United Kingdom’s Command and Control Approach to Petroleum and Diesel Autos

The worldwide mass utilization of petroleum and diesel autos (PDC) has brought about negative externalities on the surroundings and societal prosperity. This exposition will address United Kingdom’s command and control approach: a prohibition on PDCs by 2032 and its helpfulness in combatting market collapse. By assessing the approach’s adequacy and its possible impact on related markets like oil and lithium-particle batteries, this article will confirm that a mix of government and technical help and purchaser readiness must exist for an effective approach to take place.

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Market failure is “a circumstance in which the market fails to create at the effective dimension of yield” (Hubbard et al. 2015, 426). There are various instances of market breakdown: extending from absence of competitiveness (monopoly market potential), where just a single firm sets and produces a kind of good, to externalities. There are some positive externalities, where an outsider gets a free profit by another person’s action, and negative externalities, which is a cost forced on a third party from another person’s movement (Hubbard et al. 2015, 426). United Kingdom’s approach is an a reaction to negative utilization externalities of cost and diesel vehicles. Negative utilization externalities are the contrast among private and social advantages of utilization. Private advantage is the “advantage gotten by the purchaser of a product or service, though social advantage is the all out advantage including both private and any other advantages from utilization” (Hubbard et al. 2015, 447).

Figure 1.1 Negative Consumption Externality (Hubbard et al. 2015, 449).

Figure 1.1 demonstrates the social advantage (D2) as not exactly the private advantage (D1). Since D1 shows the private advantage to an individual, the equilibrium market utilization at 5.49 is excessively high. By devouring where D1 crosses the supply curve, it results in a deadweight loss equivalent to the blue triangle. Deadweight loss is when focused balance is not come to subsequently decreasing monetary overflow (Hubbard et al. 2015, 127). This shows allocative wastefulness in the market (creation does not mirror the inclinations of purchasers, thus not amplifying creation capacity) (Hubbard et al 2015, 9). This market collapse must be redressed; the market should move to one side from D1 to D2 where the amount expended will be 4.25 which is the socially effective balance. Here, society is probably going to get the best come back from their rare assets.

United Kingdom’s circumstance is a non-market based strategy, increasingly adjusted to a command and control approach. It is “quantitative breaking points or guidelines on the sum or kind of movement that firms and people can take part in” (Hubbard et al 2015, 460). A case of this is Australia forbidding smoking inside bars, clubs, and cafés by 2007 (Hubbard et al. 2015, 460). By restricting the English society in vehicle choices, it energizes the closeout of electric vehicles (EVs) which will diminish negative externalities related with PDCs. The term ‘boycott’ be that as it may, implies another non-market based strategy which is restriction. For United Kingdom, a blend of the two arrangements are utilized to battle the negative utilization externalities on social wellbeing and air contamination (Vaughan 2018).

The application procedure is important in surveying the policy’s adequacy. First is buyer’s view, which plays a crucial role. An investigation in Germany demonstrates that buyers are exceedingly receptive to monetary incentives forces for EVs (Peters and Dütschke 2014, 359). Thus, Electric vehicles effectively ready to cut greenhouse gas emissions  considerably (Gabbatis 2018). The research likewise recognizes exceptions in negative customer recognition, on the off chance that it is because of lacking data on EV (Peters and Dütschke 2014, 360). Norway has been fruitful in their strategies, setting the objective of 100% of all new vehicle deals being electric or fitting in hybrid by 2025 (Chrisafis and Vaughan 2017). Their implementation  is encouraging; the Street Traffic Information Council discovered 51.4% of new vehicle enrollments in January 2017 as either electric or hybrid vehicles (Rodionova 2017). This measurement bolsters their positioning of having the most elevated per capita of battery-vehicles only on the planet: no less than 100,000 of every a nation of 5.2 million individuals (Hockenos 2017). Norway has made ready in diminishing negative externalities of greenhouse gas emission, empowering comparative approaches in different nations like United Kingdom.

It is critical to assess the expenses and advantages of this policy. This strategy may result in huge expenses, particularly for governments, in the application procedure. Norway expanded government consumption to induce buyers to buy EVs. They gave

transport path get to, charging stations and without toll travel for EVs, which likely starts from the tax paid by citizen (Hockenos 2017). United Kingdom is proposing a comparable approach, developing number of electric vehicle proprietors could save and create profit from imaginative innovation by offering vitality back to the matrix smart energy advancements, including smart duties, could save the UK as much as £40 billion among now and 2050 (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and The Rt Hon Claire Perry MP 2018). It might be seen as inappropriate with highest opportunity costs as the money could be spent on improving different areas, similar to education. Another expense is with current innovation, EVs may result in battery wastage. In the European Union, as low as 5% of lithium-particle batteries are being reused bringing about an ecological cost (Gardiner 2017). Unexpectedly, keeping away from ecological expenses is a natural expense without anything else. As indicated by Jessika Transik, a associated teacher of Energy Studies in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a boycott does receive rewards, as it places pressure on vehicle makers to create EVs (Radu 2017). This boosts an expansion in innovative work for EVs,  but as inputs and complement goods like batteries to fulfill the developing interest. innovation change will pursue, bringing about expanded effectiveness and efficiency for firms. This is a solid advantage encouraging financial development. Another advantage is the decrease of negative externalities, as improving wellbeing and greenhouse gas emissions ; the motivation behind this approach. Consequently, the benefits for the surroundings and prosperity of the populace later on exceed the expenses.

The two recent suggestions must be balanced with the adequacy of other strategy. For instance, the restriction on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a forceful ozone- exhausting substance, in 1996. It brought about negative externalities like skin disease and hereditary harm (Department of the Environment and Energy 2001, 6). Like PDCs, CFCs were basic in the public arena henceforth cautious arranging was required for the restriction to succeed. Here, a mixture of government, industry and purchaser readiness encouraged it. It is significant to take note of that there are exemptions, similar to when CFC use is fundamental (Australia. Bureau of Condition and Energy 2001, 18). This is joined by financial analyst viewpoints which are for the most part positive, with Tony Seba, a Stanford University market analyst, anticipating the move to happen quickly (Chrisafis and Vaughan 2017). United Kingdom may battle with executions due to the sturdy idea of PDCs. Thinking about the costs, a ban may be excessively hopeful and result in over the top government use. Consequently a strategy like CFCs: a long haul restriction with special cases is a progressively reasonable and productive methodology.

Figure 1.2 Oil Market Demand

The restriction on PDCs will result in gradually expanding influences on business sectors, for instance oil. As an information, it has procured the increases of PDCs consistently. Subsequently all things considered, the oil showcase will encounter the negative impacts of the ban. As appeared in Figure 1.2, it will make a move the left from D1 to D2. Thus, the equilibrium (Pe) and quantity (Qe) of oil will decrease to Pe2 and Qe2. This is the oversimplified strategy which exists just for the residential market in United Kingdom. Since oil is essentially an imported good, worldwide oil request must be considered to distinguish the effect on the market of oil. As indicated by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, EVs will diminish the worldwide demand of oil by eight million barrels every day (Chrisafis and Vaughan 2017). This is a negligible imprint as the International Energy Agency expects worldwide normal demand of oil to be at 96 million barrels for each day (Jaffe and Fulton 2017). Goldman Sachs, a worldwide venture banking gathering, assessed the certainties and contended that a combination of EVs, slower monetary development and a fall in plastic creation must coincide to have a conspicuous negative effect on the market of  world oil  (Jaffe and Fulton 2017).

Figure 1.3 Lithium-Ion Markets

The second market is lithium-particle batteries (LIBs), the main batteries utilized by EVs. Figure 1.3 demonstrates a prohibition on PDCs will result in increase of demand for LIBs from D1 to D2; bringing about quantity and price expanding from P1 to P2 and Q1 to Q2. This hypothesis exists in the market, with costs of lithium carbonate at any rate multiplying since 2015 (Sanderson 2017). This increment in demand will put more pressure on the supply of lithium, bringing about expanded ventures for its procurement. The issue, as indicated by Union Bank of Switzerland, is not the battery materials, yet rather the mining and refining process which may result in blockage. Thus, investors of capital  in lithium-rich nations like South America and Australia must build (Sanderson 2017). This will expand the supply of lithium batteries to fulfill the developing interest, from S1 to S2. It is expected that the expansion sought after is kept up and will end up  with an expansion in the amount of LIBs for the market from Q1 to Q2.

Figure 1.4 Aluminum-Ion Market

Following an expansion in demand for LIBs, different batteries will probably develop to expand on the increasing demand. A model is an aluminum-particle batteries (which guarantee expanded security at a diminished expense) (Karsten and West 2015). Whenever acquainted with the market, they will expand competition. Figure 1.5 demonstrates that as a substitute, a diminished cost in aluminum-particle batteries will result in decrease of demand  for LIBs from D1 to D2 as there is less expensive production input available. LIB makers will have two choices, decline their cost or then again leave the market. The diminished, competition cost will profit electric vehicle makers (less expensive inputs), and will probably result in a less expensive final good for the purchaser.

