rate in 2011 is 3% and targets a 5% rate in 2012 and beyond. In the long term, the UAE will more than likely return to the fast-paced economic growth it enjoyed in previous years.
Current Analysis of UAE Economy
As discussed above, the country has faced extreme financial growth in the early 2000’s, but has dropped significantly in growth through 2008, 2009, and 2010. We will now analyze the performance of UAE’s economy by examining the gross domestic product, economic performance indicators, international trade, and resources and infrastructure.
Gross Domestic Product
Since 2003, the UAE’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has exceeded the worlds GDP every year. In 2009, the GDP of both the UAE and the world declined, but the UAE’s growth rate of -0.7% was better than the world’s growth rate of -1.9% (Worldbank). According to the UAE government website, this decrease in GDP was based on a decrease in oil prices. The per barrel price dropped from $95 in 2008 to $60 in 2009. The government projected a real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2010. The UAE currently ranks 35th in the world in GDP at around $230 Billion (Worldbank). UAE’s per capita GDP rose steadily from $23,523 in 2003 to $58,272 in 2008, but fell to $50,070 in 2009. The overall world per capita GDP faced a decline in 2009 as well. The UAE ranks 7th in the world in per capita GDP. The GDP growth and GDP per capita indicators show that the UAE’s economy is growing at a high rate in comparison to the rest of the world.
The non-oil sector industries that contribute to UAE’s GDP (UAE Govt Website):

Manufacturing – 16.2%
Construction – 10.7 %
Wholesale and retail trade and repairing services – 9%
Real estate – 8.2 %
Government services – 8.0 %
Transportation, storage, and communication – 7.1 %
Financial services – 5.8 %
Hotels and restaurants – 1.8 %
Agriculture, livestock, and fishing – 1.7 %
Electricity, gas, and water – 1.6 %
Household services – 0.5 %

Economic Performance Indicators
The UAE faced double-digit inflation rates from 2005 through 2008, anywhere from 13-19% per year. In 2009, the UAE’s inflation rate dropped to -11.3% (Worldbank). These dramatic increases and decreases are substantially different from the 2-3% cost of living annual increase that most economies target. UAE officials project that inflation will remain around 2% this year (Khaleejtimes).UAE’s unemployment rate has slowly risen from 2.75% in 2004 to 4.25% in 2010 (Trading Economics). Although unemployment has risen, it is still low in comparison to many other countries around the world. UAE’s Growth Rate of Industrial Production was 3.2% in 2010 (estimate), ranking them 102nd in the world (CIA)(analysis). The current interest rate of the UAE, called the Emirates Interbank Offered Rate (EIBOR), is 2.5% for a one year loan (Worldbank). The EIBOR one year interest rate has remained at or near 2.5% since the end of 2009. The average overall interest rates have dropped in the past four years. In 2007, the average interest rate was 5.5% (Trading Economics). As of January 2011, the current average interest rate in the UAE was 1%. The UAE government spent around 32% of its GDP in 2010, and the UAE government will continue to operate in a budget surplus. The EIU forecasts that UAE’s budget surplus will continue to narrow in coming years, as the government budget will face deficits from 2013-2015 (EIU).
International Trade
The UAE exported $192 Billion in 2009 and imported $150 Billion, resulting in a trade surplus of $42 Billion (Trading Economics). The UAE has enjoyed a trade surplus between $20 Billion and $62 Billion since 2004. The UAE’s top importing partners are China, India, US, Germany and Japan (UAE Embassy). The top five exporting partners of the UAE are Japan, South Korea, India, Iran, and Thailand. The major exports of the UAE are oil, natural gas, re-exports, dried fish, and dates. The major imports of the country are machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, food (UAE Embassy).
Resources and Infrastructure
UAE land is rich in natural resources. The UAE contains about 10% of the world’s oil reserves, and has the world’s seventh largest supply of natural gas (UAE Embassy)(See exhibits 4 and 5). The exportation of oil is the major source of revenue for the UAE, accounting for about 30% of its annual GDP (UAE Embassy). The UAE government has used this oil revenue to invest heavily in the country’s infrastructure. These investments in the country have promoted the rapid growth of other industries in the UAE including tourism, re-export commerce, and telecommunications (UAE Embassy).
Short-Term and Long-Term Prospects/Forecasts
Short Term Forecast and Prospects
As the UAE continues to recover from the global financial struggles, growth in the next few years will be slower than the extreme growth rate it enjoyed in the recent past. The UAE’s GDP is expected to grow by 3.3% in 2011 (7days). Dubai plans to pay off its debt in 2011, which is a positive for the country. After 2011, the economy’s anticipated growth is 5% per year for the next few years (EIU). Inflation in the UAE is expected to rise by 2.8% in 2011(Arabian Business).
Oil exportation will remain a solid revenue stream for the country. Existing and newly developing non-oil industries will also enjoy growth in the coming years. Trade, tourism, and business service industries should maintain strong growth as the UAE continues to diversify its economy. Healthcare and Information Technology (outsourcing services, smartphones, servers, and disk storage) industries are anticipated to increase by 15-20% this year (Arabian Business).
High food prices are an immediate concern to the UAE and other countries in the Middle East. The UAE government has subsidized the food markets in the country. Political unrest in the Middle East and unused real estate in Dubai are also concerns. Inflation from rapid economic growth in non-oil industries is also a risk.
Long Term Forecast and Prospects
The UAE economy should remain strong for the next twenty years. Oil exports will provide a constant income source to the country. Volatile oil prices can be a threat to the economy, but the country’s foreign investments should provide enough support if and when oil prices drop (EIU). Other UAE industries should develop further as long as the country continues to invest in expanding these industries. Developing and employing its country’s people will be a focus in the coming years, as the country is heavily dependent on foreign workers. Inflation could also be a concern as the country continues to grow.
Exchange Rate Behavior and Forecasting
The United Arab Emirates dirham is pegged to the International Monetary Funds’s Special Drawing Rights. It is effectively also pegged to the U.S. dollar most of the time with the average exchange rate at 3.6725 USD/AED (See Exhibit 5).
In 2008, after reviewing its currency regime, the UAE decided to keep the dirham pegged to the US dollar for the next 30 years.
Capital Markets
The capital markets of the United Arab Emirates are very modern. There are two stock exchanges in the UAE: the NASDAQ Dubai and the Abu Dhabi Securities Market (ADSM). In keeping with Muslim teachings, all trading is based on assets or other tangible goods in order to avoid what is considered usury, which is not in compliance with sharia, an Islamic ethical foundation. Sharia has impacted the structure of financial institutions and the way certain investments such as gold are traded, but most offerings and services are similar to other parts of the world.
Stock Exchanges
NASDAQ Dubai opened in September 2005 and maintains investment standards that it considers comparable to those of leading international exchanges in New York, London and Hong Kong. NASDAQ Dubai offers both primary and equity listings for companies based in the region, as well as internationally-based companies representing Australia, China, United Kingdom and the United States.
NASDAQ Dubai offers a variety of options of investments including equities, debt, derivatives and other securities. As the market continues to grow, it has plans to expand its offerings including exchange-traded funds, subject to regulatory approval.
NASDAQ Dubai has set itself up to be the “international listing destination for equity securities in its region”. (NASDAQ Dubai) The region is defined as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes the UAE, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey and the Indian sub-continent.
 NASDAQ Dubai is the only exchange in the GCC region that offers:

