Rules of Statutory Interpretation

In R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health (2003), Justice Maurice Kay stated that:

‘‘the basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. [However] the court’s task within the permissible bounds of interpretation is to [also] give effect to parliament’s purpose’’ 

I agree with the statement by Justice Maurice Kay above. In supporting the position taken by Justice Maurice Kay, I’ll proceed and discuss the rules of statutory interpretation and instances where the said rules have come to play.

Rules of Statutory Interpretation

Rules of statutory interpretation can be said to refer to or to include legal concepts and principles that give meaning to words and expressions used in a statute. Courts have over time referred to these rules when faced with a question on the interpretation of a statute. They are also referred to as canons of interpretation or construction rules. The main purpose of these rules is to clarify and explain the meaning of a statute so as to aid understandability. There are three major rules of statutory interpretation. They include;

• The literal rule,
• The golden rule; and
• The mischief rule.

Other than the above major rules of statutory interpretation, courts have developed other rules such as the purposive approach.

The Literal Rule

 This rule of statutory interpretation is to the effect that when a court of law is faced with a question of interpretation of a statute or legislation, the court is required to interpret it in such a way that gives the words used in statute their ordinary meaning and to apply the said common and ordinary meaning to the circumstances and facts before them. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words in this rule of statutory interpretation is aimed at respecting the will of the legislature.

Literal rule of statutory interpretation has been applied by courts in a myriad of cases such as Fisher v Bell where the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 had criminalized the sale of certain types of offensive weapons such as flick knives. James Bell, who was a Bristol shopkeeper, had put on display a certain weapon considered offensive in his shop window. It was held by the Divisional Court that James Bell could not be convicted of displaying the weapon  by employing the use of literal rule of statutory interpretation. The court stated that the weapon had not been offered for sale. The display only amounted to an invitation to treat under the principles off contract law. The court stated that:

The Literal Rule

‘‘the court having discovered the supposed intention of 32 Part 1 Sources of law Parliament must proceed to fill in the gaps – what the Legislature has not written the court must write – and in answer to that contention Lord Simonds in his speech said ([1952] AC 189, 191): ‘It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation.’’ 

In Literal rule therefore, the court looks at what the statute says rather than what the words used in the statute mean or it might mean when looked at carefully. In achieving this objective, the courts strive to give the words their ordinary everyday plain meaning even if such interpretation produces an outcome that is undesirable or unjust.  The literal rule is to the effect that the intention of the legislature can be discerned from the natural, plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Lord Diplock once noted:

“Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not then for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.” 

The golden rule

This rule is derived from the literal rule. It is a modification or an extension of the literal rule. It is to the effect that if the literal rule in its interpretation produces an absurdity, then the judge should interpret the words in a manner that cures such absurdity. The golden rule was defined by Lord Wensleydale in the case of Grey v Pearson where he stated that:

“The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.” 

This rule of statutory interpretation was applied in Alder v Georgeso as to avoid any absurdity. Under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920, it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces in a prohibited place. Mr. Frank Adler had been arrested while obstructing the said forces. He made an argument that he was not within the vicinity of a prohibited place and that he was actually right within a prohibited place. In making a decision, the court applied the golden rule and extended the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation of the statute to include and cover the actions of Mr. Frank Adler. In case the literal meaning of the statute could have been applied, it would have created an absurdity since an individual near the base would be found to be committing an offence while a person inside the base would not have committed an offence.

The Golden Rule

The golden rule is applied on a case to case basis and based on the unique circumstances of each case. The rule is mainly applied in situations so as to avoid absurdity, there is no test available to ascertain or define an absurdity. It only refers to absurdities which parliament did not intend and as a result, tries to avert any absurdity in statutory interpretation.

The Mischief Rule

This rule of statutory interpretation was developed and stated in the case of Heydon. It gives a lot of discretion to the court as compared to the literal and golden rules of statutory interpretation. The court is required under this rule to interrogate the original position of the law before the statute under consideration was made law. This enables the court to understand the lacuna that existed in such law and which the statute was passed in order to cure. The court is then given the mandate to interpret the legislation in such a way that their interpretation covers the gap intended to be cured by the statute. In doing so, the court has to take the following factors into consideration:

1. What was the existing law before the said legislation was enacted
2. What defect or mischief which the existing law did not cover or provide for
3. What remedy has parliament put in place to ensure that the gap is filled
4. What is the aim of the remedy and as a result, the court would construct such legislation in a manner so as to cure the mischief and advance the remedy as intended by the legislature.