United Kingdom’s restriction, while appropriate on paper, requires a mix of industry and purchaser readiness to consent, government motivating forces and severe exemptions showed in

CFCs. By the uplifting viewpoint of market analysts towards electric vehicles and the advantages exceeding costs, this approach will receive rewards for United Kingdom and the related market of lithium- particle batteries, with a little effect on the oil showcase.


Vaughan. “MPs call for ban on petrol and diesel car sales by 2032.” The Guardian, October 19 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/19/mps-call-for-ban-on-petrol-and-diesel-car-sales-by-2032

Hubbard, R. Glenn, Anne M. Garnett, Philip Lewis, and Anthony Patrick O’Brien. 2015. Microeconomics. NSW: Pearson Australia.

Department of the Environment and Energy. 2001. Australian Chlorofluorocarbon Management Strategy. http://www.environment.gov.au/protection/ozone/publications/australian-chlorofluorocarbon-management-strategy

Gabbatis.j. “Electric vehicles already able to cut greenhouse gas emissions by half https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/electric-cars-vehicles-greenhouse-gas-emissions-climate-change-co2-a8528006.html

Gardiner, Joey. “The Rise of Electric Cars Could Leave Us With a Big Battery Waste Problem.” The Guardian, August 10 https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/aug/10/electric-cars-big-battery-waste-problem-lithium-recycling

Hockenos, Paul. “Power to the EV: Norway Spearheads Europe’s Electric Vehicle Surge.” The Guardian, February 8


Jaffe, Amy Myers, and Lewis Fulton. “How Electric Vehicles Could Take a Bite out of theOil Market.” The Conversation, August 4 https://theconversation.com/how-electric-vehicles-could-take-a-bite-out-of-the-oil-market-81081

Karsten, Jack, and Darrell M West. “Five Emerging Battery Technologies for Electric Vehicles.” Brookings (blog), September 15, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/09/15/five-emerging-battery-technologies-for-electric-vehicles/

Peters, Anja, and Elisabeth Dütschke. 2014. “How do Consumers Perceive Electric Vehicles? A Comparison of German Consumer Groups.” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 16 (3): 359-360. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2013.879037

Radu, Sintia. “Three European countries say they’re done with fossil-fueled cars. Can the rest of the world catch up?” Washington Post, August 3, 2017. Infotrac Newsstand (accessed May 1, 2019). http://link.galegroup.com.libproxy.murdoch.edu.au/apps/doc/A519911783/STND?u=murdoch&sid=STND&xid=5b4fa579.

Rodionova, Zlata. “Half of All New Cars in Norway are now Electric or Hybrid.” The Independent, March 7 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/norway-half-new-cars-electric-hybrid-ofv-vehicle-registrations-a7615556.html

Sanderson, Henry. “Electric Car Demand Sparks Lithium Supply Fears.” The Financial Times, June 8  https://www.ft.com/content/90d65356-4a9d-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b

(Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and The Rt Hon Claire Perry MP 2018). “Smart meter enabled technology could see electric car owners cut bills and make money



Mission Command and Operation Anaconda


This essay conducts an analytical overview to “Operation Anaconda”, a military operation conducted in Eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. This operation was designed to finish off the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda forces that were remaining after several months of intense combat who had gathered in Shahikot Valley. This operation provided many examples of how the principles of mission command are interwoven into the capability to conduct unified land operations. It also demonstrated the fragility of the relationship between those principles when the required attention to those principles was not applied. The successes and failures of this operation, in particular, were used to modify the relationship between unified land operations and mission command. Thus, changing the approach to all future engagements and how they would be governed.

Keywords:  Operation Anaconda, mission command, unified land operations

Mission Command and Operation Anaconda 

Mission command is used “to balance the art of command with the science of control”. The art of command is used to “exercise authority, to provide leadership, and to make timely decisions. Commanders and staffs use the science of control to regulate forces and direct the execution of operations to conform to their commander’s intent”. Mission command addresses the nature of operations by exercising mission command philosophy, executed through mission command warfighting function and enabled by mission command system.

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The exercise of mission command encompasses how Army commanders and staffs apply the foundational mission command philosophy together with the mission command warfighting function, guided by the principles of mission command. The exercise of mission command assimilates mission command philosophy with mission command warfighting functions. Mission command philosophy is guided by six principles. These six principles are as follows; build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. The mission command philosophy is executed through the mission command warfighting function, which basically consists of a series of mutually supporting tasks. The supporting tasks fall into two categories, commander tasks, and staff tasks. These tasks are mutually supporting in that the commander tasks drives the operations process, develops teams, and informs and influences audiences inside and outside their organizations. Staff tasks conduct the operations process, knowledge/information management, synchronize information-related capabilities, and conduct electromagnetic activities. Mission command is accomplished through the execution of staff tasks that are defined by the commander tasks and these tasks define the mission command warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function enables the commander to execute the principles of mission command philosophy.

Operation Anaconda demonstrated a breakdown in all six mission command philosophy principles and became the catalyst for changing the way war was conducted by the United States. Each principal had an individual failure that created an enormous challenge to overcome in order to accomplish the mission. The following is a look at exactly how the principles of mission command were compromised.

Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

The United States had secured the support of friendly governments as well as much needed ground support from the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance proved to be battle-hardened allies that could be counted on to fulfill critical tasks of the mission command warfighting function. However, during Operation Anaconda, the Afghan troops were not from the battle-tested Northern Alliance, but instead from a local, untested Pashtun militia. The U.S. forces had not created mutual trust in order to build a cohesive team with this Pashtun militia. The assumption was made that this militia would perform just as the Northern Alliance performed. Sadly, the Pashtun militia demonstrated they were profoundly out-skilled in comparison to their Northern Alliance counterparts. They did not possess the desire to overcome changes in their operating environment nor the capability to do so if given the chance. The militia was even told to conduct their operations according to the way they wanted. A stronger creation of shared understanding between the U.S. military and the Pashtun militia would have assisted in providing more “ownership” of their critical role in the mission.

Create Shared Understanding

 The goal of shared understanding is that “commanders, staffs, and unified action partners will possess a shared understanding of their operational environment, the operation’s purpose, problems, and approaches to solving them”. A great example of mutual trust and shared understanding is demonstrated in “The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant”. a letter of orders from General Grant to General Sherman. The correspondence between the two displays an understanding of the entire operational environment. General Sherman replies to General Grant his understanding and purpose of the orders. This type of shared understanding was not initially achieved by the commanders of the U.S. forces. Mainly due to the multi-head command structure and the lack of time to define correct approaches to solving problems that may be encountered.  The Pashtun militia did not possess a clear, shared understanding of the importance of their role in the operation. They were not proficiently trained in the type of warfare they were being tasked to execute. The militia did not have an understanding of the “bigger picture” and just how important they were to the success of the mission.

Provide a clear commander’s intent

The earlier phase of the war had been conducted without a joint commander. When the execution of Operation Anaconda occurred, U.S. military presence in Afghanistan was not yet fully mature. This command structure consisted of multiple commanders of various agencies whom all had an individual role in the success of the operation. For instance, airstrikes had to be approved by a different commander than the one commanding the ground operations. This type of command structure inhibited the commanders on the ground to exercise disciplined initiative.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

ADRP 6-0 states that the phrase “exercise disciplined initiative” is “action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise”. The Pashtun militia obviously failed to exercise disciplined initiative by failing to take action when unforeseen threats arose. The U.S. forces, however, exercised disciplined initiative by adapting to the situation and taking action when the unforeseen threats presented themselves. The U.S. forces had a mission to secure the escape routes out of the valley. Through seven days of heavy, intense combat they were finally able to secure the very last objective. On the second day, U.S. forces modified its original plan from a hammer-and-anvil focus to one that would see mass air fires on the valley’s eastern sides in support of the U.S. Army’s positions there. Because of this adaptation, the necessary adjustments were made and the tide of the battle would soon turn in favor of the Americans.

Use Mission Orders

Mission orders are the guide by which tasks are assigned, resources are allocated and guidance is issued. Initially, resources such as air support, heavy mortars, and personnel were not sufficiently allocated for the operation based largely on the inaccurate intelligence assessment. As events unfolded, commanders were able to quickly adapt to the realization of their predicament. Mission orders define the desired results but do not mandate how to achieve them. Mission orders rely on individual initiative and provide the maximum freedom of choice in how to best accomplish the assigned mission.  Because of the poor initial intelligence assessment, the troops on the ground were initially exposed to a much higher prudent risk factor than what was originally anticipated. Only after the adaptation of mission orders did the acceptable prudent risk factor become acceptable.

Accept Prudent Risk

Intelligence assessments for Operation Anaconda presented the scenario that the coming battle would be fought with light arms and would last no more than three days, instead, it lasted seven days with intense combat and terminated after seventeen days. The commander took these factors into consideration because he judged that the deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss would be worth the cost, this is a prudent risk. The level or prudent risk instantly increased to an unacceptable level as soon as the battle began.