A book-building IPO with full access for foreign investors
A free float of as little as 25% of issued share capital
International standards of regulation
Links to investors through a broad mix of local, regional and international Members
Contractual market-making, to provide liquidity
Multi-currency listings – including US dollar and UAE Dirham 
Minimum lock-up period of 180 days for founding shareholders
Over The Counter (OTC) trading

(NASDAQ Dubai)
The Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) was established in November 2000 and is primarily UAE companies. ADX is located in the emirate of Abu Dhabi but also has branches in Fujeirah, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah and Zayed City.
The exchange has high standards of protecting investors by requiring fair and accurate transactions with stringent controls. They also ensure financial and economic stability by creating trading that ensures liquidity and stability of the prices for the securities listed on the exchange.
Market Oversight
The UAE created the Securities & Commodities Authority (SCA) in 2000. Its mission is:
to protect investors and enhance the principles of sound and fair practices, and to improve the efficiency of UAE capital markets through the development of the necessary legislations, the enhancement of supervisory regulations and the development of investment and legal awareness. (Securities and Commodities Authority (UAE))
The UAE is trying to ensure that its markets are attractive to investors from around the world for listing and investing.
Government-owned Investment Institutions
The UAE has created several government-owned investment institutions that act like private-equity firms to help invest diversify the government’s investments. The focus is to create more overseas investments because the UAE realizes that its natural resources will one day be depleted.
These investment institutions recently clarified their roles and investment approaches in order to enhance international understanding and cooperation.  In particular, they clarified that they haven’t ever and will never use its investment organizations or individual investments as a foreign policy tool. (UAE US Embassy)
Foreign Investment
The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2007, issued by the World Economic Forum (WEF), ranks the UAE in the top position among Arab countries and in the 29th position among the 40 most advanced economies. It states that “Sound economic management has contributed to stabilizing the macroeconomic environment and strengthening public institutions.” (UAE US Embassy Financial Sector)
The UAE is considered a global business center and is trying to diversify from their reliance on natural resources by building up their economy in a variety of industries. While the UAE is becoming a more global economy, business is conducted on the basis of personal relationships and mutual trust so it is important to be patient and build these relationships rather than being too direct. Companies are still a family affair, with the ultimate decision-maker being the head of the family.
Establishing a Business
The regulations around the establishment and conduct of businesses are shared at the federal and emirate levels. There are three methods for establishing a business in the UAE:

Joint Partnerships
Branch Offices
Free Trade Zone
Joint Partnership

In order to establish a business that sells products or services freely throughout the UAE, at least 51% of the business must be owned by a UAE national. This type of business structure offers the broadest alternatives for operating a company in the UAE. All businesses require a license and licensing procedures vary from emirate to emirate.
Branch Offices
Foreign companies can establish wholly-owned branches and representative offices in the UAE, provided that a UAE national is appointed as a local agent. The UAE considers a branch office as a regular business that is permitted to perform and enter into contracts or conduct other activities as specified in the license of its parent company. 
The UAE national that is the local agent for the branch office assists with all the administrative requirements of setting up the office including obtaining visas, licenses and dealing with local authorities.
Free Zones
The UAE has numerous Free Trade Zones (FTZs) that can be an attractive alternative for foreign investors and businesses to set up operations. There are over 20,000 companies in 21 Free Zones around the UAE. Businesses in a FTZ can only conduct business within the FTZ or abroad. If the company desires to sell products in the UAE, a UAE official agent is required, and a joint venture needs to be formed.
Companies located in FTZs do not have the UAE ownership requirements that come with a joint partnership. All imports and exports in and out of the FTZ are exempt from tax and all profits are fully repatriated without penalty back to the company’s parent country. FTZs also offer no corporate tax for the first 15 years which is renewable for an additional 15-year period. No personal income tax exists either.
An independent Free Zone Authority (FZA) governs each free zone and is responsible for issuing FTZ operating licenses and assisting companies with establishing their business in the FTZ. Companies can either register a new company in the form of a Free Zone Establishment (FZE), which is a limited liability company governed by the rules and regulations of the Free Zone in which it is established, or establish a branch or representative office of their existing company based within the UAE or abroad.
Financial Market Performance, Future Outlook and Investment Opportunities
As a mainstay to the economy, oil exports now account for about 30 percent of total UAE gross domestic product. Since the UAE began exporting, it has been using the associated revenues to improve the quality of life for her people since 1969. The UAE is in a strategic location bordering the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, a vital transit point for world crude oil. With a prime location on the global map, the UAE has invested billions of dollars in logistics and infrastructure, capitalizing on its potential as a world-class logistics hub.
As the UAE builds wealth from oil exports, their rapid development will continue. The building of roads, office buildings, housing and so forth – all require more energy. Rising populations consume more energy as well (See Exhibits 6). Natural gas plays a disproportionate role in energy generation, accounting for 98 percent, and the increasing demand is surpassing available supply.
Economic growth across the UAE has led to massive increases in the demand for electricity. Current estimates indicate that the domestic demand for power will more than double by 2020, even given the global economic slowdown.

