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a) Leibniz finds critical flaws in Descartes’ and the Occasionalist views of the mind-body union:“[–] on my view, we should not worry about how the soul1 can give some motion or some new determination to animal spirits2, since, in fact, it never them any at all, insofar as there is no proportion between mind and body, and there is nothing that can determine what degree of speed a mind can give a body, nor even what degree of speed God would want to give to a body on the occasion of the action of the mind in accordance with a certain law. The same difficulty found in the hypothesis of a real influence of soul on body, and vice versa, is also found in the hypothesis of occasional causes, insofar as we can see no connection nor can we see a foundation for any rule.” (p.83, Letter to Arnauld, April 30, 1687)Explain (on the basis of the above) why Leibniz thinks that Descartes’ and the Occasionalist views of the mind-body union, respectively, should be rejected.b) In which ways does Leibniz’s new theory of the soul and its union with the body attempt to evade the problems inherent in the above views?INFO- Do not include an introduction or a conclusion.Go quickly to the main point.Introduce concisely the concepts that are necessary for the reader to understand your answer.The questions test your understanding of the concepts.Explain things in your own words.Use examples when they are helpful to get the point across.A concise and clear answer is usually better than a long and sprawling answer that tries to hit all the possible details.Some of the questions also ask you to apply the concepts and reflect on their relations to other concepts.Some of the questions are open-ended and involve critical thinking which means that they are evaluated by the quality of your answer, not just by its factual correctness.
New System of Nature, Letter to Arnauld 1687
Early Modern Conception of the Mind
One way to get to the problem is to start from defining
characteristics of mental activity:
Early Moderns (a la Descartes) largely thought that the mind’s
central function is to think, to cognize. Everything else is
relative to that.
Perception, will, decision, conception … (= thoughts)
What unites these is that there is some intelligent capacity for
considering truth and falsity of thoughts. Thoughts are
attempts to capture truth, that is, express something about
what things are.
For example, when I think that my room is messy, my thought
expresses something that is separate from that thought itself.
Now, consider the causal relations into which thoughts enter:
Thoughts are influenced by other thoughts, because thinking
is driven by the function of trying to express the truths about
the world.
Example: my thought that the room is messy is influenced by
my thought that there is a sock on the floor.
Early Modern Version of the Mind-Body problem
Part 1: Causal relations in the mind
The
sensation of
thirst in my
throat
My decision to
grab a beer
from the fridge
Memory of
cold beer on
a hot day
Anticipation
that my arm
will grab the
beer
What characterizes these causal arrows?
They are relations of truth and representation, even if we
didn’t consciously and explicitly reason through these steps.
I decided to grab a beer because I felt the sensation of
thirst and remembered past experiences of drinking a beer.
I anticipate my arm to rise because I just decided to grab a
beer.
Early Modern Version of the Mind-Body problem
Part 2: Bodily causal relations
Neural
stimulation in
the body
Brain’s
determination to
act
Muscle activity
of moving the
arm
Image saved in
the brain
In this diagram, the order of the arrows are isomorphic to the
ones in the mind diagram.
Leibniz calls this isomorphism “parallelism” because one
could place the series of bodily causes parallel (not
intersecting) to the time series of mental causes.
What should be noted here is that the nature of causal
arrows here is different from the mind diagram:
The relations involve physical influence, such as force.
Physical determination is “blind”: it involves no regard for
truth and expresses nothing outside itself. There is no
thought in physical determination that renders it capable of
determining.
The statement of the mind-body problem
The mental and physiological activities and their
relations are fundamentally different in kind.
For that reason, we should think of the mind and body as
two things differing in their nature.
The conclusion:
They are in some ways distinct because two things
differing in nature cannot be the same thing.
Follow-up questions
Does this mean that the mind and body are two distinct
substances?
>>> Two things different natures seem to be
independent of one another which means they are
substances.
How are these two things (substances or not) united to
one another?
>>>> What is it that constitutes the special nature that
human being consists both of a mind and body in one
entity?
How do these two things (substances or not)
communicate with, or influence, one another? Does
that even make sense?
Critique of Descartes’ Solution
The mind feels pain because the mind is united to the
human body.
The nature of that union enables that the human body (and
no other body) can communicate a kind of a message
about its state to the mind. This message amounts to a
certain kind of influence.