Overall, my stance is that the operation was a success. The military objective was achieved but with a higher loss of life than what was anticipated or warranted. Many high-value targets did escape, reportedly the primary target of interest Osama bin Laden, due to the many negative circumstances that occurred during the planning and conduct of the mission. However, valuable lessons were learned from Operation Anaconda and utilized in future engagements. The U.S. military aligned the command structure so that only one commander would be in charge. This commander would have the authority to assign resources according to real-time need. This authority would be delegated to subordinate commanders that ultimately shared one common intent. The mutual trust would have to be achieved before American lives would be put in danger. A shared understanding of the common operating picture is now a prerequisite, and that shared understanding supports only one (not multiple) intent(s). Because of this, the exercise of the disciplined initiative is accomplished and gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous situations because everyone at every level knows the mission’s purpose, key tasks, and desired end state. Mission orders that assign tasks and allocate resources became more accurate due to the missteps of Operation Anaconda. It is now accepted that the level of prudent risk has been maximally mitigated to ensure the greatest chance at success while minimalizing the chance for negative outcomes. Operation Anaconda was a necessary evil. The way the operation was planned and executed highlighted the need for a paradigm shift in the way the U.S. conducted military operations. It provided an example of the ability of the American military to accomplish the mission in the face of adversity and to succeed regardless of the chances for success. The operation displayed the military’s capability to adapt to unanticipated changes and overcome them. The American military needed Operation Anaconda to happen in order to secure success for future engagements; however, it is regrettable that eight people had to provide the ultimate sacrifice in order to learn the required lessons.


Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-0 (pp. 11-64).

Grant, U., & Simon, J. (1982). The papers of Ulysses S. Grant (10th ed., pp. 251-254). Carbondale [etc.]: Southern Illinois University Press.

Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Fort Lesley J. McNair, WA, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy.


Command Principles of Operation Anaconda


Operation Anaconda, the first operation in Afghanistan that combined a multitude of American and Coalition units to attack an enemy stronghold, demonstrated a host of principles of the battle that are only experienced through action. Namely the continual effort of all individuals and units to readapt the approach to maintain the drive to the mission objective; in this case driving the Taliban out of Shah-I-Kot Valley.  From day one, the continual adaptation of a plan due to unforeseen circumstances is what drove the operation to eventual success.  The Afghan fighters did not make their advance through the valley due to a severe lack of moral. The bombing campaign that was significantly anticlimactic because the pilots were under the impression they had to cease their bomb runs due to a miscommunication of the chaotic radio communications.  One thing led to another, down the never-ending cascade of failure after failure with continual rewriting of the mission to improvise adapt and overcome.

Command Principles of Operation Anaconda 

The Operation was planned from head to toe; after an eventual agreement of the analysis of the information from the battlefront. Who, what, and where are the enemy bunkers and what are their capabilities?  Who, what, and where are the friendlies current, future transitional and future dug in positions? What are our capabilities?  Once all the questions have been answered, and all the answers have been challenged and thoroughly vetted, the Mission Plan is finalized.  However, all plans have multiple contingency plans for a reason.

Six Guiding Principles

The Six Principles of Mission Command are:

Build cohesive teams

Create a shared understanding

Provide a clear commanders intent

Exercise disciplined initiative

Use mission orders

Accept prudent risk (Army, 2012)

Upon analyzing Operation Anaconda through the eyes of the Mission Command Principles you will find that through the failing of the original and all the contingency plans the exercising of the Principles of the Mission Command ensured the eventual success of the Operation.

Build Cohesive Teams

Operation Anaconda is comprised of a combined 200 Special Operations Troops from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Norway, New Zealand; as well as Afghan Allies (Geibel, 2002).  An Afghan warlord named Zia Lodin is one of the main leaders of the Afghan allies that are fighting against, and have been fighting the Taliban for decades. (Kugler, 2007)  The cohesion of the fighting front when compared to the displaced, but still unified, enemy proved to be the eventual driving force that led the US to push the Taliban out of the valley.

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Create a Shared Understanding.

A Commander must ensure that the troops understand the whole scope of the battle.  From the big picture to how their tasks and preparation will accomplish the mission.  Understanding what all the different key players are tasked to perform will clarify what tasks and efforts have to be accomplished so the entirety of the mission will be successful.  Each Soldier and fighter must understand and trust each other and the supporting units.  Collaborative understanding is normally accomplished through clear, concise, and effective communication.  Any type of misunderstanding to include assumptions can lead to incorrect decisions made. 

Operation Anaconda is successful eventually because the commanders of all the units down to the individual Fighter knew and understood what the Commanders intent was, and what their objective was.  The US and Coalition Special Operational Forces (SOF) knew their role, as well as knew what the role was of the Close Air Support (CAS), the light Infantry Troops, as well as the roles of Central Command (CENTCOM), Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC), and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC).

Proved a Clear Commanders Intent.

A Commanders Intent is closely related to providing a shared understanding.  A Commanders intent is “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0).” (Army, 2012)  The difference between the Commanders intent and a shared understanding is that shared understanding is viewed from the Soldier’s perspective to their left and right that their fellow Troops understand each other. Whereas a Commanders intent is how well the Soldiers and subordinate Commanders understand the top-down perspective.

Operation Anaconda was successful eventually and explicitly because the Commanders Intent was thoroughly understood, as well as the consequences for not achieving the end state.  There were fellow Fighters, Americans and Coalition that are in Afghanistan, in the Valley relying on you to get to the end state no matter what.  As long as the end state was always in mind, the Fighters pushed forward. On day one, the original mission failed due to a cascading turn of events.  Starting with a miscommunication that the pre-attack bombarding planes had from a ground controller to cease fire due to possible friendlies too close to one of the targets.  Which caused not enough of the enemy targets to be engaged, which caused the Afghan fighters to take an excessive loss to personnel and vehicles, which caused them to halt their attack.  All this caused the Taliban to surge in fighting spirit. On day one, as plan A was already off, the commanders regrouped and re-attacked using a heavy bombardment of Fighter and Close Air Support (CAS) planes.  After an exemplary performance by the planes, the enemy was dislodged from their strongholds and the Commanders Intent was met. (Geibel, 2002) (Grant, 2005)

Exercise Disciplined Initiative.

Exercising Disciplined Initiative is a compilation of the thoughts, perspectives, analysis, judgments, and actions that were required to alter the initial plan to a variation of the plan, including if required scrapping the plan altogether, so long as the Commanders Intent is met.  In these times it is important to listen to the Soldiers, NCO’s and Officers to get a comprehensive understanding of the root cause of the issues, to find doctrinal and creative plans to overcome the obstacles. (Army, 2012)

Operation Anaconda is was fraught with obstacles, however, the command was flexible and took initiative to provide recommendations up the chain of command to complete the mission.  When the Afghan fighters were not able to get to their objective due to the excessive damage from the enemy, back up was sent from other units to reinforce them and give them the equipment and gun power required.  When a group of US Soldiers was inadvertently the target of a CAS attack due to bad target identification.  Backup was sent in to rescue them and reinforce their numbers so the attack can continue.

Use Mission Orders

“Commanders use mission orders to assign tasks, allocate resources and issue broad guidance. Mission Orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them” (Army, 2012)  Additionally they are given maximum freedom to accomplish the mission.

Operation Anaconda was successful because mission orders were used, and micromanagement.  When a Commander micromanages the Troops, the Troops will not provide input to the command as to why they are not achieving, and what they think needs to happen so they can.  It was originally determined that CAS was not going to be a big asset due to the terrain. However, due to bad intel and a gross underestimation of the number of enemy fighters and their equipment, the original plan went askew and it was recommended to switch to CAS providing the spear point to take out the enemy positions.  When the light Infantry Soldiers from the 101st and 10th Mountain identified that they need bombs from planes, that is what happened.

Accept Prudent Risks

Accepting risk is a decision that is always made all the time by everyone regardless if they make a good decision, or know all the options, or know enough of the consequences of their decision options to make the best one.  “Prudent Risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost” (Army, 2012)

There was a lot of risk in Operation Anaconda, there were fatalities and wounded.  That is a risk that is assumed by the commander when they send the Soldiers to fight against the enemy.  The mission comes first, before life. However, it is prudent to plan for the least number of lives lost that will still achieve the mission.  The Hammer and Anvil taskings in the Operation had the risk of friendly fire if the coordination and timing were not accurate.  (Kugler, 2007)  CAS bombing taskings were slow and monotonous due to the risk of mid-air collisions due to the high elevation of the valley, as well as the high elevation of the surrounding mountains.  It physically limited the number of aircraft that could be around to drop bombs without dropping on other planes, and without running into each other. (Kugler, 2007)


In Conclusion the plans for Operation Anaconda were a failure, however, the Mission Command Principles are what kept the overall concept, and end state of the mission a success.  This operation serves as a great teaching tool on how to properly apply the Command Principles to a mission to ensure mission success.


Army, H. D. (2012, May). ADRP 6-0 Mission Command. Retrieved from Army Pubs: https://armypubs.us.army.mil/docrine/index.html

Geibel, A. (2002, May). Military Review. Retrieved from March 2017 Online Exclusive Article: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Operation-Anaconda-Shah-i-Khot-Valley-Afghanistan/

Grant, R. (2005). Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective. Retrieved 5 4, 2019, from https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ada495248

Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 5.