Arab – Israeli War 1967

Israel and Arabs have fought a number of wars after 1947. After the creation of Israel in 14 May 1948, Arab and Israel became front to front in 1949, 1956, and 1967 and in 1973. Among all those the war of 5 -10 June 1967 also famous for six days war was the one of the major conflict. For Arabs it was the revenge and for Israel it was a war of survival. The outcome of war became a defeat for Arabs and victory for Israel. The entire Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and Jordanian territory west of River Jordan including Jerusalem was captured by Israel. “This campaign taken as one of example in the history as decisive effects on striking to enemy defenses through deep penetration in very short period of time.” (Army command and staff collage, 2012).
The aim of this presentation is to analyze the decision making and brought out lesson learned from 1967 Arab Israel war.
Historical Background
Historically Arabs and Jews are sprung from the prophets Ismael and Issac both sons of prophet Abraham. Prophet Ismael is believed to be the ancestor of the Arabs while Prophet Issac became the ancestor of Jews. So for both the Palestine is holy land.
The creation of Israel on 14 May 1948 was the main cause between Jews and Arabs conflicts. Arabs considered the creation of Israel as an independent State is plot against the people of Palestine by the Europeans and Americans.
In 1956 Israel attack Egypt with the support of Britain and France to open Suez Canal. They occupied Gaza strip and large part of Sinai but left the area because of international pressure and 1967 war was taken as a sequel to these conflicts.
Major factors for the 1967 conflict
After the 1956 war there are many issues arises in this area. Arabs are looking to revenge for their loss in 1956 and for Israel it was always the survival after its creation. According to Rowman & Littlefield (2000) some of the important factors, which contributed directly towards escalation of 1967 conflict, are as follows:
a. Refusal of Arabs to recognize Israel as independent state.
Increasing activities of Palestinian guerrillas Al- FATEH against Israel.
b. Withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on 19 May 1967 that increased the already existing tension between Egypt and Israel.
c. The Mutual Defense Pact signed by Egypt and Syria in 4 Nov 1966 and Jordan – Egypt Defense Agreement on 30 May 1967 that strategically threaten the Israel
d. Closing of Channels of Tiran that cut off the Israeli access to Red sea. On which the Israelis immediately responded with a pre-emptive attack on June 5, 1967 that is starting of famous six-day war.
Analyze the 1967 War
Short six days war of 1967 change the big boundary in the Middle East. After this war Israelis strategic situation had changed and they became more stronger where as the Arabs faces the humiliating loss. Different historians analyzed this war in their different way. Army command and staff collage (2012) analyzed this six days war as follows.
National Aim/Objectives: Arabs had set for themselves the aim of achieving political victory over Israel. To achieve this, they signed defense pacts among themselves and planned to give economic, political, psychological and military pressure to Israel.
National Strategy: Ever since the creation of the Israel as independent State, the Arab’s national strategy is the destruction of it and creation of an independent Palestine.
Military Strategy: The Arabs had no offensive intention at the outset. Their total emphasis was on achieving a political victory and preventing Israel from going to war. Therefore, their military strategy was:
(1) Deterrence through troops concentration helping guerrilla activity and playing the card of ‘Crush Israel’, in the Arab world.
(2) Force mobilization for long duration and closing of Straits of Tiran, which Israel could not able to afford.
(3) If war is imposed, force Israel to fight war on three fronts, all from Sinai, Jordan and Syria.
Centre of Gravity: Arabs identified Israel Defense forces as the center of gravity. But they failed to notice that within these their strength lay in their mobility.
Concept of Operation:
a. War on more than two fronts to keep Israelis committed in all directions.
b. Initiate actions like forward concentration, guerrilla activities and closing of Straits of Tiran which will force Israel either to submit or attack the Arabs, which is politically advantageous for Arabs.
c. If the war starts, involve Israel in long-drawn war of attrition and exploit their numerical inferiority.
National Aim/Objectives: The national aim of Israel was the survival and defense of their homeland. Their strategic concept has been to avoid war but if a war is imposed they were to go for a quick and decisive war.
National Strategy: Israel had the national aim of ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country by employing all possible instruments of national power like: military, political and diplomatic.
Military Strategy: Israel military objective was offensive against Arabs for defense of their homeland. Therefore there military strategy was:
(1) Surprise Arabs both at strategic and tactical level to lure them into a false sense of complacency.
(2) Undertake a pre-emptive air strike to achieve complete air superiority over Sinai.
(3) Undertake a pre-emptive ground offensive too.
(a) Fight the war on enemy territory and seek decisive battle on their soil.
(b) Have a short and decided war destroying the Egyptian forces in Sinai.
(c) If Jordan and Syria also enter the war, then capture strategic objectives of West Bank of River Jordan and the Golan Heights.
Center of Gravity: Israelis rightly identified that within the three Arab countries the center of gravity laid in Egypt especially its armed forces. Once Egyptian Army Is destroyed, Syria and Jordan could never initiate an offensive on their own. They accordingly dealt with the Egyptian air and ground forces first deferring Syria and Jordan for the time being.
Concept of Operation:

Employment of all conceivable political and psychological measures to give an impression to Arabs that Israel had been outwitted in time and space and was not in a position to under-take a major offensive.
Having completely deceived the Arabs, acquire complete air superiority by under taking a pre-emptive air strike against Egyptian air bases followed by similar strikes against Jordanian and Syrian air bases.
Appreciating that center of gravity lay with Egyptian Army in Sinai, Israelis decided to affect a swift dislocation of Egyptian defenses by breaking-through the critical triangle of Rafah, EI-Arish and Abu Agheila, isolate them and then carry-out destruction of the trapped enemy.
Maintain initially a defensive posture against Syria and Jordan. And after secured and destroy the Egyptian side in the Sinai, concentrate forces against Jordan and Syria.