The court has discretion and during interpretation of the statute, it goes behind the wording of the legislation, and considers the lacuna or gap in the law that the legislation intends to cure or remedy. The mischief rule has been said to be a flexible rule of statutory interpretation. The only limitation it has is that it limits itself to the existing law prior to the enactment of the legislation under consideration, and what the current legislation intended to remedy.

An instance where the mischief rule has been applied is in the case of Corkery v Carpenter. Shane Corkery had been convicted and committed to a month’s imprisonment for the offence of being in control of a bicycle and in public while drunk. The charge was brought under the then section 12 of the Licensing Act of 1872 for being in charge of a carriage while drunk. The act however had not mentioned or referred to bicycles. In deciding the matter, the court applied the mischief rule; that the purpose of the act was to discourage people from using any form of transportation on a public highway when drunk so as not to endanger the lives of other road users. A bicycle being a form of public transportation fell within the interpretation of the statute and the court held that Mr. Shane was correctly charged in the circumstances.

The Mischief Rule

The Purposive approach to statutory interpretation

The first three rules of statutory interpretation are the common rules that courts have applied when faced with a question on the interpretation of statutes. Since this area is developing, courts have come up with other rules that enable them to effectively give both the meaning to the statute and the intention of parliament when it passed the said legislation it its form. In the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation, Lord Denning had this to say:

‘’we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment by opening it up to destructive analysis’’. 

Purposive approach therefore is intended to give effect to the purpose for which the legislation was passed. The court is task with ascertaining and giving effect to the true meaning to what parliament intended and has said in the statute to be interpreted and in doing so strive to give purpose for which the legislation was enacted. The provisions of the statute under consideration should therefore be read in within the context wholly and the statute read to conform with the situation, context, circumstances and purpose for its enactment. On this purposive approach to statutory interpretation Lord Wilberforce gave a guidance in his dissenting opinion in the case of Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security, a case brought under the Abortion Act of 1967on whether trained nurses had the right to get involved in a procedure leading to termination of a pregnancy that did not exist at the time when the act was enacted. Lord Wilberforce stated that:

‘’In interpreting an Act of Parliament it is proper, and indeed necessary, to have regard to the state of affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that Parliament’s policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs. Leaving aside cases of omission by inadvertence, this being not such a case, when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the Parliamentary intention…’’ 

In summary therefore, I agree with the statement of Justice Maurice Kay entirely when he stated that the court should strive to give true meaning to what parliament has said in the statute and also give effect to parliament’s purpose. The statement by Justice Maurice Kay therefore adopts a purposive approach to statutory interpretation where the statute to be interpreted is given effect and understanding of its true meaning, what parliament intended and has said in the statute to be interpreted and in doing so strive to give purpose for which the legislation was enacted.

The provisions of the statute under consideration should therefore be read in within the context wholly and the statute read to conform with the situation, context, circumstances and purpose for its enactment. Purposive approach to statutory interpretation can therefore be said to be more elaborate and advanced and is the current approach followed by courts when faced with a question on the interpretation of a statute. This is because it widens the interpretation and looks at the meaning as well as the purpose of the enactment.

Barak, Aharon. Purposive interpretation in law (Princeton University Press, 2011)

MacCormick, D. Neil, and Robert S. Summers interpreting statutes: a comparative study (Routledge, 2016)

Scalia, Antonin, and John F. Manning “A dialogue on statutory and constitutional interpretation” Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 80 (2011): 1610.

Manning, John F. “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation.” Harv. L. Rev. 124 (2010): 1939.

Ward, Richard, and Amanda Akhtar Walker & Walker’s English legal system (Oxford University Press, 2011)

Alcaraz, Enrique, and Brian Hughes Legal translation explained (Routledge, 2014)

Twining, William Law in context: enlarging a discipline. Vol. 315 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007)

Menski, Werner F. Comparative law in a global context: the legal systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

Fox, Marie, Christine Bell, and Simon F. Lee Learning legal skills (Blackstone Press, 2009)

Case Law

Fisher v Bell (1960), Divisional Court

Grey v Pearson (1857) HL Cas 61

Alder v George (1964)

Heydon (1584)

Corkery v Carpenter (1951)

Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security (1981) AC 800

Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation (1950)