Did FIghter Command Nearly Get Defeated in the Battle of Britain?

Fighter Command came close to defeat during the Battle of Britain. How accurate is this statement?


Off Cdt Nixon 263, D Squadron, D Flt

The year of 1940-41 proved a pivotal time during World War 2, not only had France surrendered by June 1940 but both the United states and the Soviet Union remained out of the war. This left Great Britain the only remaining world power in the fight against the Nazi regime[1]. With the fall of France, Germany was now a predominant power across the continent. The Battle of Britain to come was to put Britain under extreme pressure to litigate peace on German terms, or to gain ‘air superiority’ known as directive 17 for Hitlers’ planned invasion, Operation Sealion[2]. This essay will examine three main points that ultimately demonstrate that even though Fighter Command became stretched at times and the overall victory was only by a narrow margin, it did not come close to defeat. Firstly, it will discuss, how Britain had effectively used its advancement in technologies such as, the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) to their advantage. Secondly the poor intelligence and leadership of the German high command that led to both strategic and operational level failures, and finally the British war effort production output which all combined support the fact that fighter command did not come close to defeat.

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Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding became commander of Fighter command on 14th July 1936 and within a week chose Bentley Priory to become the new headquarters (HQ)[3]. It was here at Bentley Priory that would be home to the world’s first Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), the ‘Dowding System’. Prior to entering his role as Air Chief Marshall, Dowding had contributed to the decision that led to the funding and research into RDF (Radio Direction Finding)[4] which in turn would become an essential component to the IADS by the end of 1939. The capability of this technology meant that enemy aircraft can be detected with its height and distance approaching the UK mainland from Europe. This provided the British pilots a minimum of a 5-minute warning prior to an attack as the aircraft crossed the channel that the observer corps was not capable of providing.  This technology brought a range of advantages to fighter command, one being that little to no standing patrols were required which in turn would diminish manpower and a range of resources. The system would also guide British pilots into effective high advantage positions for engaging the enemy from above.  The system was not just comprised of fighter command and its aircraft but, the observer corps and anti-aircraft batteries. All working in unison under the same command from Bentley Priory, allowing flexibility at tactical level[5]. The UK was split into four segments, number 10-13 group, each being informed with critical information from the HQ, allowing each area to conduct its own ‘mission command’ and tactically apply their assets to intercept the enemy with the sector and station that was best suited and equipped for the task[6].  This statement is supported by a Luftwaffe pilot Adolf Garrand who stated,

“From the first the British had an extraordinary advantage, never to be balanced out at any time during the whole war, which was their radar and fighter control network and organisation. It was for us a very bitter surprise. We had nothing like it. We could do no other than knock frontally against the outstandingly well-organised and resolute direct defence of the British Isles”


For a period of the battle the Luftwaffe targeted the RDF sites, although only small effects were felt across the arm due to the effectiveness of the repairs on the equipment, it was only direct hits that caused prolonged damage. To counter the down time for repair after direct damage, fighter command installed dual transmitters so a recognised air picture (RAP) could be maintained throughout the battle, keeping that advantage to British pilots. The Dowding system was crucial in evading defeat by providing fighter command with a vigorous detection, dispatch and control system. Allowing the RAF to put the principles of war into effective use, surprise, concentration of force, flexibility and economy of effort.

June 30th 1940, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering signed the operational directive 17 for the aerial war against the British Isles. The plan incorporating an attack against the RAF itself, its support echelons and the aircraft industry. These attacks would create the necessary conditions for an assault on the UK mainland known as Operation Sealion. The strain of blitzkrieg and the battle for the Fjords of Norway imposed a significant host of economic, tactical and strategic problems before solving the “British question”. The German intelligence and leadership during these key months proved to be inadequate to achieve success, causing significant changes to operational tasks. All the way up to July 1940, Hitler still believed that the UK would sue for peace which he would happily accept. At this time the mood in Berlin was euphoric, the Germans believed that the war was almost over. Following Goering’s lead the Luftwaffe paid little attention to the future operational problems in securing the UK.  A report produced on 16th July 1940 by the Luftwaffe significantly underestimated the capabilities of the ‘Hurricane’ and ‘Spitfire’ aircraft, along with no mention of the Britain’s Integrated Air Defence System[7], finishing with the positive note that “the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, will be in the position in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year”. A lack of intelligence in the operational capabilities of the British aircraft against those in the Luftwaffe’s arsenal led to an overestimation of theirs. German Bombers, Stukas and the BF 110 fighter proved vulnerable to British fighters, it was only the Bf 109 that proved a compatible match to the Spitfire and superior to the Hurricane. The single engine fighter BF 109 thus had to provide protection to all bomber and BF110 sorties throughout the battle. This overworked the German fighter crews and its equipment, leading to heavier casualties as the battle progressed.  Prior to the battle, Britain had 1032 aircraft across its operational bases, 715 being ready for immediate action and a further 424 in storage units. These reserves remained unknown to German intelligence leading to a miscalculation of the number of aircraft required at the front to have superior numbers to overwhelm Fighter Command. It was with these statistics that Goering assigned only 1011 fighters with 805 being immediately ready for combat to the front for operations[8]. The numerous varying intelligence reports from various levels led to the German strategy to change sporadically, even when each phase had not been completed. It was these decisions to change the aim of attack that provided Fighter Command the opportunity to adjust and repair for a prolonged fight. Fighter command was coping during the operational phase targeting aerodromes and industry infrastructure by 12 group supporting and protecting the airfields while 11 group were up engaging the enemy.  Hitler ordered a change in the strategy on the 7th September 1940 to target London in retaliation to Bomber Commands attack on Berlin. It is clear that this shift in tactics relieved some of the stresses on both the bomber and fighter commands and its resources, providing an invaluable rest period to recover its losses to full capability.  Even if there wasn’t a shift in the German strategy to target 11 group aerodromes, the introduction of more satellite airfields could have been utilised or a tactical withdrawal to retreat the aircraft inland out of the range of the German fighters meant that fighter command would have remained an effective fighting force and have the ability to project air power on an invasion force.

 Prior to the war Dowding in 1937 convinced the Prime Minister of the time, Neville Chamberlain, to increase his force. He achieved this by convincing the Prime Minister and the Minister of Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip that the manufacture of fighters was the far cheaper option in comparison to a fleet of bombers. Neville chamberlain believed that bombers were immoral and therefore were neglected in the development of the Air Force prior to the Second World War. This decision led to the purchase and manufacture of over 1000 Hurricanes and 310 Spitfires between 1936-1938, beginning the mass production of fighter aircraft. By June 1940, the production output was approximately 500 aircraft a month, this figure was only once succeeded in August 1940 where the fighting was at its height. The Harrogate Programme set in January 1940, set the target of 3602 fighters to be manufactured per annum, although this was exceeded by 681, demonstrating the efficiency of the British Industry. During the battle the repairs to damaged aircraft was complemented by the Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO). At its highest point this administration help deliver a further 160 aircraft per week to the front line. It was with the combined effort of the British industry that the German’s were being massively out produced for fighter aircraft. By the end of the battle figures showed that between June – November 2091 aircraft were manufactured compared to 1220 lost in combat, alongside this there was a significant increase in the number of available pilots, coming from accelerated training programmes and squadrons being formed of pilots from occupied Europe. In comparison the German’s had a different doctrine in its formation of aircraft fleets, a combination of aircraft from bombers to fighters, acting as an Expeditionary Air Wing. There was no organised manufacture and repair unit to repair and return damaged aircraft to the frontline. All of Germany’s industry was within its homeland, this caused a huge logistical effort to fix severely damaged aircraft efficiently. Even though the Luftwaffe could inflict heavy losses upon Fighter Command there was always a consistent flow of newly trained pilots and enough fighter aircraft at the front to remain a formidable fighting force. This was achieved as the Luftwaffe failed to continue to target infrastructure and industry due to their strategic change to bomb London. On the other hand, the German’s also suffered heavy losses across the year and was not able to maintain its number of pilots or aircraft at the front because of its poor logistic set up and the manufacturing doctrine of the Luftwaffe.

In the inter-war years, the build-up and development of the German Air Force was flawed with its doctrine and the competition between its leadership. The Luftwaffe was predominately equipped with aircraft and technology that was outdated, principally their heavy bombers (Ju87, He111). The maintenance and production of aircraft was flawed with logistical errors and poor aircraft manufacturing doctrine. This led to a significant drop in aircraft numbers which were operationally ready at the front during the battle. Meanwhile the British industry were capable of manufacturing and maintain sufficiently high numbers continuously and therefore maintaining the number of fighter aircraft at the front. In terms of operational capability, the Luftwaffe were well trained and experienced, although organised to support the movement of the army and not to conduct its own independent operations. The leadership had failed to see this structure was not working as it had proved so effective with the Condor legion during the Spanish Civil War and the Blitzkrieg across Europe. The critical fault therefore lies with how the German leadership conducted the campaign and its intelligence gathering. Germany had failed in achieving accurate intelligence prior and during the battle which lead to poor decisions being made. Decisions made by Hitler himself and Goering led to the Luftwaffe’s resources being used ineffectively or withdrawn during the latter part of the battle for the planned invasion of Russia (Operation Barbarossa), allowing the Royal Air Force (RAF) the ability to recover, regroup and develop a strategic plan to counter.  The effectiveness of Fighter Command in utilising its technological advancements over the enemy and its aircraft was an advantage the German’s could never match. The detailed control system based out of Bentley Priory provided the RAF fighter pilots with a significant advantage in battle through its early warning and recognised air picture. These factors combined stopped the Luftwaffe gaining a foothold to gain air superiority by defeating Fighter Command to assist the land invasion Operation Sealion or crushing the morale of the British people to surrender.