Main Reason of Loss/Achievement of War
Failure Threat Perception by Arabs: There are full of examples in history that whenever a nation or a commander failure to calculate the capabilities and intentions of the enemy’s he had to pay heavy price. Same here the Arabs completely misread Israeli reactions, in-spite of there own provocative actions. They failed to perceive the inherent mobility of Israeli ground forces and went wrong in their appreciation that they would be able to involve Israel into a long-drawn war of attrition on their three successive defense lines which Israel couldn’t manage.

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Strategy of Pre-emption by Israelis: Fully conscious vulnerability due to lack of strategic depth and multi-directional threat from Arab states, Israel had well prepared to use the option of pre-emption. Israelis knew that it would be difficult to destroy Arabs in full front war without taking initial initiative. So that they use the strategy of pre-emption for which they are fully prepared.
Lessons Learnt
Threat Perception: The correct visualization of enemy was very important to gain initiative in war which the Arabs failed resulting loss in war.
Surprise: Surprise at strategic as well as tactical level in war is very key to achieve success. In spite of inferior in number and equipment Israeli achieve success because of there surprise not only lies on the military but at political leadership as well.
Strategy of Pre-emption: Israel’s strategy of pre-emption adequately showed the importance of this strategy especially for a force inferior in number and equipment.
Training: High standard mission oriented training can bring amazing results. Training is the only aspect by which one can offset the quantitative superiority of enemy as shown by Israelis in this war.
Intelligence: Correct intelligence about enemy intents, capabilities and preparation has always been of paramount importance. This fact was further highlighted by these wars.
Decision Theories in 1967 in War
Cognitive performance: As crisis induced stress grows up and need of more effective decision making authority and bold leadership. “When stress was low, Israelis decision makers evaluated all courses properly and made decisions for their interest. And their stress increased after closing of straits, which was perceived as a threat to their basic values. During this situation also Israel’s decision makers were psychologically prone to reliance on past experience, which created a greater conceptual rigidity as a guide to coping with current threats to basic values. They seemed to be acutely aware of their complex environment. Increasing stress and fatigue during this crisis did not weaken their dimension of cognitive performance.” (Brecher and Geist ,1980).
Focus on immediate objectives: We find that Israelis decision makers gave more attention to immediate than long-term objectives in this 1967 crisis. Like countering the blockade of the Straits, withdrawal of UNEF and Arabs military build up. But long-term goals and interests influenced all the decisions taken after the crisis. Brecher and Geist (1980) clustered the decisions into five stress phases corresponding to time periods. Which are detailed in table below.


Stress Phases

Time Periods

Decisions Taken


Low Stress Phase

Before 17 May

Issue a threat of retaliation against Syria – 7 May
Place the IDF on alert – 15 May
Limited mobilization – 16 May


Rising Stress Phase

17–22 May 1967

Order further mobilization of IDF reserves – 17 May
Institute large scale mobilization – 19 May
Shift IDF from defensive to offensive posture – 19 May
Authorize the mobilization decision – 21 May


Higher Stress Phase

23-27 May 1967

Postpone decision on military response to Egypt’s massing of troops- 23 May
Send Foreign Minister to U.S.- 23 May
Warn the U.S. that an Egyptian attack was imminent
Await Foreign Ministers report on his discussions in Paris, London, and Washington- 26 May


Highest Stress Phase

28 May- 4 June

Delay pre-emptive decision again- 28 May
Renew the IDF alert- 28 May
Send Director of Counter Intelligence to U.S.- 30 May
Form a National Unity Government- 1 June
Crystalize military plans – 2 June
Launch pre-emptive air strike – 4 June


Declining Stress Phase

After 4 June

Warn Jordan against military intervention – 5 June
Delay attack on Jerusalem’s Old City – 5 June
Encircle the Old City – 6 June
Enter to Old City- 7 June
Halt IDF advance east of the Canal – 7 June
Not to cross Syrian border – 7 June
Delay attack on Syria -8 June
Scale the Golan Heights – 9 June
Accept cease fire – 10 June

Rational Theory: Rational choice theory provides decision-makers choose their best options for their interest. It tell us that when faced with risk, decision makers consider the expected values and probabilities of possible outcomes and choose the option with the highest value. “For Israel and Egypt, those periods were a turbulent period of international relations. During those times both Israel and Egypt were constantly faced with “risky” decisions while at the brink of war. The decisions made by these two states, specifically the decisions to go to war, were sometimes unexpected and unexplainable given current models of rational choice.” (Kelly, 2008).
Although the 1967 Arab – Israel war was limited type of war happened only for six days, it has been the favorite subjects for military historians. This war gives real picture of saying “ Offense is best form of Defense.” This war shows how leadership, wills, motivation and training count in war in spite of technology.
Army Command and Staff Collage. (2012). Military History Primer. Kathmandu: Army Command and Staff Collage.
Brecher, M., Geist, B. (1980). Decision in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. Vol. 1. (Pg. 341-394). California: University of California.
Bregman, A. (2009). Israel’s Wars: A History since 1947. Routledge.
Howard, M., and Hunter, R. (2012). Israel and the Arab World: the Crisis of 1967. Routledge.
Kelly, N. and Christopher, B. (2008). Ripe without warning: Israel and Egypt 1967-1973. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 2 (1), (Pg. 013-019). Retrieved from
Popp, R. (2006). Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. Vol. 60(2), (Pg. 281-309)
Remnick, D. (2007). The Seventh Day: Why the Six Day War is still being fought.
Sudetic, S. (2014). Pre-Emption and Israeli Decision- Making in 1967 and 1973. Routledge. Retrieved from