The mind can do the same to the body when it wills
something (e.g. deciding to grab a beer).
Problems concerning this solution:
Interaction problem: What is the nature of the influence
that takes place between these two things?
Union problem: How can two fundamentally different things
even communicate with one another in an intelligible way?
>>The mind is responsive to representations, the body is
responsive to physical forces, energy.
Metaphysical problem: Does it make sense to think that
the mind is a substance acting in principle independently of
the human body (including the brain)?
>>Possibility of divergence of mind’s activity from the body’s
activity
Critique of Occasionalist Solutions (Malebranche et al.)
The critical failure of Descartes’ view consisted in that it
posited a union between two substances without rendering it
intelligible what the nature and operation of that union is.
As a natural consequence, certain followers of Descartes
turned to the notion of God as an explanatory ground.
Occasionalism == A mental decision is synchronized with a
suitable bodily event (such as neural signal to lift the arm)
due to God’s decree for that causal occasion.
This is very similar to the notion of orchestration that I kept
talking about in the lecture about “On Nature Itself”.
Leibniz’s solution
1) Substances as worlds unto themselves
All truths about the global object (the world) are
contained in the nature of the substance in a latent way.
“Latent” means something like rational or logical ground.
The nature of every individual substance hold the
grounds of establish the truth for everything that has
happened, happens and will happen in the universe.
In this sense, every substance is representationally or
informationally complete.
Why this solution?
>> There is no need to solve the question of how two
distinct substances (mental and bodily) can
communicate with one another.
Every substance speaks the language of the physical
world through its internal “programming”.
2) Each substance latently expresses the same
Universe with infinite detail.
Each substance is complete and independent.
This expression is about parsing information that the
substance already contains.
It is fairly obvious that Leibniz cannot say that each
substance knows everything that goes on in the universe.
The key to understanding his idea is that each substance
latently represents what happens in the universe but
understands and discerns only a small fraction of what
is happening there.
3) Each substance is a point of view
It perceives things only in relation to a particular body
and its biological functions.
The human body is in Leibniz’s view a living (organic)
mirror through which the soul/substance represents
everything that happens.
The point of view of the substance is focused most
saliently and constitutively to one physical entity, the
human body.
4) Substances are “united” together insofar as they
represent the same Universe, a shared object of
perception.
The substances are capable of acting on one another
insofar as the shared global object has to accommodate
the nature of each substance.
5) Each substance also acts by striving towards what
it perceives to be the best for it
Because each substance perceives most saliently a
particular body, there is a natural agenda that is internal to
each substance.
If a substance perceives primarily Antti’s body, then it is
most saliently perceiving the sensations and biological
tendencies that occur in Antti’s body.
In that way, we can say that substance is Antti even
though it expresses everything.
6) Action-perception “loop”
The idea is this striving of substances is the cause of their
next perception.
A perception is the cause of the next striving.
For example, my anticipated perception of the arm
movement happens because I strove to grab a beer from
the fridge.
New System of Nature, Letter to Arnauld 1687
Mind-body union
Concepts of striving and perception
Concept of unity
Concept of reason
Leibniz’s aim: Can we have a system of metaphysics in
which these concepts are the primary ones?
Leibniz is coming from the point of view that matter in itself
cannot be the ultimate ground of being.
It cannot supply striving or perception. (See previous
lecture)
It cannot supply unity. (See lecture on On Nature Itself)
It cannot supply reason. (See lecture on Best of Possible
worlds)
Last time we saw that this scheme of placing thoughtful
activity “outside” matter produces the mind-body problem.
Leibniz thinks that his philosophical system is the best and
only solution to this problem.
Leibniz’s solution: Pre-established harmony among
substances
1) Substances as worlds unto themselves
All truths about the global object (the world) are
contained in the nature of the substance in a latent way.
“Latent” means something like rational or logical ground.
The nature of every individual substance hold the
grounds of establish the truth for everything that has
happened, happens and will happen in the universe.
In this sense, every substance is representationally or
informationally complete.
Why this solution?
>> There is no need to solve the question of how two
distinct substances (mental and bodily) can
communicate with one another.
Every substance speaks the language of the physical
world through its internal “programming”.