Overy, Richard (2010) The Battle of Britain – Myth and Reality (London: Penguin Books).

Bungay, Stephen (2009), The Most Dangerous Enemy (London: Aurum Press Ltd).

Murray, Williamson (2002) Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (University Press of the Pacific).

Lt Col Lund, Earl (1996) The Battle of Britain: The German Perspective (USAF)        

Smith, Tyler (2016) Enduring the Battle of Britain and the Blitz: Perseverance of the British Home Front from 1940-1941 (Liberty University)

Bishop, Patrick (2010) Battle of Britain (Clays Ltd)

Cooksley, Peter.G (1983) 1940 The Story of No.11 Group, Fighter Command (Robert Hale Limited)

C.Dildy Douglas (2018) Battle of Britain 1940: The Luftwaffe’s ‘Eagle Attack’ (Osprey Publishing Ltd)

Ray, John (1994) The Battle of Britain New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War (DAG Publications Ltd)

Deighton, Len (1980) Battle of Britain (Dai Nippon Printing Company Ltd)

[1] Smith, Tyler (2016) p.4

[2] C. Dildy, Douglas (2018) p.40

[3] G. Cooksley, Peter (1983) p.65

[4] C. Dildy, Douglas (2018) p.26

[5] C. Dildy, Douglas (2018) p.28

[6] Lt Col Lund, Earl (1996)

[7] Ray, John (1994) p46-47

[8] Overy Richard (2010) p.32

Mission Command in the Battle of La Drang

The efficiency of mission command makes it a preferred concept in the military because it enhances the capacity to accomplish assigned missions. Mission command guides the human factor to adopt a set of actions and behaviors to make independent decisions, exploit the created opportunities, address the prevailing risks, and achieve the desired end state.1 Mission command ensures that commanders collaborate with the rest of the force to integrate and synchronize operations. In addition, the application of mission command is dependent on six principles that include the need to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, providing clear commander’s intent, exercising disciplined initiative, using mission orders, and accepting prudent risk.2

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The Battle of la Drang initiated military revolution that caused a significant shift in how armies conducted their warfare. The use of air mobility to transport soldiers on a surprised enemy, enhanced the efficiency of the US Army and eliminated the challenges and pitfalls associated with terrain. Additionally, they offered lessons that would shape the future utilization of mission command in complex environments. Consequently, it emphasized the need of well-intended commanders to utilize the principles of mission command and enhance the Army to deriving their operational goals. In order to understand the implications of mission command on the Battle of la Drang, it is important to examine the decisions and actions undertaken by both the commanders and personnel. However, this report will only focus on three principles that include providing a clear commander’s intent, exercising disciplined initiative, and the acceptance of prudent risk. Lastly, the information will determine whether the commander applied the principles of mission command to achieve the operation’s goals. 

Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent

A commander’s intent is clear, precise, and concise. It articulates the goal, purpose, and the desired outcome of the operation. The purpose is to guide and unify the actions of the staff, subordinates, and the supporting commanders to attain the commander’s desired outcome even in the absence of orders. The commander should convey the reasons behind the operation, the key tasks to be undertaken, and their intended outcome.3 The efficiency of this principle relies on the existence of a clear communication approach between the commander and his/ her Soldiers prior to the operation.4 It is important that the commander communicates with his/ her Soldiers to raise their awareness and comprehension of expectations, tasks, and boundaries for conducting such roles.

Clear evidence of compliance with the principle in the battle is evident. The commander’s intent had clear and well-defined orders that were to guide the operations of the US Army in Vietnam. The mission orders focused on weakening the Viet Cong and its allies by curtailing their influence, eliminating the local support intended at facilitating their operations, and enhancing the capacity of the local villagers to defend themselves. In order to accomplish these goals, the Special Forces and the Army conducted successive small counterinsurgency throughout the country targeting the Viet Cong and its allies.5 In addition, the orders prioritized the establishment of measures that were to repulse any retaliatory offensive attacks by the Viet Cong and its allies targeting the Special Forces Camps in Plei Me, Dak Sut, and Duc. The approach is evident in the orders issued by General William C. Westmoreland who was the Commander of US Forces in South Vietnam. The strategy led to the deployment of a battalion of Marines to guard the airbase at Pleiku as a means of avoiding a repeat of the offensive attack by the Viet Cong at the base that resulted in eight fatalities and over hundred wounded.6 Consequently, it ensured that the Army was prepared for any future attacks on the base. Furthermore, compliance with this order led to the successful repulsion of a repeat offensive attack by the Viet Cong and its allies. Led by General Chu Huy Man, who was the Commander of the Western Field Front Headquarters, forced them to withdraw towards the Cambodian border. The commander’s orders and intent that shaped the engagement of the US Forces in Vietnam focused on weakening the will of the North Vietnamese to fight. Subsequently, the initial objective was to repeatedly engage and destroy them to maintain a resemblance of a political order in Saigon that could actualize the interests of the US in the region.

The shift of the initial operations targeting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments is a clear illustration. Prior ground combat operations targeting the Viet Cong and its allies rendered ineffective by the terrain of their new location that made it inaccessible. Therefore, it ushered a new and reactive approach by the US Army that involved the deployment of the airmobile assault.7 The decision of this new approach was facilitated by intelligence source that revealed the location of the NVA regiments that were 5 km northwest of landing zone (LZ) X-Ray, south of LZ X-Ray, and 3 km to the northwest of LZ X-Ray.8 As a result, Colonel Brown ordered his 1st Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore to prepare and execute an airmobile assault into the Ia Drang Valley.9 The successful execution of the airmobile assault required the coordination of varying tasks that could facilitate the acquisition, safe landing, and the protection of the helicopters.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

Disciplined initiative are actions undertaken by the supporting commanders and Soldiers when the prevailing situation renders the commander’s orders irrelevant or when they face unpredicted opportunities or threats. The supporting commanders use their judgment to initiate actions to adapt to the prevailing situation. However, they are required to adhere to the limits set by the commander’s intent.10 For example, supporting commanders and subordinates can initiate alternative actions to derive the intended outcome. They can engage in actions that strive to solve the prevailing unanticipated threats and problems. In addition, the supporting commanders can defy the commander’s orders if they are unlawful and expose the force to needless risk.11 Adhering to lawful orders strives to ensure that the disciplined initiates are legitimate and credible. Trust is a fundamental principle within the exercising disciplined initiative principle. Leaders and subordinates need to know each other’s limits to make the right choices within the parameters of the commander’s intent.

The preparations that facilitated the execution of the airmobile assaults highlight the compliance with the principle. The opportunity to exert maximum damage on the NVA regiments through aerial bombardment meant that the US Army’s adaptive approach placed them at an advantageous position to accomplish the commander’s initial order of weakening the NVA. Consequently, coordinated preparation efforts undertook suitable landing zones and provided artillery support at strategic positions to protect the helicopters from attack by the NVA regiments.In addition, implemented strategies ensured that the Army assumed a defensive posture that could successfully resist any attacks by the NVA. The strategies involved superior fire support and the timely deployment of additional units from the 1st Cavalry Division to assist the existing forces to repulse the possible attacks by the NVA. Finally, in order to exercise disciplined initiative, subordinates must trust that their leaders will take ownership

of their mistakes, which includes not leaving them unsupported on the battlefield or in their career.12

Accept Prudent Risks

The uncertainty that is prevalent in military operations compels commanders to make decisions that limit the force’s exposure to potential risks, injury, and loss while accomplishing the operation’s goal. The principle recognizes that each opportunity comes with its set of risks and opportunities. Subsequently, the commander needs to determine, analyze, and instigate efforts to address the risks, assess the viability of the opportunities, and initiate appropriate actions that exploit the opportunities.13 The principle prioritizes the element of surprise and mobility when seeking to exploit the presented opportunities. Any actions intended to exploit the opportunities should be undertaken in a location that the enemy does not expect and should deprive them of any knowledge.