The Impact of Social Media During the Arab Spring

1. Introduction
The Arab Spring is a revolutionary movement in North Africa and the Middle East, which began in December 2010 with the Tunisian Revolution – before spreading to other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, amongst others. While the Arab Spring was not predicted by political commentators and the media, in retrospect, there are a number of reasons with regard to why it occurred, such as longstanding oppressive regimes and difficult economic conditions. However, despite all of this, the catalyst for the Arab Spring came from a twenty-something fruit vendor in Tunisia who, frustrated and angry about the treatment he was receiving from local officials, set himself on fire in protest – and subsequently died (Haas & Lesch, 2013). In years gone by, such an event might have been largely covered up by an autocratic regime that was able to control the mass media – but nowadays, in the age of the Internet and social media, such a task is more difficult. Indeed, Adi (2014) has suggested that the use of social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) did play an integral part in the Arab Spring uprisings – but reiterates that social media was used as a tool to gather increasing support for the cause, rather than being the catalyst in itself. Therefore, this paper shall discuss the impact of social media during the Arab Spring, and try to ascertain the extent to which it facilitated the growth of the movement.
2. Social Media and the Arab Spring
To begin with, Howard & Hussain (2013)state that:
“Social protests in the Arab world have spread across North Africa and the Middle East, largely because digital media allowed communities to realize that they shared grievances and because they nurtured transportable strategies for mobilizing against directors” (p. 3).
Moreover, Howard & Hussain (2013)go on to unequivocally state that the Internet, mobiles phones, and social networking have transformed politics in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, in light of the Arab Spring movement that began in late 2010, it would be difficult to argue against such a notion. Furthermore, Bebawi & Bossio (2014) also point out that the mass media has labelled the Arab Spring as a ‘social media revolution’, with citizen journalism and social media reporting helping to sustain the wave of protests in North Africa and the Middle East from 2010. Thus, there are two ways in which social media has been used during the Arab Spring, these being: (1) by helping to coordinate protests on a mass scale, and (2) by reporting on the events without any media bias. This then, is something that was also used to great effect during the 2011 riots in England, when social media was used to coordinate riots in various English cities (Briggs, 2011) – and it is perhaps no coincidence that these riots coincided with the Arab Spring movement and the successful use of social media in North Africa and the Middle East at that time. However, in oppressive regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, unlike in the UK, such technologies are a revelation in communication – as these are countries that have traditionally had their media manipulated by despotic rulers and regimes, and have been subjected to extreme censorship and manipulation.

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Gismondi (2014) notes that a study in Washington found that social media helped to shape and lead the debate with regard to the politics of the Arab Spring, and that young and educated people tended to lead this discourse, with women also being highly involved with social media participation (and the riots and protests themselves). For example, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali discovered the power of social media when revolutionaries posted a video of him and his wife using a government-funded jet to travel to Europe on lavish shopping trips – something that angered locals, who were struggling with economic conditions; and ultimately contributed to his downfall. Moreover, the Washington study cited by Gismondi (2014) also found that social media was instrumental in sharing democratic ideas internationally, and this no doubt also helped to fuel the Arab Spring, and to make people in the region dream of living in a free and democratic society.
In addition, Khondker (2011) also notes that social media played a vital role in the Arab Spring in the absence of an open media and civil society. Indeed, in Syria, for example, the regime there is notorious for controlling the mass media – and remains a very dangerous place for journalists to ply their trade; with there being very few press freedoms, and with Internet activity also being monitored by the government, and being highly censored. However, it is very difficult to monitor and control all Internet activity, and in this respect, social media likely played a vital role in the uprisings there too. Therefore, as a result of the threat that social media now poses to autocratic regimes, places such as the United Arab Emirates now have laws in place that have the power to punish people if they discuss or post photos of other people (which of course includes politicians or people in positions of power), which is causing some concern amongst human rights groups (Tovey, 2015).
Thus, while food shortages as a result of the 2008 global economic crisis, global warming, and poverty may all have been factors that led to the mass uprising in the region, it could be said that it was social media that help to sustain this discontent, and this is something that autocratic leaders are now well aware of – and as in the UAE, are attempting to mitigate through laws that prohibit people from disseminating information about other people without their consent. However, ironically, it is such violations of human rights and individual liberties that are perhaps causing discontent in the first place – and the flexing of such political muscles might only serve to further distance the people from the regime that they are being oppressed by. Indeed, Beaumont (2011) has noted that due to the volume of people now using the Internet and social media in North Africa and the Middle East, that blocking such activity might actually cause more problems, and even more discontent. Moreover, it is also highlighted how social media was crucial in covering the initial news of the man who set himself on fire in Tunisia (which could be seen as the catalyst for the whole Arab Spring movement), as a similar event had taken place three month before, but nobody really knew about it because it had not been filmed and posted on social media. As a result of this, in Egypt, the government even went as far as pulling the plug on Internet services and 3G networks so that the public could not organise protests and riots. However, this was responded to with the analogue equivalent of Twitter: via handheld signs that were held aloft at demonstrations, which contained information about the next protest (Beaumont, 2011).