2) Each substance is a point of view on
the global object
The global object
The order of all
truths
Individual
substances are
points of views on
the same, shared
world object
What is a point of view?
As you can see from the simple diagram above, a point
of view is in part a concept involving a negation. To
perceive something from a point of view, is to perceive
something partially, in relation to a particular stand
point.
Leibniz emphasizes that substances are souls that
observe and act on the world object, but they do not
consist of an actual visual or geometrical perspective.
He talks about them being “metaphysical points”, not
physical.
The idea is that each substance is individual (and thus
distinct from others) insofar it inhabits a share of the
global object.
But because the substances are beyond the material world
(to avoid the communication problem between independent
substances), they cannot inhabit the world as physical
pieces of matter would.
So, how does Leibniz work around this problem?
The idea is instead that each substance has a
representational/perceptual access to the world in a partial
way.
Each substance comprehends the world only to a degree.
This comprehension is relativized to a particular physical
entity, your body. The soul perceives most clearly those
changes that take place in its body and through those
changes it perceives the physical objects that act on the
body.
3) Unconscious vs conscious
Because substance is independent of others, it has to
express the whole global object.
If it didn’t, then there would be no way in which the
various substances would be interacting with the same
world.
Whenever a substance strives or perceives, it interfaces with
truths that it already contains.
Leibniz cannot say that each substance knows everything
that goes on in the universe.
Instead, he thinks that only what is perceived clearly and
distinctly is known in the ordinary sense of the word.
All these infinite details are latently present in the substance
as unconscious representations: something that is perceived
but not comprehended.
Later on, Leibniz calls these unconscious perceptions petites
perceptions (little perceptions).
4) The world is a collaborative project of striving for
individual substances
The concept of striving made an appearance in at least two
past lectures.
This is the key concept in understanding Leibniz’s theory of
substances and his solution to the mind-body problem. ‘
Each substance strives to bring about what appears to be the
best for them.
The best thing is not an individual physical thing, but a new
perception of what the world is.
Each substance strives to bring about a new state of the
world that is more perfect (more real).
5) Perception-action cycle
noumenon
The
sensation of
thirst in my
throat
My decision to
grab a beer
from the fridge
Anticipation
that my arm
will grab the
beer
Striving
Perception
Memory of
cold beer on
a hot day
Perception
Perception
of
prevailing
facts
Neural
stimulation in
the body
Striving
to
change
the
state of
the
world
Brain’s
determination to
act
Perce
ption
Muscle activity
of moving the
arm
Image saved in
the brain
phenomenon
The idea is that the physical world ultimately exists as an
object of perception in these individual substances.
Is Leibniz then a subjective idealist in the sense that
minds can create things at will?
No.
His idea is that the perceptions that each substance faces
are the only realities to which it can and must respond.
So, insofar as the substance perceives a living body most
saliently, its striving is conditioned to perceived biological
tendencies and realities (animal desires).
Leibniz’s notion of “perception” is more basic and
metaphysically fundamental than mere visual
perception: If I see something in the ordinary sense, I don’t
have to take it to be something onto which I build my
desires.
For Leibniz, perception constitutes the represented
range of options and possibilities concerning the
world which the substance can strive to make
true.
For example, in the above scenario the physical
tendency to grabbing a beer is a possibility that
appears to be the best given the immediate past
perceptions of the world.
I’m perceiving the body most saliently and through it,
I’m perceiving thirst and memories of past delights
involving quenching my thirst.
Against that background, the immediate future
possibility of going to grab a beer appears to be the
best one.
Next: Freedom and contingency
You might have noticed by now that there is a connection
between the notions of a possible world and the
individual substances as points of view.
An individual substance is a possible being that strives to
bring about perceptions that themselves are possibilities.
The world itself is a possible being that consists of all
possibilities accommodated together.
It is a collaborative project of individual strivings that must
accommodate each other into a singular, coherent
possibility.
The world is optimized, or the best of all possibles,
because it best suits the constraints of accommodating
the best all the individual agendas of finite things.
It is here where Leibniz locates the notion of freedom:
Every substance is free because it has a range of
possible actions that it perceives.
But only one of those actions is the best in the sense
that it meets the agenda of the individual while also
accommodating the perceived actions of others.
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