While the intended aerial bombardment ensured that the US Army altered their initial approach to accomplish the operation’s intended mission, it failed to account for the varying options that the NVA had to counter their attacks. Specifically, it signifies the inefficient undertaking of the principle because it only focused on the logistics and terrain-based concerns. It neglected the need to limit the force’s exposure to potential risks, injury, and loss by assuming that the NVA regiments lacked the capacity to interfere with the new plan.14 For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore failed to consider a scenario where the actions of the NVA deviated from his expectations. In addition, failure to articulate the remedial responses that could neutralize the unexpected actions of the NVA regiments threatened the successful accomplishment of the operation’s objectives. Moreover, the inability of Lieutenant Colonel Moore to consider the possible unexpected events while planning the aerial bombardment exposed them to potential failure, injuries, and casualties. The inadequate planning of the aerial bombardment attributed to the damage and the subsequent destruction of Lieutenant Herrick’s platoon caused by the surprise attack from the NVA regiments. Not able to connect with Lieutenant Devney’s platoon, Lieutenant Herrick exposed himself to enemy fire that ultimately led to his death. Lastly, it led to a prolonged engagement that exposed the other platoons and segments of the US Army to surprise attacks by the NVA.


Mission command is a tactical approach utilized by commanders to conduct military operation. The approach focuses on the decentralization of military decision-making that empowers commanders and armies to undertake unified and discipline military operations. Ultimately, accomplishing the commander’s intent and goals of the operation. The efficiency of this approach relies on the capacity to adhere to the provisions articulated by its six guiding principles. While the battle revealed the successful application of the principles of “exercise disciplined initiative” and “provide a clear commander’s intent”, the inefficient application of the “accept prudent risks”, threatened to derail the accomplishment of the operation’s goals. The failure to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the risks associated with the aerial bombardment exposed the US Army to surprise enemy fire.


1. U.S. Department of the Army. ADP 6-0 Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2014), 2.

2. Ibid., 2.

3. Ibid., 4.

4. Ibid., 8.

5. Peter Schifferle, The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign or Mere Tactical Failure. (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 36.

6. Carl Builder, Steven Bankes and Richard Nordin, Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 89.

7. Thomas Graves, Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965. (Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2017), 20.

8. Builder et al., 94.

9. Ibid., 94.

10. Nathan Finney and Jonathan Klug, Mission Command in the 21st Century: Empowering to Win in a Complex World. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Army Press, 2016), 43.

11. Ibid., 85.

12. Ibid., x.

13. U.S. Department of the Army. ADP 6-0 Mission Command (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, March 2014), 5.

14. Builder et al., 101.


Builder, Bankes and Richard Nordin. Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999.

Finney, Nathan K, and Jonathan P Klug. Mission Command in the 21st Century: Empowering to Win in a Complex World. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The ArmyPress, 2016.

Graves, Thomas. Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965. Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2017.

Schifferle, Peter J. The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign or Mere Tactical Failure. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994

U.S. Department of the Army. ADP 6-0: Mission Command. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2014.


Did Fighter Command Come Close to Defeat in the Battle of Britain?

Fighter Command came close to defeat during the Battle of Britain.

How accurate is this statement?

The Battle of Britain is widely regarding as the first military campaign fought entirely in the air.[1] The Royal Air Force (RAF) defended Britain against large scale attacks from the Luftwaffe, Germany’s air force. Following Germany’s lightning war success’ over the French army, the German high command then set their sights on Britain.[2]Therefore, the Luftwaffe were set the task of achieving control of the air, to establish opportunity for invasion, known as Op Sealion.[3] Through analysis this essay will demonstrate that throughout the battle, Fighter Command never truly came close to defeat. This was due to a combination of German strategic failures, British technological advantages and the way each side applied intelligence. It will be shown that Mission Command was employed by the RAF, enabling Dowding to have complete control of Fighter Command, utilising the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). The IADS network would prove to be crucial component for Fighter Command throughout the battle as it provided an early warning of incoming attacks and a real time intelligence picture, allowing this information to be distributed to the relevant airfields, acting as a force multiplier.[4] On the other hand, the German leadership was laden with issues arising from their poor intelligence,  which was largely influenced through political corruption. Specifically, the German High Command crucially underestimated Fighter Command and furthermore the battle which they were involved in, resulting in a failure to apply a key principle of war, which is to have a clear, unambiguous strategy.[5] Finally, the essential areas of aircraft production, maintenance and pilots, a vital industry needed to maintain the sustainability to be operationally effective, will be highlighted. This will clearly emphasise the decisive role of keeping the maximum number of aircraft available for deployment at all time, again, enabling Fighter Command to avoid defeat.

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The tactics and strategies employed by the RAF and Luftwaffe was critical to determining the outcome of the battle. Fighter Command was mono-functional, it was purpose built for these exact circumstances. Whereas the Luftwaffe were multifunctional, largely regarded as a tactical air force, primarily used in support of ground and naval forces.[6] Therefore it was simply unprepared for a solo aerial battle of attrition. As previously stated; Britain employed mission command, with Churchill empowering Dowding to lead Fighter Command. This enabled Dowding, to have complete unilateral control. [7] As a result, Dowding was able to utilise the IADS. The IADS system was a pivotal system for Fighter Command which was magnified by the fact that it was disregarded by Goring. [8] The Chain Home radar system and Royal Observer Corps (ROC) enabled Fighter Command a key early warning system. Once this information was fed into the filter rooms and HQ it enabled Fighter Command to efficiently deploy relevant squadrons to the incoming threat, rather than have rolling patrols. This not only offered more respite to their pilots, but it gave a proportional response to each Luftwaffe attack, therefore never revealing the true state of Fighter Command aircraft numbers. The network that was the IADS system gave Fighter Command operational intelligence and Dowding the ability to manage his resources effectively.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe were led by Hermann Göring, a previously WW1 fighter pilot. Goring was in the predisposition that victory over Britain was all but assured and it was merely a matter of time. This level of complacency and confidence was largely as a result of the victories over Poland and France in addition to a lack of intelligence of the British which will be highlighted later in the essay.[9] As a consequence of Goring’s over-confidence, the Luftwaffe went into the battle lacking several key principles of war, such as having a selection and maintenance of the aim and know your enemy. [10] This was evident throughout the battle; for example, in August of 1940, when the battle was in its infancy, the Luftwaffe targeted Fighter Command’s radar defence system; attacking multiple front-line radar towers. However, only one was put of action for any significant period. [11] Shortly after the Luftwaffe began targeting the RAF airfields. Not only does this show that German High Command highly underestimated the radar system’s integration into the RAF’s defensive network, its highlights a lack of decisiveness from German leadership.[12] Throughout the battle various targets were chosen such as; defeating Fighter Command and its airfields, destroying the air industry, breaking the will of the people by bombing cities, meanwhile achieving air superiority to enable the naval invasion. As no clear strategy is evident it can be argued that Goring and the German High Command never identified a centre of gravity that would bring about their operational end state.

German Air Power Strategy conducted by officers with little practical experience of air ops.

They felt Luftwaffe should be used to support Army/ Navy- not conduct a war, therefore no strategic air campaign that didn’t involve supporting other services

German intelligence in the Battle of Britain was characterised with disorganisation, rivalry among its differing services and inefficiency. The cause of this was largely down to the Nazi political system itself, with the relevant intelligence agencies often embellishing reports to gain favour with their commanders to develop their personal careers.[13] Furthermore, any valuable information was often wasted due to lack of collaboration. The result of this had a direct impact on the Battle of Britain as the RAF’s key strategic strengths, such as the IADS or the fighter production industry were largely undervalued and overlooked.[14] Prior to the battle, Josef Schmid, head of Luftwaffe intelligence, was tasked with producing a report on the RAF and Britain’s aerial warfighting capabilities. In his report he completely underestimated the RAF, miscalculating their available fighters while stating that the Luftwaffe is superior in every way including their aircraft and commanders.[15] Consequently, the German High Command were confident of a swift conquest over Fighter Command and the wider RAF. The report also furthered Goring’s impeccable confidence in the Luftwaffe and he felt so assured he went onto claim that Fighter Command could be defeated in four days and the wider RAF within a month.[16] As this clearly wasn’t the case it highlights the importance of a clear intelligence picture. The Luftwaffe never managed to achieve this and as a result suffered from a fatal over-confidence in their own strengths and abilities.

To have any chance of avoiding defeat, Fighter Command always needed the maximum number of aircraft available for operation. Therefore, it was aircraft production and repairs that would contribute significantly. This was evident in the RAF pre-war planning on wastage, with the research from WW1 suggesting they could expect to suffer aircraft losses up to 50% per month.[17] As the results suggested, aircraft production was of critical importance if there was an to be an outbreak of war, leading to the introduction of the War Potential Programme to focus on aircraft production in 1938. Subsequently, British aircraft production for 1940, during the Battle of Britain, was 4,283, while the German output was 3,000. [18] Moreover, in September, at the height of the battle, Britain still produced more than double of German single seat fighters. Aircraft maintenance, repairs and the ability to salvage downed planes would also be critical to fighter command sustaining operational ability. The introduction of the Civilian Repair Organization (CRO) in January 1940 was vital to aircraft repairs. During the battle the CRO would contribute a total of 40% of total repairs [19], ensuring production and maintenance would always outweigh losses. In comparison with the Germans, no such civilian system was in place. It was the out production of the German factories coupled with better maintenance programmes that would enable the RAF to outlast the Luftwaffe and sustain aircraft attrition rates.