Perhaps then, the power of social media comes from its unedited and uncensored format, which allows people to get closer to the truth than traditional media in the region has allowed. Moreover, it is also a tool that allows people to organise, to quickly gather support for a cause, to disseminate information, and to galvanise people into action before momentum is lost. In addition, Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) note that the role of social media in collective action cannot be understood without first examining the political environment in which it operates, and that a significant increase in the use of new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it – and this was also the case in the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, while some might play down the role of social media in the Arab Spring uprisings, others – such as Eltantawy & Wiest (2011) – suggest that more research is needed in order to ascertain the true extent to which social media influenced the direction of the Arab Spring movement.
In hindsight, it seems axiomatic that social media had a big part to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, and helped to maintain the momentum of the movement by continually updating the public with news of oppression and violations of human rights – that would, under past regimes, have been covered up. However, it seems that it would be a mistake to suggest that social media caused the uprisings, as the protests continued in Egypt – as mentioned – even after the government pulled the plug on Internet services and 3G connections. Social media then, is merely a tool for disseminating information in a quick and efficient manner – in much the same way as leaflets and written manifestos have been in the past (although this is obviously a much slower process). Moreover, the multimedia nature of social media also allows people to instantly post photographs or videos, which can potentially be seen by millions of people – which is an unprecedented innovation; and one that could have a big effect on world politics for many years to come. Nevertheless, while the use of social media led to many successful campaigns and the overthrowing of dictators in some countries (such as Tunisia), elsewhere, civil wars are still raging; as in Syria.
Kassim (2012) states that: “In Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by the government” (n.p.). This then, is something that seems to be fairly clear in a subjective sense. However, this sentiment is also backed up with empirical data, such as the study done by Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid (2011), which analysed over three million tweets, gigabytes of You Tube content, and thousands of blog posts, to find that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Thus, they note that: “Conversations about revolution often preceded major events on the ground, and social media carried inspiring stories of protest across international borders” (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid, 2011, n.p.). Indeed, this is a study that is also commented on by O’Donnell (2011), who notes that in the week before Egyptian president Hosni Mubaraks resigned, tweets from Egypt – and around the world – that talk about political change in Egypt proliferated from around 2,300 per day, to around 230,000 per day. Thus: “Online activists created a virtual ecology of civil society, debating contentious issues that could not be discussed in public” (O’Donnell, 2011, n.p.). As such, in the absence of a civil society and an elected government in places in the Middle East and North Africa, a virtual and comparable environment was created in cyberspace where political discourses could be relatively safely held. 
3. Conclusions
While this relatively brief discourse has shown that social media had a major role to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, it has also demonstrated that there is still a lack of consensus on the extent of its impact. Thus, while Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) suggest that social media discussions tended to increase in volume after a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring, Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazai (2011) suggests the opposite: that social media content increased before a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, what can be said without any doubt is that social media was used during the Arab Spring to great effect, and that it had some degree of influence on its outcome. Indeed, without people posting images and videos of events in the Arab Spring, and commenting on what they saw, then the revolution may have never gained the momentum that it needed to topple the long-standing regimes that activists opposed. However, with laws being formulated – in places such as the UAE – that curb social media use by making it illegal to comment on and post photos and videos of people without their consent; autocratic leaders are now clearly afraid of the power of social media and the impact that it can have.
[2,011 words]
Adi, M. (2014) The Usage of Social Media in the Arab Spring, Berlin: Lit Verlag.
Beaumont, P. (2011) ‘The truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world’, The Guardian [online],, Date accessed 16/10/2015.
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Briggs, D. (2011) The English Riots of 2011: A Summer of Discontent, UK: Waterside Press.
Eltantawy, N. & Wiest, J. B. (2011) ‘The Arab Spring Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory’,International Journal of Communication,Vol. 5, No.18, pp. 1207-1224.
Gismondi, A. (2014) ‘Occupy Wall Street: Social Media, Education, and the Occupy Movement’. In: Vladlena, B. (Ed.) Cutting-Edge Technologies and Social Media Use in Higher Education, Hershey: Information Science Reference (pp. 156-173).
Haas, M.L. & Lesch, D.W. (2013) The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, USA: Westview Press.
Howard, P.N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W. & Mazaid, M. (2011) ‘Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?’ ICTlogy,, Date accessed 16/10/2015.
Howard, P.N. & Hussain, M.M. (2013)Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring,USA: Oxford University Press.
Kassim, S. (2012) ‘Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media’, Policy Mic [online],, Date accessed 16/10/2015.
Khondker, H.H. (2011) ‘Special Forum on the Arab Revolutions
Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring’, Globalizations, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 675-679.
O’Donnell, C. (2011) ‘New study quantifies use of social media in Arab Spring’, UW Today [online],, Date accessed 16/10/2015.
Tovey, J. (2015) ‘United Arab Emirates is a “dangerous place” to use social media, human rights groups warn’, The Sydney Morning Herald,, Date accessed 16/10/2015.
Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E. & Sheafer, T. (2013) ‘Social Media and the Arab Spring Politics Comes First’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 115-137.

Arab, Muslim, and a Teenager in Post 9/11 America

There are many different cultures all over the world that one can find represented in the United States. Upon a great deal of thought, the culture that was chosen for this assignment was Middle Easters, specifically an individual is Middle Eastern, as well as, Muslim. Although adults have distinct perceptions and memories, the interviewee for this project is thirteen. She was chosen deliberately due to her age, as she was born after the events of September 11, 2001 and can give insight to her daily existence, never having lived in a time where her culture and/or religion was not met with suspicion by others.

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In order to interview her, her mother had to give permission. Permission was given with one rule, the child’s real name could not be utilized. To honor the request of the mother, and due to the fact the interviewee is a minor child, she will be referred to as R. The interview was conducted with her mother present over facetime.
The Interview
R was happy to give an interview and discuss her culture and religion. The first question she was asked to answer was: Do you feel that being Middle Eastern or Muslim has a positive or negative impact on your daily life with regards to how other treat you? R smiled at this question and replied: “I’m not the only Middle Eastern kid in my school, there are two others. We don’t advertise it to everyone. Sometimes, you can’t hide. Like, my last name for example is, like, really Arab. No one knows to look at me because I don’t look Middle Eastern, or so people say.” At this point the next question was What do you mean by, you don’t look Middle Eastern? R replied “Well, I don’t have black hair or tan skin. I have blonde hair and I’m fair skinned with green eyes. So when people see me they don’t think of me as anything other than a regular white girl with a weird name. It’s not until they hear my last name that they start to ask questions.”
The next question was What sort of questions do you get asked? R sighed and answered: “I get asked what part of the Middle East I’m from. I tell them I’m not from the Middle East, I was born here. I tell them my Dad was born in Jordan and came here when he was a little kid. I always point out that I’m not fully Middle Eastern, my Mom isn’t Arab. When I tell them I have an assortment of European countries on my Moms side they always want to talk about my Dad.” The follow up question was Why do you think they focus on your Dad when they ask you questions? R replied “Because he’s more interesting than my Mom. They all have European countries in their families’ backgrounds, me having a Dad from the Middle East makes him more interesting. As soon as they find out he’s actually FROM there, they always ask me if I can speak Arabic or if I can read Arabic. They’re always disappointed when I tell them I can only speak and read English.”
Religion was the next topic for discussion. R was asked Does your religion ever come up in conversation? R answered “Yes, and faster than you would think. I live in the Bible belt, so everyone always wants to know what church you go to. If they don’t ask that, they ask why you can’t eat pork at lunch or on a field trip. I don’t wear a hijab or anything, so you can’t tell I’m Muslim unless I tell you. The reactions are getting better the older I get, when I was a kid they were really mean.” This response led to the next question Could you elaborate on those responses you consider mean? R nodded “Well the first one I can remember I was in Kindergarten. I told one of my classmates I was Muslim and they told me that I was a dirty heathen that prayed to Satan and I would burn in hell. One time, a classmate brought her Bible to school and told me only Christian children could attend the school, then she hit me in the face with her Bible.” Logically, the follow-up question was How did that make you feel? R responded “It scared me when I was little. As I got older it just makes me sad when someone says that kind of stuff. The really bad part is when you tell a trusted adult at the school and nothing happens to the kids that are being mean.”
Moving on, the next question surrounded what she experiences due to the events of 9/11. Do you have any negative things happen to you when you learn about 9/11 every year? R replied “No, not really. Sometimes you get one smart aleck kid who decides to ask you why those people did what they did. I always answer the same, because they were bad people. Bad people are just bad people, it doesn’t matter what religion they are or what the color of their skin is, and every group of people has bad people in them. I don’t know why they did those bad things. I was born in 2006.”
Finally, the floor was R’s so she could express whatever she felt the interview needed to know. What would you like to say that hasn’t been asked? R replied “I know that I seem weird to others. Like, I don’t eat pork or that I have to wear a hijab to go to Masjid, but I’m just like other girls my age. I like the VSCO girl stuff, like scrunchies, Corgi’s and Hydroflasks. I watch YouTube and listen to Pandora. The only real difference between me and my friends at school is that I can’t wear clothes that aren’t modest and I can’t date. But I’m 13, and really, dating at 13 is just sitting together at lunch. People don’t need to be afraid of me, just because I like falafel or listen to some Arabic music with my Dad. It’s hard enough to see people on TV talk about us like we aren’t human, I mean I saw on the news one time where some politician guy was wanting us to register in a database. That’s crazy! But really, if you are scared of Middle Eastern people or Muslims, talk with someone who is one of those things. Honestly, they’ll just feed you because that’s a whole thing in Middle Eastern culture, they feed you to show their love. Like really, if you eat at Middle Eastern person’s house, go hungry.”
R continued “Also, don’t believe everything you read online. For real, like people believe lies or second hand information that is just wrong. I’m Muslim, and it is NOT a part of our belief that we have to kill Christians to get into Heaven, that is just a big lie. Also, and I get really tired of explaining this one, you are not infidels. In Islam, that word is used to describe idolaters and pagans. Christians and Jews are both referred to as People of the Book, and are to be treated with respect and as equals to Muslims. The lies that are out there just keep the hate going, and you can’t defeat hate without information. At least that’s what my Mom says. I’ll just keep correcting misinformation about my culture and my religion. Oh, before I forget, my Dad only has one wife and no he cannot trade me for two goats and a camel. I hate that joke.”
The interview was concluding at this point, to which this was stated Thank you very much R, for your time and your input on these topics. R stated: “You’re welcome, I’m glad I could help you. Keep in mind that everyone has issues that they have to deal with because people assume things about other people’s cultures and their religions. You might not want to ask because you may be afraid they’ll laugh at you or get mad that you asked, I promise, the majority of us will be happy to answer questions, as long as you don’t make any racist jokes. No Middle Eastern person wants to hear another Omar the tent maker joke, ok?” R smiled widely as the interview ended.
“As of 2016, there were about 3.3 million Muslim Americans living in the United States, comprising about 1 percent of the country’s total population, according to estimates by the Pew Research Center” (Wihbey, 2016). It is important to note that Muslim and Arab are not synonymous with one another. There are people from the Middle East that are Christian, Atheist, any variation of faith or non-faith, just as there are people of every ethnicity that could be Muslim as it is a religious belief not an ethnicity. As R stated in her interview, there were two other Middle Eastern children in her school, but she did not state there were two other Muslim students.
“Arab Americans’ classification within the United States’ racial schema as White makes them invisible as a minority group” (Abuelezam, El-Sayed, & Galea, 2018). R’s mother shared this information, prior to the interview being conducted. When a person is born in the United States, one has to fill out a birth certificate for that child. One of the questions on the birth certificate is the ethnicity of the child. Under Caucasian, there is a list of different ethnicities that one could be that is considered Caucasian by the United States government, Middle Eastern is among those on said list. R is considered a minority by politicians and society, but is not considered one by the government.
“A new survey by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) reveals that 42 percent of Muslims with children in K–12 schools report bullying of their children because of their faith, compared with 23 percent of Jewish and 20 percent of Protestant parents” (Ochieng, 2017). This was confirmed by R in her interview. R’s mother also shared, outside of the interview, one specific memory that R was too young to remember. She stated: “When R was in Kindergarten, they had an awards day at the end of the year where every child was receiving an award. As each child’s name was called to receive their award, the families in the auditorium would erupt in applause for that child. When R’s name was called, I was the only one to applaud. It was a very upsetting experience, one that R, thankfully, does not remember”. R has been bullied because of her faith. The most concerning portion of her interview was when she shared that there were adults at the school who did nothing with regards to the children who bullied her.
It was also clear, from R’s interview, that she had interactions with people that made ‘jokes’ about her culture or her faith, that she did not seem to view as bullying, at least not in the interview. Many people would not have to explain to others that their fathers cannot sell them for livestock. That was absolutely astounding to learn. There are quite a few misconceptions still being perpetuated by children in Middle School, misconceptions that really should not exist as we enter 2020.
R has a good understanding of her culture and her faith, and can offer up age appropriate explanations of both. It is clear, however, by her interview that she feels at least slightly isolated due to the views others hold of her culture and her faith. For example, one may wonder if other children are asked personal questions resulting from their lunch choices. It also makes one wonder why, when cultures area discussed, the children from European descendants are not asked if they can speak/read Greek, French, Celtic, or German.
It appears as if being a Middle Eastern, Muslim, teenager has its own unique set of difficulties. R went out of her way to state she was just like her female peers, with the two exceptions she listed. That shows that she wants to be seen as ordinary. In addition, R wanted to make sure that people did not fear Muslims. Her adding that discussion into the interview shows that the fear others have of Muslims weighs on her.
Speaking with R, and having a chance to do some research on Middle Eastern culture as well as the Islamic faith shows that they are just like any other culture and faith. The culture has specific foods, music, art, and interpersonal customs, like any other culture. The Islamic faith also has similar guidelines to other faiths. For example, as a Muslim girl R cannot date, the faith puts a restriction on that, as well as, requiring her to wear modest clothing. Other faiths also require this, for example there are many sects of Christianity that do not permit dating and also require females of the faith to dress modestly.
The differences in cultures are interesting to learn about and understand. It also shows that similarities exist between cultures that one may assume are extremely different. One can learn everything about a culture through reading and study, however, making it personal and speaking with someone of that culture/faith really helps make things personal. When you put a face and a name with an idea, you no longer see aspects of that culture/faith as an abstract idea taken from the pages of a book or a journal article, you now hear the voice of that person explaining it to you, you see their smile as they speak, and you feel a connection with another human being.