Pilot numbers of both sides were to play a crucial role during the Battle of Britain. Fatigue and attrition rates were key elements which would directly impact fighter command through the battle. Following their intense three-week campaign over the various European air forces, the Luftwaffe pilots were beginning to suffer with combat weariness.[20] Furthermore, the RAF pilots that fought over France were awarded the time to recover in Scotland and the Midlands, while fighter command rotated the freshest squadrons to the South East. [21] This was a significant advantage for fighter command throughout the battle, allowing rest and recuperation away from the frontlines. Dowding enforced each pilot had a minimum 24 hours off per week.[22] It was a respite that was simply something that Luftwaffe pilots couldn’t attain. Additionally, Fighter Command also held home advantage, allowing pilots that were shot down over British skies and ejected safely, to return to active duty the following day. The Luftwaffe pilots had no such luxury, often facing death or becoming POWs for the remainder of the war, which gave Britain a major psychological advantage. [23] The number of operational pilots were vital to the sustainment of both sides throughout the course of the battle. Besides home advantage, the RAF were able to employ pilots from other nations such as US, Canada, South Africa and several others totalling almost 3000 additional pilots. [24] However, regardless of support from other nations and having home advantage, it would be the lack of a constant supply of pilots through training that would be Fighter Command’s greatest weakness; even though they were able to recruit and train more than the Luftwaffe. On September 1st, 1940 RAF pilot numbers were at the lowest, with a quarter of their entire pilot strength had been lost. [25]

In conclusion, this essay has highlighted several key aspects which support the notion that Fighter Command was never truly close to defeat. A critical cause of this was the failures in German high command which came from a complete lack of airpower strategy. This was coupled with a failure to define an operational end state from the outset. This was emphasised with the various change in tactical targets, such as airfields; to that of a strategic nature, such as attacking the will of the people when bombing cities. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was a tactical air force designed to support ground forces and therefore unprepared and lacking the capabilities to defeat Fight Command from the beginning. Additionally, their lack of intelligence of their enemies’ defences, capabilities and organisation resulted in a complete underestimation of the force they were facing; the German high command never had a situational awareness of the fight they were in. Therefore, their industries were not prepared for a war of attrition in the air and could not sustain such an offence. Furthermore, the RAF’s use of their technological advantages into a coherent defensive system and their employment of mission command was critical. It enabled Dowding complete control and manoeuvrability to defend Britain. Moreover, the concentrated production of fighter aircraft allowed Fighter Command to remain operational. Therefore, it was a totality of combined factors that ensured Fighter Command would not be defeated. The lack of competent leadership and little emphasis on intelligence resulted in the German not sufficiently equipped or organised to overcome a such well-prepared Fighter Command.


Barley, M. (2006), ‘Contributing to its Own Defeat: The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain’, Defence Studies, Vol 4, No 3, pp.387-411.

Boog, Horst (2008), ‘German Air Intelligence in the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol 5, No 2, pp.350-424.

Corum, James (1997), The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (US: University of Kansas Press).

Clark, Gregory (2014), Deflating British Radar Myths pf World War II (London: Lucknow Books).

Clausewitz, Carl von, ed. (2012), Principles of War (England: Dover Publications).

Clodfelter, Micheal (2002), Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures (McFarland & Co Inc; 2nd Revised edition).

Dempster, Derek & Derek Wood (2003), The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise Air Power, 1930-1949 (Pen & Sword, Barnsley).

Dye, Peter (2000), ‘Logistics and the Battle of Britain’ Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol 25, No 2, pp31-39.

Emmett, Peter (2002), ‘Silent Trackers: The Spectre of Passive Surveillance in the Information Age’, Air Power Review, Vol 5, No 2, pp.43-58.

Gray, Peter (2000), ‘The Battle of Britain’, Air Power Review, Vol 3, No 3, pp.15-30.

Higham, Robin DS (2012), Unflinching Zeal: The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May-October 1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press).

Holland, James (2010), The Battle of Britain: Five Months That Changed History, May-October 1940 (United States: Bantam Books).

Holland, James (2017), The Battle of Britain, (London: Ladybird Books).

Murray, Williamson (1999), War in the Air, 1914–1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Olsen, John (2010), A History if Air Warfare (United States: Potomac Books, Inc).

Overy, Richard, ed (2010), The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality (England: Penguin Books).

Smith, N. (1962), The Battle of Britain (London: Faber and Faber).

[1] Smith (1962), pp.22-24.

[2] Holland, James (2017), p.4.

[3] Olsen, John (2010), p.30.

[4] Overy, Richard (2010) p.42.

[5] Clausewitz, Carl von (2012). PAGE NUMBER

[6] Barley, M (2006), p.400.

[7] Barley, M (2006), pp.387-411.

[8] Smith (1962), pp.58.

[9] Murray, Williamson (1999), pp9-11.

[10] Clausewitz, Carl Von (2012), PAGE NUMBER

[11] Overy, Richard (2010), PAGE NUMBER

[12] Clark, Gregory (2014), PAGE NUMBER

[13] Boog, Horst (2008), pp.350-424.

[14] Boog, Horst (2008, p.405.

[15] Barley, M. (2006), pp.403-407.

[16] Gray, Peter (2000), pp.15-30.

[17] Emmett, Peter (2002), pp.43-58.

[18] Clodfelter, Michael (2002), p.490.

[19] Dye, Peter (2000), p.37.

[20] Murray, Williamson (1999), p.10.

[21] Murray, Williamson (1999), p.13.

[22] Dye, Peter (2000), PAGE NUMBER

[23] Dempster & Wood (2003), RESEARCH PAGES

[24] Dempster & Wood (2003), RESEARCH PAGES

[25] Clodfelter, Michael (2002), p.490.

How close did Fighter Command come to Defeat in the Battle of Britain

The Battle of Britain was an aerial campaign launched by the German Luftwaffe in summer 1940 to achieve air supremacy over Britain and potentially pave the way for a German invasion of the British Isles, ‘Operation Sealion’.[1] This essay will analyse how close Fighter Command came to defeat during the Battle of Britain. In order to answer this question, this essay will examine the following key points. Firstly, the effect the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had on the battle will be explored. Secondly, failures in German intelligence will be evaluated, focusing on the accuracy of the intelligence obtained and its subsequent utilisation by the Luftwaffe. German High Command’s inability to deliver an effective and consistent strategy will also be analysed.  Lastly, a comparison of attrition will be drawn, in order to assess the number of pilot losses, recoveries and aircraft production from both sides. Losing air superiority would have meant defeat for Fighter Command, as they would have been incapable of effectively defending Britain from the air. This essay will explain that Fighter Command did not come close to defeat during the Battle of Britain.