Abuelezam, N. N., El-Sayed, A. M., & Galea, S. (2018). The Health of Arab Americans in the United States: An Updated Comprehensive Literature Review. Frontiers in Public Health, 6:262.
Ochieng, A. (2017, March 29). Muslim Schoolchildren Bullied By Fellow Students And Teachers. Retrieved from National Public Radio:
Wihbey, J. (2016, August 1). Muslim Americans and cultural challenges: Research roundup. Retrieved from Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy:


The United Arab Emirates

Brief history
Rank on human development index
Type of government and economic system
Health care
Family life
Social issues
Works Cited

This paper deals with the overview of economic, social, governmental and political arrangements in United Arab Emirates. UAE is a steady, exceedingly developed authoritarian system by means of a contemporary financial system. Tourist facilities are extensively on hand. UAE a country that shows us even all the way through hard times, even a great combat, could stand up from the ashes and be one of supreme countries in the human race. (Walsh, 2008)

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of total of seven emirates came into being on 2 December 1971, in the company of the seventh member, Ras al-Khaimah, coming in early 1972. Ever since that time, on the other hand, the UAE has developed as a federal unit, by means of the result that the so-called try out of unification in the present day symbolizes the lone flourishing effort at federation inside the Arab world. (Romano, 2004)

Backed by the progressive financial program built around monetary liberalization, diversification and development in the position of the private division, the UAE has moved up 23 positions in the United Nation Human Development Index ever since 1980, at present standing in 32nd position in the class of extremely high human development

The UAE’s governmental system persists to be defined by the conventional patriarchal method of leadership shared with political devotions prearranged around the country’s a variety of ethnic elements. Authoritarian type of government is present here. On the national level, the Supreme Council, counts in the monarchs of each of the seven emirates, is the top executive and governmental authority, “exercising supreme control upon the affairs of the Union in general”

The most recent value for GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) in UAE was 40,760 as of 2012. Since 10 years, the rate for this indicator has varied between 45,630 in 2008 and 33,070 in 2002. The per capita GNP for the UAE is recorded as 112 billion dollars. (Zaman, 2011)

Health is a significant subdivision of any country and it is the responsibility of the government to make available the superlative health care facilities to the populace of the state. It is the accountability of the government to present the population by means of the best possible health check facilities. The major aim of any administration is to make sure the interests and well being of the natives. It is one of the most important rights of any human being that he is supposed to encompass the entrance to the fundamental medicinal facilities. When citizens talk on the subject matter of healthiness, they do not converse about a healthy body on the other hand health means robustness of brains which can never be accomplished if the body is not healthy enough in order to perform the responsibilities and the additional everyday tasks. Health is not a personal matter, but instead healthy human being means a healthy measurement of any population. No state can continue to exist devoid of its people fit in every sense that counts in the physical and mental well being of nation. It’s the citizens who construct or damage the states. For a fit and progressive country, a strong and fit nation is as obligatory similar to that of the oxygen is for the existence.
Following stats show the health care system and expenditures in UA E

Total population (2013)


Gross national income per capita (PPP international $, 2011)


Life expectancy at birth m/f (years, 2011)


Probability of dying under five (per 1 000 live births, 2012)


Probability of dying between 15 and 60 years m/f (per 1 000 population, 2011)


Total expenditure on health per capita (Intl $, 2011)


Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (2011)


The UAE offers wide-ranging education to each and every one (male and female students), from play school to university, with schooling for the country’s citizens given that at no cost at all classes. The UAE steadily enlarged its budgetary allotment for both basic and higher teaching levels. AED 9.7 billion or 23% of the entire federal funds was given to the Ministry of Education in 2012

If inhabitants of UAE are to choose between family or work they probably chose family. This shows the clear inclination of the Emiratis people towards family. For them spending quality time with the family is more of a blessing and it is the basic priority in their way of living. Studies show that flexible connection between the family and the work cam lead one to the path of prosperity and success. Those who do not care about the responsibilities of their family unit they suffer ion their private lives and personal relations. A strong family bonding is seen in their families. Number of children may vary from 4 10 6 and concept of re marrying is common in them.

Some of the social issues may count in corruption, adoption of westernization, unequal rights of female, bonded labor and obsession of teen towards modern technology with the passage of time. However well built policies and laws are formulated and implemented to avoid the further consequences of these issues. (Hurreiz, 2002)

As per the Article 14 of the constitution specially assures “equality for all before the law, without distinction between citizens on the basis of race, nationality, religion or social status,” still there do exist an unsaid and undefined criterion by which national or spiritual minorities are deprived of aspects of their civil rights as populace of the country. As UAE is a diverse place for a lot of indigenous people, government is trying to preserve the rights of incoming people by providing equal opportunities on all level. (Ibrahim Abed, 2001)

I would like to sum up my report with the learning that UAE being the federation of all seven emirates, is flourishing well in terms of economy, education and trade while the country requires to work on human rights and eradication of social problems.

Hurreiz, S. H. (2002). Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates. Psychology Press.
Ibrahim Abed, P. H. (2001). United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective. Trident Press Ltd,.
Romano, A. (2004). A Historical Atlas of the United Arab Emirates. The Rosen Publishing Group.
Walsh, J. (2008). UAE. Kuperard.
Zaman, N. U. (2011). Uae and Globalization – Attracting Foreign Investments. GRIN Verlag.