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Fighter Command had an advanced early warning system in the form of the IADS, developed under the leadership of Air Chief-Marshal Hugh Dowding (Commander of Fighter Command), who foresaw the importance of an integrated defensive network.[2] This air defence network connected the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and Radio Direction Finding (RDF) assets to ground operations and onward to air assets at sector level.[3] Fighter Command was divided up geographically into groups, in order to cover specified areas within Britain.[4] These sectors had an Air Officer Commanding appointed so that ‘mission command’ could be utilised to allow sectors to decide how best to deploy specified aircraft closest to, or more suitable for the battle, economising their resources.[5] This had a force multiplying effect and also meant no time would be wasted in making decisions from the top. RDF provided Fighter Command with the ability to determine the direction and strength of a raid before it arrived. This gave them vital time to react, allowing Fighter aircraft time to climb to a tactical height and minimise the disadvantage of their defensive position.[6] As a result, Britain did not have to waste valuable resources on unnecessary standing patrols and could appropriately portion its time and assets.[7] This also meant British pilots could rest but Luftwaffe pilots were expected to fly continuously, which would not have been sustainable for an extended battle.[8]  However, RDF was not without its faults. There was no capability for a ‘inward’ looking air picture which meant that when the Germans flew inland, they had to be monitored by other resources such as the ROC.[9] To counter this, IADS employed redundancy, utilising the other systems in its network to overcome these deficiencies. Initially Luftwaffe strategy was to destroy the fighter control system, including radar stations.[10] After targeting RDF early on, the Luftwaffe discovered the towers were hard to hit and damage long-term. In these cases, stations could be rapidly repaired, meaning it had little overall effect on Fighter Command’s capability. For heavily hit RDF stations that would take time to repair, the Royal Air Force (RAF) deployed mobile reserve equipment that could be moved into any area of the Chain Home system.[11] Had German Commanders realised how much of a role RDF would play in Fighter Command’s operations, stations may have been attacked more determinedly and this strategy would not have been abandoned.[12] The German failure to recognise the importance and accept the revolutionary technology of RDF was a significant strategic oversight, which would be a great influence on the outcome of the battle.[13]
Failing to realise the importance of IADS was one of several shortcomings in German intelligence which undermined the Luftwaffe’s plan to defeat Fighter Command. German intelligence was described as inefficient and disorganised, primarily because the intelligence agencies never collaborated.[14] Analysing German intelligence from the battle, it is clear to see that because of British defence preparations, the Luftwaffe’s morale began to suffer and impact negatively on their operations. The RAF was constantly misrepresented as a technologically and tactically incompetent force. This included poor estimates of serviceable aircraft, pilots and functioning airfields. This misinformation meant that Luftwaffe pilots were met with more fierce resistance than expected.[15]  The cycle of misinformation continued as Luftwaffe pilots inflated their reports of successes against the RAF. Estimates of losses of up to 50 percent of its fighters since August 1940, against a loss of 12 percent of German fighters, did not reflect the reality.[16] Some departments would only tell German commanders what they thought the Air Staff and the Luftwaffe’s Reich Marshal Herman Goering, would want to hear.[17] This led to German commanders making strategic decisions based on inaccurate information.
Luftwaffe strategy during the Battle would be directly affected by the consistent poor intelligence. Goering and Fuhrer Adolf Hitler had a divided aim and Hitler was beginning to grow impatient, conscious that winter was approaching, and the invasion would not be viable in adverse conditions.[18]  Goering, while ignorant of his forces’ position, promised Hitler that the Luftwaffe could destroy Fighter Command within four weeks.[19] Phase 2 of the Luftwaffe strategy was to destroy airfields and fighters on the ground.[20] Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle advocated the continued attacks on RAF airfields.[21] But this was at odds with Hilter and Goering, who ordered the shift in strategy to focus on British Cities,[22] which is believed to be in response to the bombings of Berlin and the misinformation that Britain was ‘on its knees’. This, along with the inaccurate intelligence that the ‘last’ of Fighter Command’s aircraft would get sucked in to attacks over London aided the decision to be made hastily. [23] This added to tensions and frustration in the Luftwaffe’s leadership and allowed Fighter Command time to repair damaged airfields and fighters. This shift was described by Luftwaffe pilot Adolf Galland as ‘perhaps the greatest mistake Goering would make during the war’.[24] Goering’s inability to deliver an effective and consistent strategy in combat, left his subordinates frustrated and confused, while senior Luftwaffe Commanders Albert Kesselring and Sperrle ‘literally did not know what they were doing’ when attempting to interpret the strategic objectives of their High Command.[25] It is debated that, had the attacks on airfields continued, this could have led to the defeat of Fighter Command as at this point the RAF was under severe pressure. Nonetheless, essential Fighter Command sector stations remained at, or swiftly returned to operational status.[26] Also, sectors that were being attacked heavily had the option to order the retreat of resources in land, where range would severely limit the Luftwaffe.[27] Extra protection from other groups could be requested had they needed more coping strategies. In these cases, any serious damage was largely attributed to attacks by the Ju-87 Stuka, or low-level raids. However, such tactical operations and specialist aircraft were withdrawn from the campaign due to their high attrition rate.[28] Therefore, it is unlikely that the Luftwaffe would have been able to carry out and sustain attacks on such a large scale if they had continued. The leadership’s continuing shift in strategy, meant that they were not able to fully complete a strategic phase and therefore were never in a position to decisively defeat Fighter Command.
On examining both the Luftwaffe and Fighter Command’s abilities to wage campaigns of attrition, it is evident that the Luftwaffe remained deficient in both the material and personnel needed to sustain an extended campaign. The Luftwaffe had enjoyed substantial success in the Polish and French campaigns, building an air of complacency throughout the ranks. In the months preceding the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe was largely inactive. There was an inadequate effort to replace the 1,667 aircraft lost in the French Campaign, as its bomber force fell to just 841 aircraft by late June 1940, far below what would be considered an effective force.[29] In 1940, Britain was outproducing Germany by 40 percent, which continued to rise over the following years.[30] During the campaign, the Luftwaffe lost almost twice as many aircraft as the RAF.[31] Crucially, Britain’s supply chain simply outclassed Germany’s by producing two aircraft for every one manufactured by German industry. This was due to the Shadow Factories and Civilian Repair Organisations (CRO) employed to counteract the military shortcomings in manpower and help spread out industry, making it harder to target.[32] Despite the persistent campaign waged, there was never a shortage of aircraft,[33] however, Fighter Command suffered from a shortage of man-power in the early stages of the Campaign. Through necessity and adaptation, Fighter Command turned to aircrew from overseas, including the experienced pilots of Poland and Czechoslovakia, who relieved the burden long enough for training to adequately meet frontline demands.[34] The Luftwaffe did not duplicate such a solution which is significant because they needed to replace lost or captured crews over enemy territory. However, RAF crews, if uninjured, could return to their squadron as they were fighting over Britain.[35] Throughout the conflict, the Luftwaffe lacked foresight in planning to resolve these deficits. They entered the campaign to deliver a short, sharp and fatal blow to Fighter Command and break British resistance, but Fighter Command developed a sustainable long-term plan capable of enduring an extended campaign of attrition.[36] Fighter Command never came close to defeat with respect to attrition, as the RAF ended the battle with more operational pilots and aircraft than the Luftwaffe.[37]
In conclusion, these main arguments reveal that the Luftwaffe failed to comprehend the revolutionary IADS technology, and its importance to Fighter Command. It allowed Fighter Command to deploy its resources economically, therefore was ‘force multiplying’ and removed the Luftwaffe’s element of surprise. Further to this, the Luftwaffe was continually fed inaccurate and exaggerated intelligence to such an extent that its aircrews had become a victim of German propaganda. This inevitably shattered German morale when a lack of progress was evident and inaccurate intelligence fuelled questionable decisions made by the German High Command. As the campaign progressed, the initiative slipped from the Luftwaffe’s grasp as it grew desperate, stumbling from one strategic objective to another, hoping to find the knockout blow in the process. The crucial switch from bombing airfields to cities was another mistake in Luftwaffe strategy. Nevertheless, even if they had continued bombing, Fighter Command relied on many redundancies and would have survived through their proven innovation. The Luftwaffe had not come decisively close to achieving destruction of its adversary, and with every passing week, Fighter Command remained able to function. It grew stronger in resources towards the Battle’s closure, no doubt due to its ability to absorb a campaign of attrition better than the Luftwaffe. Britain outproduced Germany with the support of CRO, Shadow Factories and drafted in pilots from the Commonwealth to counter the loss of experience. At best, the Luftwaffe had tested Fighter Command, but at a strategic level, it had only maintained the status quo prior to the start of hostilities. The Luftwaffe was by no means any closer to destroying Fighter Command. Instead, it had left them battle hardened, confident and more resource-rich than it had begun. Ultimately, these key points show that Fighter Command did not come close to defeat during the Battle of Britain.

Bungay, Stephen (2001), The Most Dangerous Enemy – A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum press).
Clayton, Tim & Craig, Phil (2001), Finest Hour (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
Didly, Douglas (2018), Battle of Britain 1940: The Luftwaffe’s ‘Eagle Attack’ (Oxford: Osprey).
Holland, James (2010), The Battle of Britain, The RUSI Journal, 155:4, pp.70-75.
Ledwidge, Frank (2018), Aerial Warfare – The Battle for the Skies (New York: Oxford University Press).
Olsen, John Andreas (2010), A history of air warfare (Dulles: Potomac Books, Inc).
Overy, Richard (2010), ‘The Air War in Europe, 1939-1945’ in John Andreas Olsen, ed., A History of Warfare (Dulles: Potomac Books Inc.). pp.30-33.
Overy, Richard (2004), The Battle of Britain (London: Penguin Books).
Price, Alfred (1990), Battle of Britain (London: Arms & Armour Press).
Shields, John (2015), ‘A Not So Narrow Margin’, Air Power Review, Battle of Britain Edition, pp.182 – 184.
Terraine, John (2010), The Right of the Line – The Role of the RAF in World War Two (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military).
Williamson, Gordon (2006), German Commanders of World War II (2): Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe & Navy (Oxford: Osprey Publishing).
Wood, Derek & Derek Dempster (2010), The Narrow Margin – The Battle of Britain & The Rise of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation).


Overy (2004), p.27.
Shields (2015), p.85.
Dildy (2018), pp.24-25.
Clayton & Craig (2001), p.197.
Bungay (2001), pp.62-63.
Clayton & Craig (2001), pp.198-199.
Shields (2015), p.185.
Holland (2010), p.74.
Ibid., p.186.
Price (1990), p.93.
Ibid., p.94.
Overy (2004), p.72.
Shields, (2015), P.185.
Wood & Dempster (2010), p.41.
Overy (2004), p.116.
Ibid., p.72.
Wood & Dempster (2010), p.43.
‘THE AIR WAR:1’, The Sunday Times magazine, 30 May 1965.
Terraine (2010), pp.172-173.
Price (1990), p.93.
Williamson (2006), p.45.
Olsen (2009), p.32.
Overy (2004), p.78.
Ledwidge (2018), p.71.
Bungay (2001), p.236.
Price (1990), p.93.
Shields (2015), p.191.
Bungay (2001), p.236.
Terraine (2010), p.171.
Bungay (2001), p.94.
Overy (2004), p.116.
Bungay (2001), p.95. Wood & Dempster (2010), p.103.
Ledwidge (2018), p.69.
Bungay (2001), p.201.
Ledwidge (2018), p.70.
Overy (2004), p.148.